X E N O P H O N

The Memorabilia of Xenophon

construed literally

and word for word

by

the Rev. Dr. Giles

London, J. Cornish & Sons

1867

664081

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA.

BOOK I.

I. *Πολλακις εθαυμασα* I have often wondered, *τισι ποτε λογοις* by what ever arguments *οἱ γραψαμενοι* those who indicted *Σωκρατην* Socrates *επεισαν* persuaded *Αθηναιους* the Athenians *ὡς* that *ειη* he was *αξιος* worthy *θανατου* of death *τῃ πολει* towards the state, *Ἡ μεν γαρ γραφη* for the indictment *κατ αυτου* was against him *ην τοιαδε* to this effect: "*Σωκρατης* Socrates *αδικει* is guilty *ου μεν νομιζων* not recognizing *θεους* as gods *οὑς* those which *ἡ πολις* the city *νομιζει* recognizes, *εισφερων δε* but introducing *καινα ἑτερα δαιμονια* other new deities: *αδικει δε* and he is guilty *και* also *διαφθειρων* corrupting *τους νεους* the young."

188791

2. *Πρωτον μεν ουν* first then *ποιῳ ποτε τεκμηρῳ* what ever proof *εχρησαντο* did they use *ὡς* that *ουκ ενομιζεν* he did not recognize *θεους* the gods *οὓς* which *ἡ πολις* the city *νομιζει* recognizes? *Ην τε γαρ* for he was both *φανερος* manifest *θυων* sacrificing *πολλακις μεν* often *οικοι* at home, *πολλακις δε* and often *επι των κοινων βωμων* on the common altars *της πολεως* of the city, *και* and *ην* he was *ὁυκ αφανης χρωμενος* not unknown to use *μαντικῃ* augury: *διετεθρυλητο γαρ* for it had been talked about *ὡς* that *Σωκρατης* Socrates *φαιη* said *το δαιμονιον* that the deity *σημαινειν* made communications *ἑαυτῳ* to himself: *ὁθεν δη* from which cause indeed *και* also *μαλιστα* most of all *δοκουσι* they seem *μοι* to me *αιτιασασθαι* to have accused *αυτον* him *εισφερειν* of introducing *καινα δαιμονια* new deities. 3. *Ὁ δε* but he *εισεφερεν* introduced *ουδεν* nothing *καινοτερον* more novel *των αλλων* than the others *ὁσοι* as many as *νομιζοντες* practising *μαντικην* augury *χρωνται* employ *οιωνοις τε* both omens *και φημαις* and voices *και συμβολοις* and meetings *και θυσιαις* and sacrifices. *Οὑτοι τε γαρ* for both these *ὑπολαμβανουσι* suppose *ου* not *τους ορνιθας* that the birds *ουδε* nor *τους απαντωντας* that those who meet them *ειδεναι* know *τα συμφεροντα* the things which are expedient *τοις μαντευομενοις* to those who consult, *αλλα* but *τους θεους* that the gods *σημαινειν* intimate *αυτα* them *δια τουτων* through he

agency of these κακεινος δε and he also ουτως ενομιζε thought so. 5. Αλλα but οἱ μεν πλειστοι most men φασι say αποτρεπεσθαι τε that they are both deterred και προτρεπεσθαι and encouraged ὑπο τε των ορνιθων both by birds και and των απαντωντων those [persons or things] which met them : Σωκρατης δε but Socrates, ὡσπερ as εγιγνωσκεν he believed, οὑτως so ελεγεν he spoke ; εφη γαρ for he said το δαιμονιον that the deity σημαινειν gave him intimations. Και and πολλοις to many των συνοντων of those who were with him προηγορευεν he foretold ποιειν to do τα μεν some things, τα δε and others μη ποιειν not to do, ὡς as του δαιμονιου προσημαινοντος the deity forewarning him. Και and τοις μεν πειθομενοις to those who listened αυτῳ to him συνεφερεν it was advantageous, τοις δε μη πειθομενοις but to those who listened not μετεμελε there was repentance. 5. Και τοι and yet τις who ουκ αν ὁμολογησειε would not acknowledge αυτον that he βουλεσθαι wished φαινεσθαι to appear μητε neither ηλιθιον foolish μητε nor αλαζονα arrogant τοις συνουσι to those who associated with him ? Εδοκει δ' αν but he would have seemed αμφοτερα ταυτα both these, ει if προαγορευων previously announcing things ὡς φαινομενα as shown him ὑπο θεου by the god εφαινετο he had appeared ψευδομενος speaking falsely. Δηλον οὐν it is manifest therefore ὁτι that ουκ αν προυλεγεν he would

not have foretold, *ει* if *μη επιστευεν* he had not believed *αληθευσειν* that he should speak the truth. *Τις δε* but who *πιστευσειεν αν* would trust *ταυτα* such things *αλλῳ* to any other *η θεῳ* than a god? *Πως δε* but how *πιστευων* trusting *θεοις* to gods *ουκ ενομιζε* did he not believe *ειναι* that there are *θεους* gods? *Αλλα μην* but indeed *εποιει* he did *και ταδε* this also *προς τους επιτηδειους* to his friends. *Συνεβουλευε γαρ* for he advised them *ποιειν* to do *τα μεν αναγκαια* necessary things, *ὡς* as *νομιζοιεν* they might think *πραχθηναι αν* that they would be done *αριστα* the best; *περι δε των αδηλων* but about things that were uncertain *ὁπως* how *αποβησοιτο* they would result, *πεμπειν* to send *μαντευσομενους* persons to consult the oracle, *ει* if *ποιητεα* they should be done. 7. *Και* and *εφη* he said *τους μελλοντας* that those who were preparing *καλως οικησειν* to manage well *οικους τε* both houses *και πολεις* and cities *προσδεισθαι* were in need *μαντικης* of divination: *γενεσθαι μεν γαρ* for that to become *τεκτονικον* skilled in carpentry *η* or *χαλκευτικον* a worker in brass *η* or *γεωργικον* in husbandry *η* or *ανθρωπον* a man *αρχικον* fit to govern *η οι εξεταστικον* critical *των τοιουτων εργων* in such arts *η* or *λογιστικον* skilled in reasoning *η* or *οικονομικον* a good economist *η* or *στρατηγικον* skilled in generalship, *παντα τα τοιαυτα* all such things *ενομιζεν* he thought *ειναι μαθητα* to be acquired by learning *και*

αιρετα and to be obtained γνωμῃ by the mind ανθρωπου of man: 8. εφη δε but he said θεους that the gods καταλειπεσθαι left ἑαυτοις to themselves τα μεγιστα the most important των of the points εν τουτοις on these subjects, ὡν of which [he said] ουδεν that none δηλοι ειναι was manifest τοις ανθρωποις to men. Ουτε γαρ for neither δηλον is it manifest τῳ φυτευσαμενῳ to one who has planted αγρον his land καλως well ὁστις who καρπωσεται shall reap the fruit, ουτε nor δηλον is it manifest τῳ οικοδομησαμενῳ to the man that has built οικιαν his house καλως well ὁστις who ενοικησει shall inhabit it, ουτε nor δηλον is it manifest τῳ στρατηγικῳ to him who is skilled in generalship ει whether συμφερει it is expedient for him στρατηγειν to be a general, ουτε nor δηλον is manifest τῳ πολιτικῳ to the politician ει whether συμφερει it is expedient for him προστατειν to take the lead της πολεως of the state, ουτε nor δηλον is it manifest τῳ γημαντι to him who has married καλην a handsome woman ἱνα that ευφραινηται he may be happy, ει whether ανιασεται he shall be happy [or not] δια ταυτην through her, ουτε nor δηλον is it manifest τῳ λαβοντι to him who has obtained κηδεστας connections δυνατους who are influential εν τῃ πολει in the state, ει whether στερησεται he shall [not] be expelled της πολεως from the state δια τουτους through them. 9. Εφη δε but he said τους οιομενους that those who thought

μηδεν that none των τοιουτων of such matter ειναι δαιμονικον had any thing to do with the deity αλλα but [were] παντα all της ανθρωπινης γνωμης matters of human judgement δαιμονᾳν were mad: και τους δε and that those also δαιμονᾳν were mad μαντευομενους who consulted the oracle ἁ on matters which οἱ θεοι the gods εδωκαν had given τοις ανθρωποις to men διακρινειν to decide μαθουσιν having learnt, οἱον as for instance ει if τις a man επερωτῳη were to ask ποτερον whether κρειττον it was better λαβειν to take επι ζευγος upon the box επισταμενον one who knew how ἡνιοχειν to drive η or μη επισταμενον one who did not know, η or ποτερον whether κρειττον it was better λαβειν to take επι την ναυν on board a ship επισταμενον one who knew how γυβερναν to steer η or μη επισταμενον one who knew not how, η or ἁ whatever things εξεστιν it is allowed us ειδεναι to know αριθμησαντας by counting η or μετρησαντας measuring η στησαντὰς or weighing, ἡγειτο he thought τους πυνθανομενους that those who enquired about τα τοιαυτα such things παρα των θεων from the gods ποιειν did αθεμιτα what was not right. Ἐφη δε but he said δειν that [men] ought μανθανειν to learn ἁ μεν the things which οἱ θεοι the gods εδωκαν have given them to do μαθοντας by learning, πειρασθαι δε but to try πυνθανεσθαι to find out δια μαντικης by means of divination παρα των θεων from the gods ἁ

the things which μη δηλα are not manifest τοις ανθρωποις to men: τους θεους γαρ for that the gods σημαινειν give intimations οις to those to whom ωσιν αν they happen to be ἱλεῳ propitious.

10. Αλλα μην but truly εκεινος γε he at least ην was αει μεν always εν τῳ φανερῳ before the public: πρωϊ τε γαρ for both early in the morning ῃει he went εις τους περιπατους into the walks και τα γυμνασια and the gymnasia και and πληθουσης αγορας when the market filled ην he was εκει there φανερος conspicuous, και and το λοιπον during the rest της ἡμερας of the day ην he was αει always ὁπου where μελλοι he was likely συνεσεσθαι to be in company πλειστοις with the greatest number: και and ελεγε μεν he was talking ὡς το πολυ for the most part, εξην δε and it was allowed τοις βουλομενοις those who chose ακουειν to hear. Ουδεις δε but no one πωποτε ever yet ουτε ειδε either saw Σωκρατους when Socrates πραττοντος was doing ουτ' ηκουσεν or heard him λεγοντος saying ουδεν any thing ασεβες impious ουδε ανοσιον or unholy. Ουδε γαρ for neither διελεγετο did he discourse περι της φυσεως about the nature των παντων of all things ἡπερ in the same way as οἱ πλειστοι most των αλλων of the others, σκοπων speculating ὁπως how ὁ κοσμος the world καλουμενος so called ὑπο των σοφιστων by the sophists εφυ was created και and τισιν αναγκαις by what necessities ἑκαστα the

several particulars *των ουρανιων* of the heavenly bodies *γιγνεται* are effected, *αλλα* but *και* also *απεδεικνυ* he showed *τους φροντιζοντας* that those who concerned themselves about *τα τοιαυτα* such things *μωραινοντας* are foolish. 12. *Και* and *πρωτον μεν* first indeed *αυτων* of them *εσκοπει* he considered *ποτερα* whether *ποτε* at any time *νομισαντες* thinking *ειδεναι* that they knew *τα ανθρωπεια* human affairs *ηδη* already *ἱκανως* enough *ερχονται* they come *επι το φροντιζειν* to take thought *περι τῶν τοιουτων* about such things, *η* or *ἡγουν-ται* they think *πραττειν* that they are doing *τα προσηκοντα* what they ought, *παρεντες μεν* neglecting *τα ανθρωπεια* human affairs, *σκοπουντες δε* and studying *τα δαιμονια* those which concern the deities. 13. *Εθαυμαζε δε* but he wondered *ει* if *μη φανερον εστιν* it is not manifest *αυτοις* to them *ὁτι* that *ου δυνατον εστιν* it is not possible *ανθρωπους* for men *εὑρειν* to find out *ταυτα* these things: *επει* since [it is certain] *και τους* that even those *φρονουντας μεγιστον* who pride themselves most *επι τῳ λεγειν* on speaking *περι τουτων* about these things *ου δοξαζειν τα αυτα* do not hold the same opinions *αλληλοις* with one another, *αλλα* but *διακεισθαι* are affected *προς αλληλους* towards one another *ὁμοιως* similarly *τοις μαινομενοις* to mad men. 14. *Των τε γαρ μαινομενων* for that both of mad men *τους μεν* some *δεδιεναι* fear *ουδε* not even *τα δεινα* those things that are fearful,

τους δε and others φοβεισθαι fear και even τα μη φοβερα things that are not fearful: και and τοις μεν that to some δοκειν it seems ειναι to be αισχρον disgraceful ουδε not even εν οχλῳ in a crowd λεγειν to say η or ποιειν to do ὁτιουν any thing whatever, τοις δε δοκειν but that others think ουδε εξιτητεον ειναι that they ought not to go out at all εις ανθρωπους among men: και and τους μεν that some τιμᾳν honour ουθ' ἱερον neither temple ουτε βωμον nor altar ουτε nor ουδεν αλλο any other των θειων of divine things, τους δε but that others σεβεσθαι worship και λιθους even stones και ξυλα τα τυχοντα and common logs of wood και θηρια and beasts, των τε μεριμνωντων and that of those who care περι της φυσεως about the nature των παντων of all things, τοις μεν to some δοκειν it seems το ον that what exists ειναι is ἑν μονον one only, τοις δε but to others απειρα [that things are] without limit το πληθος in number: και and τοις μεν that to some [it seems] παντα that all things αει κινεισθαι are always in motion, τοις δε but to others ουδεν that nothing ποτε αν κινηθηναι can ever move; και and τοις μεν that to some [it seems] παντα that all things γιγνεσθαι τε both are generated και απολλυσθαι and perish, τοις δε out to others ουδεν that nothing ποτε ever ουτε αν γενεσθαι can either be generated ουτε απολεσθαι or perish. 15. Εσκοπει δε but he enquired περι αυτων concerning them και

ταδε this also; Αρα whether, ὡσπερ as οἱ μάνθανοντες those who learn τα ανθρωπεια human affairs ἡγουνται think ποιησειν that they shall practise ὁ τι whatever μαθωσιν αν they may have learnt ἑαυτοις τε both for themselves και and ὁτῳ for whomsoever βουλωνται αν they may choose των αλλων of other men, οὑτω so και also οἱ those who ζητουντες enquire into τα θεια divine matters νομιζουσι think, επειδαν [that] when γνωσι they have found out αἰς αναγκαις by what necessary laws ἑκαστα those things severally γιγνεται are effected, ποιησειν they will produce, ὁταν when ever βουλωνται they wish, και ανεμους both winds και ὑδατα and rains και ὡρας aud seasons, και and ὁτου αλλου whatever other των τοιουτων of such things δεωνται they want, η or ουδε ελπιζουσι μεν do they not even hope ουδεν τοιουτον any such thing αρκει δε but it is enough αυτοις for them μονον only γνωναι to know ᾗ in what way ἑκαστα the several ones των τοιουτων of such things γιγνεται are effected. 16. Περι μεν συν concerning then των πραγματευομενων those who handle ταυτα these matters ελεγεν he said τοιαυτα such things: αυτος δε but himself αει always διελεγετο discoursed περι των ανθρωπινων about human affairs σκοπων enquiring τι what ευσεβες is holy, τι what ασεβες unholy, τι what καλον honourable, τι what αισχρον dishonourable, τι what δικαιον just, τι what σωφροσυνη is soundness of mind,

τι what μανια madness, τι what ανδρεια courage, τι what δειλια cowardice, τι what πολις a state, τι what πολιτικος a statesman, τι what αρχη the rule ανθρωπων of men, τι what αρχικος a ruler ανθρωπων of men, και and περι των αλλων about the other matters ἁ which ἡγειτο he deemed τους μεν ειδοτας those who know ειναι are καλους honourable και αγαθους and good, τους δε αγνοουντας but that those who do not know κεκλησθαι αν might be called δικαιως with justice ανδραποδωδεις men of a slavish disposition.

17. Ὁσα μεν ουν on whatever matters then μη φανερος ην he did not show ὁπως how εγινωσκεν he thought of them ουδεν θαυμαστον it is not at all wonderful τους δικαστας that the judges παραγνωναι judged wrongly περι αυτου about him ὑπερ τουτων on these matters: ὁσα δε but whatever things παντες all ηδεσαν knew, ου θαυμαστον is it not to be wondered at ει if μη ενεθυμηθησαν they did not take thought τουτων of these? 18. Βουλευσας γαρ for being a senator ποτε once και and ομοσας having sworn τον βουλευτικον ὁρκον the oath of a senator, εν ᾧ in which ην it was [laid down] βουλευσειν that he would counsel κατα τους νομους according to the laws, γενομενος having become επιστατης president εν τῳ δημῳ in the [assembly of the] people, του δημου επιθυμησαντος when the people desired αποκτειναι to put to death παρα τους νομους contrary to the laws μη

ψηφῳ by one vote παντας εννεα στρατηγους all the nine commanders τους αμφι Θρασυλλον with Thrasyllus και and Ερασινιδην Erasinides, ουκ ηθελησεν he was unwilling επιψηφισαι to put it to the vote, του μεν δημου though the people οργιζομενου were angry αυτῳ with him, πολλων δε and many και δυνατων and powerful men απειλουντων were threatening him: αλλα but εποιησατο he deemed it περι πλειονος of greater importance ενορκειν to observe his oath η than χαρισασθαι to gratify τῳ δημῳ the people παρα το δικαιον contrary to justice και and φυλαξασθαι to guard against τους απειλουντας those who threatened him. 19. Και γαρ ενομιζε for he also thought θεους that the gods επιμελεισθαι take notice ανθρωπων of men ου not ὁν τροπον in the same way as οἱ πολλοι most men νομιζουσι think: οὑτοι μεν γαρ for these οιονται think τους θεους that the gods ειδεναι know τα μεν some things, τα δε ουκ ειδεναι but do not know others. Σωκρατης δε but Socrates ἡγειτο thought θεους μεν that the gods ειδεναι know παντα all things τα τε λεγομενα both what is said και and πραττομενα what is done και and τα βουλευομενα what is meditated σιγῃ in silence, παρειναι δε and are present πανταχου everywhere και and σημαινειν give intimation τοις ανθρωποις to men περι των ανθρωπειων παντων about all things human.

20. Θαυμαζω ουν I therefore wonder ὁπως

ποτε however Αθηναιοι the Athenians επεισθησαν were persuaded Σωκρατη that Socrates μη σωφρονειν was not right-minded περι θεους about the gods τον μεν ουτε ειποντα ποτε who neither ever said ουτε πραξαντα nor did ουδεν any thing ασεβες unholy, και λεγοντα δε but both said και πραττοντα and did οἱα such things as τις a man και λεγων both saying και πραττων and doing ειη τε αν would both be και and νομιζοιτο be thought ευσεβεστατος most holy.

II. Φαινεται δε but it seems θαυμαστον wonderful μοι to me και also το τινας πεισθηναι that any were persuaded ὡς that Σωκρατης Socrates διεφθειρε corrupted τους νεους the young, ὁς who προς τοῖς ειρημενοις in addition to what has been said πρωτον μεν in the first place ην εγκρατεστατος had the greatest mastery παντων ανθρωπων of all men αφροδισιων over venereal pleasures και and γαστρος the appetite, ειτα and then καρτερικωτατος most patient προς χειμωνα against cold και θερος and heat και πάντας πονους and all kinds of toil, ετι δε and moreover ούτως πεπαιδευμενος so brought up προς το δεισθαι to have need μετριων of moderate things ὡστε that κεκτημενος though possessing πανυ μικρα very little, εχειν he held it πανυ ῥαδιως very easily αρκουντα as sufficient. 2. Πως ουν how then ων being αυτος himself

τοιαυτος such a man εποιησεν αν could he have made αλλους others η either ασεβεις unholy η or παρανομους lawless η or λιχνους luxurious η or ακρατεις incontinent αφροδισιων of venereal pleasures η or μαλακους effeminate προς το πονειν for labouring? Αλλα but επαυσε μεν he stopped men τουτων from these things, ποιησας making them επιθυμειν have the desire αρετης of virtue και and παρασχων furnishing ελπιδας hopes, αν [that] if επιμελωνται they took care ἑαυτων of themselves, εσεσθαι they would be καλους honourable και αγαθους and good. 3. Και τοι γε and indeed ουδεπωποτε ὑπεσχετο he never yet promised ειναι to be διδασκαλος a teacher τουτου of this, αλλα but τῳ φανερος ειναι by making it manifest ων τοιουτος that he was such a man εποιει he made τους those συνδιατριβοντας ἑαυτῳ who came in contact with him ελπιζειν hope γενησεσθαι that they would become τοιουτους such men μιμουμενους αυτον by imitating him.

4. Αλλα μην but however και του σωματος of the body also αυτος τε both himself ουκ ημελει was not neglectful ου τε επῃνει and he did not praise τους αμελουντας those who were neglectful. Απεδοκιμαζε μεν ουν he disapproved then το ὑπερπονειν that one should toil to excess ὑπερεσθιοντα whilst eating to excess, εδοκιμαζε δε but he approved το εκπονειν that one should work off ἱκανως sufficiently ταυτα that [food] ὁσα which ἡ ψυχη the system

δεχεται receives ἡδεως with pleasure. Εφη γαρ for he said ταυτην την ἑξιν that this habit ειναι τε both was ἱκανως ὑγιεινην sufficiently healthy και and ουκ εμποδιζειν does not hamper την επιμελειαν the proper care της ψυχης of the mind. 5. Αλλα μην but yet ουκ ην he was not θρυπτικος γε luxurious ουδε nor αλαζονικος boastful ουτε either αμπεχονῃ in his clothing ουτε or ὑποδεσει in his chaussure ουτε or τῃ αλλῃ διαιτῃ in the rest of his life. Ου μην ουδε neither indeed εποιει did he make τους συνοντας his associates ερασιχρηματους γε lovers of money. Επαυε μεν γαρ for he stopped them των αλλων επιθυμιων from other desires, ου δε επραττετο and did not exact χρηματα money τους επιθυμουντας from those who were desirous ἑαυτου of [the teaching of] himself. 6. Απεχομενος δε but abstaining τουτου from this ενομιζεν he thought επιμελεσθαι that he was taking care ελευθεριας of his freedom: απεκαλει δε and he called τους λαμβανοντας those who took μισθον pay της ὁμιλιας for their society ἀνδραποδιστας enslavers ἑαυτων of themselves, δια το ειναι on account of its being αναγκαιον necessary αυτοις for them διαλεγεσθαι to discourse παρ' ὡν with those from whom λαβοιεν they received τον μισθον the pay.

7. Εθαυμαζε δε but he wondered ει if τις any one επαγγελλομενος professing αρετην virtue πραττοιτο exacted αργυριον money και and μη νομιζοι did not think ἑξειν that he

would have μεγιστον κερδος the greatest gain κτησαμενος by acquiring φιλον αγαθον a good friend; αλλα but φοβοιτο feared μη lest ὁ γενομενος he who was become καλος honourable και αγαθος and good μη ἐξοι should not feel την μεγιστην χαριν the greatest gratitude τῳ ευεργετησαντι to him who had benefitted him τα μεγιστα in the greatest particulars. 8. Σωκρατης δε but Socrates επηγγειλατο μεν professed ουδενι to no one πωποτε ever yet τοιουτον ουδεν any such thing, επιστευε δε but trusted τους that those των συνοντων of those who associated ἑαυτῳ with himself αποδεξαμενους who received ἅπερ what αυτος he εδοκιμαζεν approved, εσεσθαι would be φιλους αγαθους good friends ἑαυτῳ τε both to himself και and αλληλοις to one another εις τον παντα βιον for the whole of life. Πως ουν how then ὁ τοιουτος αν ανηρ could such a man διαφθειροι corrupt τους νεους the young,—ει μη αρα unless indeed ἡ επιμελεια the study της αρετης of virtue εστιν is διαφθορα corruption?

9. "Αλλα but, νη Δια by Jove," εφη said ὁ κατηγορος the accuser, "εποιει he used to make τους συνοντας those who associated with him ὑπεροραν despise των καθεστωτων νομων the established laws, λεγων saying ὡς that ειη it was μωρον foolish καθισταναι μεν to appoint τους αρχοντας the rulers της πολεως of the state απο κυαμου by a bean [by voting], μηδενα δε but that no one εθελειν was willing

χρησθαι to employ κυβερνητῃ a pilot κναμευτῷ appointed by voting, μηδε nor τεκτονι an artisan, μηδε nor αυλητῃ a flute-player, μηδε nor επ' αλλα τοιαυτα for other such occupations ἁ which ἁμαρτανομενα if badly discharged ποιει cause πολλῳ ελαττονας βλαβας much less harm των ἁμαρτανομενων than errors committed περι την πολιν in the state:" εφη δε but he said τοιουτους λογους that such arguments επαιρειν excited τους νεους the young καταφρονειν to despise της καθεστωσης πολιτειας the existing form of government και and ποιειν made them βιαιους violent. 10. Εγω δε but I οιμαι think τους ασκουντας that those who cultivate φρονησιν wisdom και νομιζοντας and think ειναι that they are ἱκανους able διδασκειν to teach τους πολιτας the citizens τα συμφεροντα things to their advantage γιγνεσθαι become ἥκιστα by no means βιαιους violent ειδοτας knowing ὁτι that τῃ μεν βιᾳ to violence προσειναι are attached εχθραι enmities και κινδυνοι and dangers, δια δε του πειθειν but that through persuasion τα αυτα the same [results] γιγνεται are gained ακινδυνως τε both without danger και and μετα φιλιας with friendship. Οἱ μεν γαρ βιασθεντες for those who are treated violently μισουσιν hate you ὡς as if αφαιρεθεντες having had something taken away from them, οἱ δε πεισθεντες but those who have been persuaded φιλουσι love you ὡς as κεχαρισμενοι having been obliged. Το ουν

βιαζεσθαι to use violence therefore ουκ [is] not των ασκουντων [the part] of those who cultivate φρονησιν prudence, αλλα but το πραττειν to do τοιαυτα such things εστιν is [the conduct] των εχοντων of those who have ισχυν strength ανευ γνωμης without sense. 11. Αλλα μην but however και also ὁ μεν τολμων he who dares βιαζεσθαι to use force δεοιτο αν would have need συμμαχων ουκ ολιγων of no few allies, ὁ δε δυναμενος but he who is able πειθειν to persuade ουδενος [has need] of none; και γαρ μονος for even alone ἡγοιτο αν he would think δυνασθαι that he was able πειθειν to persuade. Και φονευειν δε but to put to death also ἡκιστα συμβαινει least of all happens τοις τοιουτοις to such men: τις γαρ for who βουλοιτο αν would wish αποκτειναι to kill τινα any one μαλλον rather η than χρησθαι to employ him ζωντι alive πειθομενῳ in obedience?"

12. "Αλλα but," εφη said ὁ κατηγορος the accuser, "Κριτιας τε both Critias και and Αλκιβιαδης Alcibiades γενομενω having become ὁμιλητα associates Σωκρατει γε with Socrates εποιησατην have done πλειστα κακα very many evils την πολιν to the city. Κριτιας μεν γαρ for Critias εγενετο was κλεπτιστατος τε both the most grasping και and βιαιοτατος most violent και and φονικωτατος most blood-thirsty παντων των of all the men εν τῃ ολιγαρχιᾳ in the oligarchy, Αλκιβιαδης δε but Alcibiades αυ on the other hand

ακρατεστατος τε both the most intemperate και and ὑβριστοτατος most arrogant και and βιαιοτατος most violent παντων των of all the men εν τῃ δημοκρατιᾳ in the democracy. 13. Εγω δε but I, ει μεν if εκεινω those two εποιησατην did κακον τι any harm την πολιν to the state, ουκ απολογησομαι will not defend it; διηγησομαι δε but I will explain την συνουσιαν the intimacy αυτοιν of them two προς Σωκρατη with Socrates, ὡς how εγενετο it arose. 14. Τω μεν γαρ ανδρε τουτω δη for these two men indeed εγενεσθην were φυσει by nature φιλοτιμοτατω the two most ambitious men παντων Αθηναιων of all the Athenians, βουλομενω τε and desirous παντα that all things πραττεσθαι should be done δι' ἑαυτων through them και and γενεσθαι to become ονομαστοτατω most famous παντων of all men. Ἠιδεσαν δε but they knew Σωκρατη that Socrates ζωντα lived αυταρκεστατα most independently απ' ελαχιστων μεν χρηματων from the smallest means, οντα δε and was εγκρατεστατον most continent πασων των ἡδονων in all pleasures, χρωμενον δε and used πασιν all τοις διαλεγομενοις who discoursed αυτῳ with him εν τοις λογοις in his arguments ὁπως as βουλοιτο he chose. 15. Ὁρωντε δε but seeing ταυτα this και and οντε being οἱω such as προειρησθον they have been before said, ποτερον whether φῃ τις can a man say αυτω that they επιθυμησαντε being desirous του βιου of [leading]

the life του Σωκρατους of Socrates και and της σωφροσυνης of the prudence ἡν which εκεινος he ειχεν had, ορεξασθαι desired της ὁμιλιας αυτου his society η or νομισαντε thinking, ει that if ὁμιλησαιτην they should associate ἑκεινῳ with him, γενεσθαι αν they would become ἱκανωτατω most able λεγειν τε both to speak και and πραττειν to act? 16. Εγω μεν γαρ for I ἡγουμαι think, θεου διδοντος that if the god gave αυτοιν to those two η either ζην to live ὁλον τον βιον their whole life ὡσπερ as ἑωρων they saw Σωκρατη Socrates ζωντα living η or τεθναναι to die, αυτω they two ἑλεσθαι αν would choose μαλλον rather τεθναναι to die. Δηλω δε εγενεσθην but they made it manifest in themselves εξ ὡν from the things which επραξατην they did: ὡς γαρ ταχιστα for as soon as ἡγησασθην they deemed ειναι that they were κρειττονε more powerful των συγγιγνομενων than those who were with them, ευθυς immediately αποπηδησαντε starting off Σωκρατους from Socrates επραττετην they transacted τα πολιτικα the political business ὡνπερ ἑνεκα on account of which ωρεχθητην Σωκρατους they sought after Socrates.

17. Ισως ουν perhaps then τις a man ειποι αν may say προς ταυτα in answer to this ὁτι that εχρην it was right Σωκρατη that Socrates μη διδασκειν should not teach τους συνοντας those who associated with him τα πολιτικα politics προτερον η before [he taught them]

σωφρονειν to be prudent. Εγω δε but I ουκ αντιλεγω μεν make no contradiction προς τουτο to this: ὁρω δε but I see παντας that all τους διδασκοντας who teach δεικνυντας τε both show αὐτους themselves τοις μανθανουσι to those who learn of them ᾗπερ in what way αυτοι themselves ποιουσι do ἅπερ what διδασκουσι they teach, και προσβιβαζοντας and gain them over τῳ λογῳ by discourse. 18. Οιδα δε and I know και Σωκρατη that Socrates also δεικνυντα showed ἑαυτον himself τοις συνουσι to those who were with him οντα as being καλον honourable και αγαθον and good και and διαλεγομενον discoursing καλλιστα most excellently περι αρετης about virtue και and των αλλων ανθρωπινων other human matters. Οιδα δε and I know και εκεινω that those two men also σωφρονουντε were prudent εστε whilst συνηστην they were in company Σωκρατει with Socrates, ου φοβουμενω not fearing μη lest ζημιοιντο they should be fined η παιοιντο or beaten ὑπο Σωκρατους by Socrates, αλλα but οιομενω thinking τοτε at that time ειναι that it was κρατιστον best πραττειν τουτο to do this.

19. Ισως ουν perhaps however πολλοι many των φασκοντων of those who say φιλοσοφειν that they are philosophers ειποιεν αν may say ὁτι that ὁ δικαιος the just man ουκ αν ποτε γενοιτο can never become αδικος unjust ουδε nor ὁ σωφρων the modest man ὑβριστης insolent, ουδε nor αλλο ουδεν in any other ὡν

[of those things] of which εστιν there is μαθησις the power of learning ὁ μαθων could the man who has learnt it γενοιτο αν ποτε ever become ανεπιστημων ignorant. Εγω δε but I ου γιγνωσκω do not think οἡτω so περι τουτων about these things: ὁρω γαρ for I see ὡσπερ [that] as τους μη ασκουντας those who do not exercise τα σωματα their bodies ου δυναμενους are not able ποιειν to do τα εργα the works του σωματος of the body, οὑτω so και also τους μη ασκουντας those who do not practise την ψυχην the mind ου δυναμενους are not able to do τα εργα the works της ψυχης of the mind: δυνανται γαρ for they are able ουτε neither πραττειν to do ἁ what δἐι they ought ουτε nor απεχεσθαι to abstain ὡν from what δει they ought. 20. Διο wherefore και also οἱ πατερες fathers ειργουσι restrain τους υἱεις their sons και αν even if ωσι they are σωφρονες prudent, ὁμως nevertheless απο των πονηρων ανθρωπων from bad men, ὡς as thinking την μεν ὁμιλιαν that the society των χρηστων of good men ουσαν is ασκησιν an exercise της αρετης of virtue, την δε but that των πονηρων of bad men καταλυσιν is its destruction. Και των δε ποιητων but of the poets also ὁ τε both he μαρτυρει bears me witness λεγων who says:

"Διδαξεαι μεν γαρ for you will be taught εσθλα good things απ' εσθλων from good men; ην δε but if συμμισγῃς you mingle κακοισι with bad men, απολεις you will lose

και even τον εοντα νοον the sense which you have."

και and ὁ λεγων he who says:

"Ανταρ but ανηρ αγαθος a good men τοτε μεν at one time κακος is bad, αλλοτε δε and at another time εσθλος good."

21. Και εγω δε but I also μαρτυρω bear witness τουτοις to them: ὁρω γαρ for I see ὡσπερ [that] as τους μη μελετωντας those who do not study των επων the epic verses πεποιημενων made εν μετρῳ in metre επιλανθανομενους forget them, οὑτω so και also ληθην forgetfulness εγγιγνομενην arises τοις αμελουσιν in those who are neglectful των διδασκαλικων λογων of didactic discourses. Ὁταν δε but when τις any one επιλαθηται has been forgetful των νουθετικων λογων of admonitory discourses, επιλελησται he has forgotten και also ὡν what ἡ ψυχη the mind πασχουσα feeling επεθυμει was desirous της σωφροσυνης of self-control: ουδεν δε θαυμαστον but it is not at all wonderful επιλαθομενον that one who has forgotten τουτων these things επιλαθεσθαι should be forgetful και της σωφροσυνης of self-control also. 26. Ὁρω δε but I see και τους that those also προαχθεντας who have been led on εις φιλοποσιαν to a love of drinking και and τους εκκυλισθεντας who have fallen εις ερωτας into loves ἡττον δυναμενους are less able επιμελεσθαι τε both to take care των δεοντων of what they ought και and απεχεσθαι to abstain των μη

δεοντων from what they ought not [to do]. Πολλοι γαρ for many και δυναμενοι who were also able φειδεσθαι to spare χρηματων their money πριν εραν before they were in love, ἐρασθεντες when they have fallen in love ουκετι δυνανται are no longer able: και and καταναλωσαντες having spent τα χρηματα their money ουκ απεχονται do not abstain τουτων κερδεων from those gains ὡν which απειχοντο they abstained from προσθεν before νομιζοντες thinking them ειναι αισχρα to be base. 23. Πως ουν how then ουκ ενδεχεται is it not possible σωφρονησαντα for a man who was prudent προσθεν before αυθις again μη σωφρονειν to become imprudent, και and δυνηθεντα who was able πραττειν to do δικαια acts of justice αυθις again αδυνατειν to be unable? Παντα μεν ουν all these things therefore τα καλα which are honourable και and τα αγαθα those which are good δοκει seem εμοιγε to me at least ειναι to be ασκητα capable of being cultivated σωφροσυνη δε and self-controul ουκ ἡκιστα not the least so. Εν γαρ τῳ αυτῳ σωματι for in the same body αἱ ἡδοναι pleasures συμπεφυτευμεναι implanted with τῃ ψυχῃ the soul πειθουσι persuade αυτην it μη σωφρονειν not to be moderate, αλλα but χαριζεσθαι to gratify ἑαυταις τε both themselves και and τῳ σωματι the body την ταχιστην the quickest way possible.

24. Και Κριτιας δη both Critias then και Αλκιβιαδης and Alcibiades, ἑως μεν whilst

συνηστην they were in company Σωκρατει with Socrates, εδυνασθην were able χρωμενω using εκεινῳ him συμμαχῳ as an ally κρατειν to have the mastery των επιθυμιων of their desires μη καλων which were not good, απαλλαγεντε δε but when separated εκεινου from him, Κριτιας μεν Critias on the one hand φυγων fleeing εις Θετταλιαν into Thessaly εκει there συνην associated ανθρωποις with men χρωμενοις who practised ανομιᾳ lawlessness μαλλον more η δικαιοσυνῃ than justice, Αλκιβιαδης δε but Alcibiades αυ on the other hand δια μεν καλλος on account of his beauty θηρωμενος being sought after ὑπο πολλων by many και σεμνων γυναικων and respectable women δια δε την δυναμιν and on account of his power την εν τῃ πολει in the state και and τοις συμμαχοις among the allies διαθρυπτομενος being corrupted ὑπο πολλων by many και δυνατων ανθρωπων and powerful men, τιμωμενος δε and being honoured ὑπο του δημου by the people, και and ῥᾳδιως without difficulty πρωτευων being a leading man, ὡσπερ in the same way as οἱ αθληται the athletes των γυμνικων αγωνων in the naked games ῥᾳδιως πρωτευοντες who easily gain the victory αμελουσι neglect της ασκησεως practising, οὑτω so και εκεινος he also ημελησε neglected αὑτου himself. 25. Τοιουτων δε but such things συμβαντων having happened αυτοιν to those two, και and ωγκωμενω μεν being puffed up επι γενει with their birth

επηρμενω δε and elevated επι πλουτῳ at their wealth, πεφυσημενω δε and swollen επι δυναμει with their political influence, διατεθρυμμενω δε and corrupted ὑπο πολλων ανθρωπων by many men, επι δε πασι τουτοις and in addition to all these things και also γεγονοτε having been πολυν χρονον a long time απο Σωκρατους away from Socrates, τι θαυμαστον what is there wonderful ει if εγενεσθην those two became ὑπερηφανω very haughty? 26. Ειτα and then, ει μεν if επλημμελησατην they transgressed τι in any thing, ὁ κατηγορος does the accuser αιτιαται blame Σωκρατη Socrates τουτου for this? ὁτι δε but because Σωκρατη Socrates παρεσχε made αυτω them σωφρονε prudent οντε νεω when they were young, ἡνικα when εικος it was likely ειναι for them to be και αγνωμονεστατω both most thoughtless και and ακρατεστατω most incontinent, δοκει does he seem τῳ κατηγορῳ to the accuser ειναι to be αξιος worthy ουδενος επαινου of no praise? 27. Τα γε αλλα μην other things however ου κρινεται are not judged οὑτω in this manner. Τις μεν γαρ αυλητης for what flute-player, τις δε κιθαριστης and what harpist, τις δε αλλος διδασκαλος and what other teacher ποιησας having made τους μαθητας his disciples ἱκανους able performers, εαν if ελθοντες going προς αλλους among other men φανωσι they show themselves χειρους inferior, εχει αιτιαν has [to bear] the blame τουτου of this? Τις δε πατηρ and

what father, εαν if ὁ παις αυτου his son σωφρονῃ is prudent συνδιατριβων associating with τῳ any man, ὑστερον δε but afterwards γενηται becomes πονηρος bad συγγενομενος being with αλλῳ τῳ some one else, αιτιαται blames τον προσθεν the first man, αλλα but ουκ επαινει does not praise τον προτερον the first. τοσουτῳ μαλλον so much the more ὁσῳ in proportion as φαινηται αν he may appear χειρων worse παρα τῳ ὑστερῳ when in company with the last? Αλλα but οἱ γε πατερες fathers αυτοι themselves συνοντες associating τοις υἱεσι with their sons, ουκ εχουσιν have not την αιτιαν the blame των παιδων πλημμελουντων when their children transgress, εαν if αυτοι themselves σωφρονωσιν are prudent. 28. Οὑτω δε but in this way και also ην it was δικαιον just κρινειν to judge Σωκρατη Socrates: ει μεν if indeed αυτος himself εποιει did τι any thing φαυλον bad, εδοκει αν he would appear εικοτως reasonably ειναι to be πονηρος a bad man, ει δε but if αυτος himself διετελει continued σωφρονων to be prudent, πως how εχοι αν could he have δικαιως justly την αιτιαν the blame κακιας of vice της ουκ ενουσης which did not exist αυτῳ in him?

29. Αλλα but ει και if also αυτος himself ποιων doing μηδεν πονηρον nothing bad επηνει praised εκεινους them ὁρων when he saw them πραττοντας doing φαυλα bad acts, επετιμῳτο αν he would be blamed δικαιως

with justice. *Αισθανομενος μεν τοινυν* perceiving however *Κριτιαν* Critias *ερωντα* loving *Ευθυδημου* Euthydemus, *και* and *πειρωντα* trying *χρησθαι* to make use of him *καθαπερ* as *οἱ απολαυοντες* those who enjoy *των σωματων* the bodies [of men] *προς τα αφροδισια* for amatory purposes, *απετρεπεν* he tried to divert him from it, *φασκων* saying *ειναι* that it was *ανελευθερον τε* both illiberal *και* and *ου πρεπον* not seemly *καλῳ* for an honourable *και αγαθῳ ανδρι* and good man *προσαιτειν* to ask *τον ερωμενον* the man he loved *ᾧ* to whom *βουλεται* he wishes *φαινεσθαι* to appear *αξιος* worthy *πολλου* of much, *ἱκετευοντα* beseeching him *ὡσπερ τους πτωχους* as the poor do *και δεομενον* and asking him *προσδουναι* to give [something] besides *και ταυτα* and this *μηδενος αγαθου* for no good. 30. *Του δε Κριτιου* but Critias *ουκ ὑπακουοντος* not listening *τοις τοιουτοις* to such arguments *ουδε αποτρεπομενου* and not being diverted [from his purpose], *λεγεται* it is said *τον Σωκρατη* that Socrates *ειπειν* said, *αλλων τε πολλων* when both many others *παροντων* were present *και του Ευθυδημου* and Euthydemus, *ὁτι* that *ὁ Κριτιας* Critias *δοκοιη* seemed *αυτῳ* to him *πασχειν ὑϊκον* to have the feeling of a pig, *επιθυμων* being desirous *προσκνησθαι* to rub *Ευθυδημῳ* against Euthydemus *ὡσπερ* as *τσ ὑδια* little pigs *τοις λιθοις* against stones. 31. *Εξ ὡν δη* from which causes *ὁ Κριτιας* Critias *και* also *εμισει* hated *τον Σωκρατη*

Socrates ὡστε so that και also ὁτε when ων being των τριακοντα one of the thirty [tyrants] εγενετο he became νομοθετης a nomothete [law-framer] μετα Χαρικλεους with Charicles, απεμνημονευσεν αυτῳ he remembered it against him και and εγραψεν enrolled εν τοις νομοις among the laws μη διδασκειν that [men] should not teach τεχνην the art λογων of words, επηρεαζων insulting εκεινῳ him και and ουκ εχων not having ὁπῃ [any particular] whereby επιλαβοιτο he might take hold of him, αλλα but επιφερων αυτῳ bringing against him το επιτιμωμενον that which is charged κοινῃ in common τοις φιλοσοφοις against the philosophers ὑπο των πολλων by the multitude και and διαβαλλων calumniating him προς τους πολλους to the multitude. Ουδε γαρ for neither εγωγε have I ουτε either αυτος myself πωποτε ever yet ηκουσα heard τουτο this Σωκρατους from Socrates ουτε ῃσθομην or known του αλλου any other person φασκοντος saying ακηκοεναι that he had heard it from him. 32. Εδηλωσε δε but he showed it: επει γαρ for when οἱ τριακοντα the thirty [tyrants] απεκτειναν had slain πολλους μεν many των πολιτων of the citizens και and ου not τους χειριστους the worst, προυτρεποντο δε and encouraged πολλους many αδικειν to do injustice, ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates ειπε που said by chance ὁτι that δοκοιη it seemed οἱ to him ειναι to be θαυμασ·

τον wonderful, ει if τις a man γενομενος becoming νομευς herdsman αγελης of a herd of oxen, και ποιων and making τας βους the cows ελαττους τε both fewer και χειρους and inferior, μη ὁμολογοιη should not acknowledge ειναι that he was κακος βουκολος a bad herdsman, ετι δε but still θαυμαστοτερον more wonderful ει if τις any one becoming προστα της ruler πολεως of a city και and ποιων making τους πολιτας the citizens ελαττους τε both fewer και χειρους and inferior μη αισχυνεται is not ashamed μηδε οιεται and does not think ειναι that he is κακος προστατης a bad ruler της πολεως of the city. 33. Τουτου δε but this απαγγελθεντος having been reported αυτοις to them, ὁ τε Κριτιας both Critias και and ὁ Χαρικλης Charicles καλεσαντε having called τον Σωκρατη Socrates εδεικνυτην τε both showed αὐτῳ to him τον νομον the law και and απειπατην forbade him μη διαλεγεσθαι [not] to converse τοις νεοις with the young men. Ὁ δε Σωκρατης but Socrates επηρετο asked αυτω those two ει if εξειη it was permitted him πυνθανεσθαι to ask ει if τι any one των προαγορευομενων of the things announced to them μη αγνοοιτο was not understood: τω δε but those two εφατην said [he might]. 34. "Εγω τοινυν I then," εφη said he, "παρεσκευασμαι μεν am prepared πειθεσθαι to be obedient τοις to the laws: ὁπως δε but that μη λαθω παρανομησας I may not insensibly transgress τι in any point δι'

αγνοιαν through ignorance, βουλομαι I wish μαθειν to learn τουτο this σαφως clearly παρ' ὑμων from you, ποτερον whether νομιζοντες thinking την τεχνην that the art των λογων of words ειναι is συν τοις on the side of those things ορθως λεγομενοις that are spoken rightly η or συν τοις on the side of those μη ορθως [that are spoken] not rightly, κελευετε you bid me απεχεσθαι abstain αυτης from it. Ει μεν γαρ for if συν τοις ορθως on the side of things [spoken] rightly, δηλον it is manifest ὁτι that αφεκτεον ειη we must abstain του ορθως λεγειν from speaking rightly; ει δε but if συν τοις with those μη ορθως not rightly [spoken] δηλον it is manifest ὁτι that πειρατεον we must try λεγειν to speak ορθως rightly." 35. Και and ὁ Χαρικλης Charicles οργισθεις being angry αυτῳ with him εφη said, "Επειδη since, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, αγνοεις you are [so] ignorant, προαγορευομεν σοι we forewarn you ταδε this οντα which is ευμαθεστερα more easy to be understood, μη διαλεγεσθαι not to converse ὁλως at all τοις νεοις with the young men." Και and ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates εφη said, "Ἱνα τοινυν in order then that μη ῃ it may not be αμφιβολον doubtful, ὁρισατε define μοι to me μεχρι ποσων ετων up to how many years δει νομιζειν I must consider τους ανθρωπους men ειναι to be νεους young." Και and ὁ Χαρικλης Charicles ειπε said, "Ὁσουπερ χρονου during all the time that ουκ εξεστιν it is not

allowed them βουλευειν to be members of the senate ὡς as ουπω not yet ουσι being φρονιμοις prudent: μηδε συ διαλεγου and do not converse νεωτεροις with those who are younger τριακοντα ἐτων than thirty years." "Μηδε not even εαν if ωνωμαι τι I buy any thing," εφη said he, "εαν if νεωτερος one who is younger τριακοντα ετων than thirty years πωλῃ sells it, ερωμαι may I ask ὁποσου for how much πωλει he sells it?" "Ναι yes, [you may] τα γε τοιαυτα in such cases," εφη said ὁ Χαρικλης Charicles, "αλλα τοι but in truth συγε you, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, ειωθας are accustomed ειδως though you know πως how τα πλειστα most things εχει are, ερωταν to ask [about them]: μη ουν ερωτα do not then ask ταυτα these things." "Μηδε αποκρινωμαι ουν and must I then not answer," εφη said he, "αν if τις νεος any young man ερωτᾳ με asks me, εαν if ειδῶ I know? οἷον as for instance 'Που where οικει dwells Χαρικλης Charicles?' η or 'Που where εστιν is Κριτιας Critias?' "Ναι yes, τα γε τοιαυτα [you may answer] such things," εφη said ὁ Χαρικλης Charicles. 37. 'Ο δε Κριτιας but Critias εφη said, "Αλλα but δεησει it will be necessary σε for you απεχεσθαι to keep aloof τωνδε from these, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, των σκυτεων from curriers, και των τεκτονων and builders, και των χαλκεων and braziers: και γαρ οιμαι for I also think αυτους that they ηδη already κατατετριφθαι have been

worn out διαθρυλλουμένους being talked deaf ὑπο σου by you." "Ουκουν [must I] not then [abstain]" εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "και also των ἑπομενων from the subjects which follow τουτοις on those points, του δε δικαιου both justice, και του ὁσιου and righteousness και των αλλων and other subjects των τοιουτων of such kind?" "Ναι yes μα Δια by Jove," εφη said ὁ Χαρικλης Charicles, "και and των βουκολων γε from herdsmen: ει δε μη but if you do not, φυλαττου beware ὁπως that και συ you also μη ποιησεις will not make τας βους your cows ελαττους fewer." 38. Ενθα there και also εγενετο it became δηλον evident ὁτι that ωργιζοντο they were angry τῳ Σωκρατει with Socrates του λογου his remark περι των βοων concerning the oxen απαγγελθοντος having been reported αυτοις to them.

Οἱά μεν ὁυν of what nature then εγεγονει had been ἡ συνουσια the companionship Κριτιᾳ of Critias προς Σωκρατη with Socrates και and ὡς ειχον how they stood προς αλληλους to one another ειρηται has been stated. 39. Εγωγε δε but I for my part φαιην αν would say ειναι that there is μηδεμιαν παιδευσιν no instruction μηδενι for any one παρα του μη αρεσκοντος from the man who does not please him. Κριτιας δε but Critias και Αλκιβιαδης and Alcibiades, Σωκρατους ουκ αρεσκοντος though Socrates did not please αυτοις them, ὡμιλησατην associated τῳ with

him ὁν χρονον during the time that ὡμιλειτην they did associate with him, αλλα but ὡρμηκοτε being desirous ευθυς immediately εξ αρχης from the beginning προεσταναι to be at the head της πολεως of the state. Ετι γαρ for still συνοντες whilst associating Σωκρατει with Socrates ουκ επεχειρουν they did not attempt διαλεγεσθαι to discourse τισιν αλλοις with any others μαλλον more η than τοις πραττουσι with those who transact μαλιστα for the most part τα πολιτικα political affairs. 40. Λεγεται γαρ for it is said Αλκιβιαδην that Alcibiades, πριν ειναι before he was εικοσιν ετων [at the age] of twenty years, διαλεχθηναι discoursed τοιαδε in this way περι νομων about laws Περικλει with Pericles ουτι who was επιτροπῳ μεν guardian ἑαυτου of himself, προστατῃ δε and leader της πολεως of the state. 41. Φαναι that he said, "Ειπε μοι tell me, ω Περικλεις oh Pericles, εχοις αν would you be able διδαξαι με to inform me τι what νομος law εστιν is?" τον Περικλεα that Pericles φαναι said "Παντως δηπου certainly I could." Τον Αλκιβιαδην that Alcibiades φαναι said, "Διδαξον δη tell me then προς των θεων by the gods: ὡς since εγω I ακουων hearing επαινουμενων τινων when some were praised ὁτι because ειεν they are ανδρες men νομιμοι obedient to the laws, οιμαι think τον μη ειδοτα that the man who does not know τι what νομος law εστιν is μη αν τυχειν could not obtain τουτου του

επαινου this place δικαιως justly." 42. "Αλλα but επιθυμεις you desire, ω Αλκιβιαδη oh Alcibiades," φαναι said του Περικλεα Pericles, "πραγματος a thing ουδεν τι χαλεπου not at all difficult, βουλομενος wishing ειδεναι to know τι what νομος law εστιν is: παντες γαρ ουτοι for all these εισι νομοι are laws, ους which το πληθος the multitude συνελθον having come together και δοκιμασαν and having approved εγραψεν has put down in writing, φραζον declaring ἁ τε both what things δει we ought ποιειν to do και and ἁ what μη not." "Ποτερον δε but whether of the two, νομισαν ordaining δειν that men ought ποιειν to do αγαθα good things η or τα κακα bad things? "Τα αγαθα good things νη Δια by Jupiter," φαναι said he, "ω μειρακιον young man, ου δε but not τα κακα evil things." 43. "Εαν δε but if μη το πληθος not the multitude, αλλα but, ὡσπερ as ὁπου where εστι there is ολιγαρχια an oligarchy, ολιγοι the few συνελθοντες having come together γραψωσι shall have enrolled ὁ τι what χρη ποιειν men are to do, τι what εστιν are ταυτα these things?" "Παντα all things," φαναι said he, "ὁσα as many as το κρατουν the ruling power της πολεως of the state βουλευσαμενον having deliberated ἁ what χρη ποιειν men are to do γραψῃ shall have enrolled in writing, καλειται νομος is called law." "Καν τυραννος ουν and if however a tyrant κρατων having the rule της πολεως of the

state γραφῃ has written τοις πολιταις for the citizens ἁ what things χρη ποιειν they must do, και ταυτα εστιν are these also νομος law?" "Και also," φαναι said he, "ὁσα whatever things τυραννος a tyrant αρχων who rules γραφει writes down, και ταυτα these also νομος καλειτει are called law." 44. "Τι δε but what," φαναι said he, "ω Περικλεις oh Pericles, εστιν is βια force και ανομια and lawlessness? αρ' ουκ is it not ὁταν when ὁ κρειττων the stronger μη πεισας not having persuaded τον ἡττω the weaker αλλα but βιασαμενος using force αναγκασῃ compels him ποιειν to do ὁ τι whatever δοκῃ αν may seem good αυτῳ to himself?" "Δοκεῖ it seems so εμοιγε to me," φαναι said τον Περικλεα Pericles. "Και and ὁσα αρα whatever then τυραννος a tyrant μη πεισας not having persuaded τους πολιτας the citizens αναγκαζει compels them ποιειν to do γραφων putting it down in writing, εστιν is it ανομια lawlessness?" "Δοκει it seems so μοι to me," φαναι said τον Περικλεα Pericles, "ανατιθεμαι γαρ for I put back το the [remark I made] ὁσα that whatever things τυραννος a tyrant γραφει enrols μη πεισας not having persuaded [the people] νομον ειναι is law." 45. "Ὁσα δε but whatever things οἱ ολιγοι the few γραφουσιν enrol μη πεισαντες not having persuaded τους πολλους the many αλλα but κρατουντες having the mastery, ποτερον whether φωμεν must we say ειναι that it is βιαν violence η or

μη φωμεν not say so?" "Παντα all things δοκει seem μοι to me," φαναι said τον Περικλεα Pericles, "ὁσα whatever τις any one αναγκαζει compels τινα any one ποιειν to do μη πεισας not having persuaded him, ειτε whether γραφων putting it in writing ειτε μη or not, ειναι to be βια violence μαλλον rather η νομος than law." "Και and ὁσα αρα whatever things then το παν πληθος the whole multitude κρατουν having the mastery των εχοντων of the men who possess τα χρηματα wealth γραφει puts down in writing μη πεισαν not having persuaded them, ειη αν would be βια violence μαλλον rather η νομος than law?" 46. "Μαλα τοι most certainly," φαναι said τον Περικλεα Pericles, "ω Αλκιβιαδη oh Alcibiades, και ἡμεις and we [I] οντες τηλικουτοι when we were of the same age ημεν were δεινοι clever τα τοιαυτα at such things: και εμελετωμεν γαρ for we both studied και and εσοφιζομεθα devised τοιαυτα such things οἱαπερ as και συ you also νυν now δοκεις seem εμοι to me μελεταν to be studying." Τον δε Αλκιβιαδη but that Alcibiades φαναι said, "Ειθε would that συνεγενομην I had been with σοι you, ω Περικλεις oh Pericles, τοτε at that time ὁτε when ησθα you were δεινοτατος the most clever σαυτου of yourself [of what you ever were] ταυτα in such matters."

47. Επει τοινυν ταχιστα as soon therefore as ὑπελαβον they thought ειναι that they were

κρειττονες more powerful των πολιτευομενων than the [usual] politicians, ουκετι προσηεσαν μεν they no longer came near Σωκρατει to Socrates: ουτε γαρ for neither ηρεσκε did he please αυτοις them αλλως otherwise, ει τε and if προσελθοιεν they came to him, ηχθοντο they were vexed ελεγχομενοι being rebuked ὑπερ ὧν for the things in which ἡμαρτανον they offended; επραττον δε but they attended to τα the affairs της πολεως of the state ὡνπερ ἑνεκεν on account of which και also προσηλθον they had come Σωκρατει to Socrates. 48. Αλλα but Κριτων τε both Crito ην was ὁμιλητης an associate Σωκρατους of Socrates και Χαιρεφων as well as Chærephon και and Χαιρεκρατης Chærecrates και and Ἑρμογενης Hermogenes και Σιμμιας and Simmias και Κεβης and Cebes και Φαιδωνδας and Phædondas και αλλοι and others, οἱ who συνησαν associated εκεινῳ with him, ου not ἱνα that γενοιντο they might become δημηγορικοι public speakers η or δικανικοι barristers, αλλα but ἱνα that γενομενοι becoming καλοι τε both honourable και αγαθοι and good δυναιντο they might be able καλως honourably χρησθαι to deal with και οικῳ both house και οικεταις and household και οικειοις and kinsmen και φιλοις and friends και πολει and city και πολιταις and citizens. Και ουδεις and no one τουτων of these ων being ουτε νεωτερος either young ουτε πρεσβυτερος or old ουτε either εποιησε did ουδεν

κακον any evil deed ουτε εσχεν or bore αιτιαν the accusation [of having done one].

49. "Αλλα but Σωκρατης γε Socrates," εφη said ὁ κατηγορος the accuser, εδιδασκε taught προπηλακιζειν to insult τους πατερας fathers, πειθων μεν persuading τους συνοντας those who associated αυτῳ with him ποιειν that he made them wiser των πατερων than their fathers, φασκων δε and saying εξειναι that it was allowed κατα νομον according to the law ἑλοντι [for a man detecting] τον πατερα his father παρανοιας of madness δησαι to confine him, χρωμενος using τουτῳ τεκμηριῳ this argument ὡς that νομιμον ειη it was lawful τον αμαθεστερον for the more uninstructed δεδεσθαι to be confined ὑπο του σοφωτερου by one who was wiser. 50. Σωκρατης δε but Socrates ᾠετο thought τον μεν δεσμευοντα that he who confined [another] αμαθιας ἑνεκα for ignorance δεδεσθαι αν would be bound και αυτον himself also δικαιως justly ὑπο των επισταμενων by those who knew ἃ things which αυτος himself μη επισταται does not know: και and των τοιουτων ἑνεκα on account of such things πολλακις εσκοπει he often used to consider τι in what αμαθια ignorance διαφερει differs μανιας from madness: και and ᾠετο he thought τους μεν μαινομενους that the mad δεδεσθαι αν might be confined συμφεροντως beneficially και ἑαυτοις both for themselves και and τοις φιλοις for their friends, τους δε μη επιστα-

μενους but that those who did not know τα δεοντα what was necessary μανθανειν αν might learn δικαιως with propriety παρα των επισταμενων from those who knew. 51. Αλλα but Σωκρατης γε Socrates, εφη said ὁ κατηγορος the accuser, εποιει made ου μονον not only τους πατερας fathers αλλα but και also τους αλλους συγγενεις one's other kinsmen ειναι to be εν ατιμιᾳ in contempt παρα τοις with those συνουσιν who associated ἑαυτῳ with himself, λεγων saying ὡς that οἱ συγγενεις one's kinsmen ωφελουσι benefit ουτε neither τους καμνοντας those who are ill ουτε nor τους δικαζομενους those who have lawsuits, αλλα but οἱ ιατροι physicians [benefit] τους μεν the ones, τους δε and the others οἱ επισταμενοι those who know how συνδικειν to aid in law-suits. 52. Εφη δε but he said και also αυτον that he λεγειν stated περι των φιλων about friends ὡς that ουδεν οφελος it was no advantage ειναι that they should be ευνους well-disposed, ει μη unless και also δυνησονται they should be able ωφελειν to help: αυτον δε and that he φασκειν said μονους that those only ειναι are αξιους worthy τιμης of honour τους ειδοτας who know και δυναμενους and are able ἑρμηνευσαι to explain τα δεοντα what was needful. Αυτον ουν that he then αναπειθοντα persuading τους νεους the young ὡς that ειη he was αυτος τε both himself σοφωτατος most wise και and κανωτατος most able ποιησαι to make αλλους

others σοφους wise, οὑτω διατιθεναι so disposed τους συνοντας those who associated ἑαυτῳ with him ὡστε that τους αλλους other men ειναι were μηδαμου by no means παρ' αυτοις among them προς αυτον compared to him. 53. Εγω δε but I οιδα μεν know αυτον that he και λεγοντα both said ταυτα this περι πατερων τε concerning both men's fathers και and των αλλων συγγενων one's other kinsmen και and περι φιλων concerning friends and προς τουτοις γε δη in addition to this indeed ὁτι that της ψυχης εξελθουσης when the life has departed, εν ᾗ in which μονῃ alone γιγνεται exists φρονησις intelligence, εξενεγκοντες carrying out το σωμα the body του ανθρωπου of the man οικειοτατου who is even most intimate αφανιζουσι they put it out of sight την ταχιστην in the quickest way possible. 54. Ελεγε δε and he said ὁτι that και ζων even when alive ἑκαστος each man αυτος τε both himself αφαιρει removes και and παρεχει αλλῳ permits another [to remove] ὁ τι whatever ᾗ αν may be αχρειον useless και and ανωφελες unprofitable του σωματος ἑαυτου from his own body ὁ which φιλει he loves μαλιστα most παντων of all things. Αυτοι τε γε both themselves at least αφαιρουσι remove αὑτων from themselves ονυχας τε both nails και τριχας and hair και τυλους and warts [corns &c. &c.] και παρεχουσιν and allow τοις ιατροις physicians μετα πονων τε both with toil και αλγηδονων and suffering

και αποτεμνειν both to cut away *και αποκαειν* and to cauterize, *και οιονται* and think *δειν* that they ought *και τινειν* even to pay *αυτοις* to them *μισθον* recompense *τουτου χαριν* on account of this: *και* and *αποπτυουσι* they spit away *το σιαλον* the spittle *εκ του στοματος* out of their mouth *ὡς δυνανται πορρωτατω* as far as they can, *διοτι* because *ωφελει μεν* it benefits *αυτους* them *ουδεν* not at all *ενον* remaining in them, *μαλλον δε* but rather *βλαπτει* hurts them *πολυ* much. 55. *Ταυτα ουν* this then *ελεγεν* he said, *ου* not *διδασκων* teaching *κατορυττειν μεν* to bury *τον πατερα* one's father *ζωντα* alive *κατατεμνειν δε* and to cut *ἑαυτον* one's self, *αλλα* but *επιδεικνυων* showing *ὁτι* that *το αφρον* what has no sense *εστιν* is *ατιμον* valueless *παρεκαλει* he exhorted *επιμελεσθαι* that [a man] should take care *του ειναι* of being *ὡς φρονιμωτατον* as prudent as possible *και* and *ωφελιμωτατον* as useful as possible, *ὁπως* that *εαν τε* both if *βουληται* he wishes *τιμασθαι* to be honoured *ὑπο πατρος* by his father *εαν τε* and if *ὑπο αδελφου* by his brother *εαν τε* and if *ὑπ' αλλου τινος* by any other *μη αμελῃ* he should not be negligent *πιστευων* trusting *τῳ ειναι* to his being *οἰκειος* intimate, *αλλα* but *πειρατai* should endeavour *ειναι* to be *ωφελιμος* useful *τουτοις* to those *ὑφ' ὡν* by whom *βουληται αν* he may wish *τιμασθαι* to be honoured.

56. *Ὁ δε κατηγορος* but the accuser *εφη*

said αυτον that he και also εκλεγομενον selecting τα πονηροτατα the worst parts των ενδοξοτατων ποιητων of the most famous poets και and χρωμενον using τουτοις μαρτυριοις these as testimonies διδασκειν taught τους συνοντας those who associated with him ειναι to be κακουργους τε both wicked και τυραννικους and tyrannical: Ἡσιοδου μεν of Hesiod το the [verse],

"Εργον δε but work ουδεν ονειδος is no reproach, αεργειη δε τε but idleness ονειδος is a reproach:"

αυτον δη that he indeed λεγειν said τουτο this ὡς that ὁ ποιητης the poet κελευει bids us απεχεσθαι abstain μηδενος εργου from no work μητ' αδικου [n]either unjust μητ' αισχρου [nor] disgraceful, αλλα but ποιειν to do και ταυτα even these επι τῳ κερδει for the sake of gain.

57. Επει δε but when Σωκρατης Socrates διομολογησαιτο concluded το μεν ειναι that to be εργατην a worker ειναι is ωφελιμον τε both useful και αγαθον and good ανθρωπῳ for a man, το δε but to [be] αργον idle βλαβερον τε is both harmful και κακον and evil, και and το μεν εργαζεσθαι to work αγαθον is good το δε αργειν but to be idle κακον evil, εφη he said τους μεν ποιουντας that those who doτι any thing αγαθον good εργαζεσθαι τε both work και and ειναι are εργατας workers, τους δε κυβευοντας but those who dice η or ποιουντας who do αλλο τι any thing else τονηρον wicked και and επιζημιον pernicious

απεκαλει he called αργους idle. Εκ δε τουτων now from these remarks το the [verse] ορθως αν εχοι would be right:

"Εργον δε but work ουδεν ονειδος is no reproach, αεργειη δε τε but idleness ονειδος is a reproach."

58. Ὁ δε κατηγορος but the accuser εφη said αυτον that he πολλακις often λεγειν quoted το [the narrative] Ὁμηρου of Homer ὁτι that Οδυσσευς Ulysses

"ὁντινα μεν βασιληα whatever king και εξοχον ανδρα and leading man κιχειη he found, παραστας standing beside him ερητυσασκε restrained τονδε him αγανοις επεεσσι with mild words, "Διαμονιε d—n it, sir, ουκ εοικεν it is not fit σε that thou δεδισσεσθαι shouldst fear ὡς as κακον a coward αλλα but αυτος τε both thyself καθησο sit down και and ἱδρυε seat αλλους λαους the other people.' Ὁν δε ανδρα but whatever man αυ again δημου of the people ιδοι he saw εφευροι τε and found βοοωντα clamouring, ελασασκεν he struck τον him σκηπτρῳ with his staff ὁμοκλησασκε τε and rebuked μυθῳ with these words: "Δαιμονιε you d—d scamp, ἡσο sit ατρεμας quiet, και ακουε and hear μυθον the talk αλλων of others οἱ who εισιν are φερτεροι better σεο than thou; συ δε but thou απτολεμος art unwarlike και αναλκις and weak, ουτε neither ποτε ever εναριθμιος of any account εν πολεμῳ in war ουτε nor ενι βουλῃ in counsel.' Αὐτον δη [he said] that he εξηγεισθαι ex-

plained ταυτα these words ὡς that ὁ ποιητης the poet επαινοιη approved τους δημοτας that those who were men of the people και πενητας and poor παιεσθαι should be beaten. 59. Σωκρατης δε but Socrates ουκ ελεγε did not say ταυτα this; (ᾠετο γαρ αν for he would have thought ουτω γε in that case και ἑαυτον that himself also δειν ought παιεσθαι to be beaten;) αλλα but εφη he said τους οντας that those who are ωφελιμους useful μητε neither λογῳ in word μητε nor εργῳ in deed και and ἱκανους able βοηθειν to aid μητε neither τῳ στρατευματι the army μητε nor πολει the state μητε nor αυτῳ τῳ δημῳ the people itself ει if τι δεοι there be any need, αν τε and if αλλως otherwise προς τουτῳ in addition to this ωσι they are και also θρασεις audacious, κωλυεσθαι should be checked παντα τροπον in every way και αν even if τυγχανωσι they happen οντες to be πανυ πλουσιοι very rich. 60. Αλλα but Σωκρατης γε Socrates at least τα εναντια the very opposite τουτων of all this φανερος ην showed himself ων to be και δημοτικος both a man of the people και φιλανθρωπος and a lover of mankind. Εκεινος γαρ for he λαβων having admitted πολλους επιθυμητας many admirers και αστους both citizens και ξενους and foreigners επραξατο exacted ουδενα πωποτε μισθον never any pay της συνουσιας for being with him, αλλα but επηρκει supplied αφθονως unstintingly τω

ἑαυτου from his own stores πασι to all: ὡν of whom ινες some λαβοντες having received μικρα μερη small portions παρ' αυτου from him προικα gratuitously επωλουν sold them τοις αλλοις to the rest πολλου for much money, και and ουκ ησαν were not δημοτικοι men of the people ὡσπερ εκεινος as he [was]. Ου γαρ ηθελον for they were not willing διαλεγεσθαι to discourse τοις μη εχουσι to those who had not χρηματα money διδοναι to give. 61. Αλλα but Σωκρατης γε Socrates και also προς τους αλλους ανθρωπους in comparison with other men παρειχε conferred κοσμον honour τῃ πολει on the city πολλῳ μαλλον much more η than Λιχας Lichas, ὁς who γεγονε became ονομαστος famous επι τουτῳ for this, τῃ on the city Λακεδαιμονιων of the Lacedæmonians. Λιχας μεν γαρ for Lichas ταις Γυμνοπαιδιαις at the Gymnopædiæ εδειπνιζε entertained at supper τους ζενους the strangers επιδημουντας who were sojourning εν Λακεδαιμονι in Lacedæmon, Σωκρατης δε but Socrates δια παντος του βιου through all his life δαπανων spending τα ἑαυτου his own property ωφελει τα μεγιστα did the greatest good to παντας τους βουλομενους all those who wished it: απεπεμπε γαρ for he sent away τους συγγιγνομενους those who associated with him ποιων making them βελτιους better.

62. Εμοι μεν δη to me then Σωκρατης Socrates ων being τοιουτος such a man εδοκει seemed ειναι to be αξιος worthy τιμης of

honour μαλλον rather η than θανατου of death τῃ πολει at the hands of the state. Τις δε and any one σκοπων viewing it και also κατα τους νομους according to the laws εὑροι αν would find τουτο this. Κατα γαρ τους νομους for according to the laws, εαν if τις any one γενηται φανερος be detected κλεπτων stealing η or λωποδυτων robbing people's clothes η or βαλαντιοτομων cutting purses η or τοιχωρυχων house-breaking η or ανδραποδιζομενος kidnapping η or ἱεροσυλων robbing temples, ἡ ζημια the penalty τουτοις on such men εστιν is θανατος death: ὧν from which things εκεινος he απειχεν abstained πλειστον most παντων ανθρωπων of all men. 63. Αλλα μην but yet εγενετο he was αιτιος answerable τῃ πολει to the city ουτε neither πολεμου for any war πωποτε ever yet συμβαντος having turned out κακως badly ουτε nor στασεως for sedition ουτε nor προδοσιας for treachery ουτε nor αλλου ουδενος for any other evil: ουδε μην nor indeed ουτε πωποτε απεστερησε did he either ever yet deprive ουδενα ανθρωπων any man αγαθων of good things ουτε περιεβαλεν or involve him κακοις in evil things, αλλα but ουδε neither πωποτε εσχεν had he ever αιτιαν the blame ουδενος of any των ειρημενων of the things I have mentioned. 64. Πως ουν how then ειη αν could he be ενοχος liable τῃ γραφῃ to the indictment? ὃς who αντι μεν instead του μη νομιζειν of not believing in θεους gods, ὡς as εγεγοαπτο had

been written εν τῃ γραφῃ in the indictment φανερος ην was manifest θεραπευων worshipping τους θεους the gods μαλιστα most παντων ανθρωπων of all men, αντι δε and instead του διαφθειρειν of corrupting τους νεους the young, ὁ which indeed ὁ γραψαμενος he who drew the indictment ῃτιατο αυτον accused him [of doing], φανερος ην was manifest παυων μεν checking τους those των συνοντων of his own associates εχοντας who had πονηρας επιθυμιας evil passions, τουτων from [indulging] these, προτρεπων δε and exhorting them επιθυμειν to desire της καλλιστης the most noble και and μεγαλοπρεπεστατης αρετης most magnificent virtue, ῃ by which ευ οικουσι they well administer πολεις τε both states και οικους and private houses; πως δε but how πραττων ταυτα acting thus ουκ ην was he not αξιος worthy μεγαλης τιμης of great honour τῃ πολει at the hands of the state?

III. Ὡς δε δη but that και also εδοκει he seemed μοι to me ωφελειν to benefit τους συνοντας those who were with him, τα μεν partly εργῳ by deed δεικνυων showing ἑαυτον himself οἱος what sort of man ην he was, τα δε and partly και also διαλεγομενος discoursing, τουτων δη of these things then γραψω I will write ὁποσα as many as διαμνημονευσω αν I shall remember. Τα μεν τοινυν now in matters προς τους θεους that concern the gods φανερος ην he showed himself και ποιων both doing και λεγων and saying ῃπερ in the same

way as ἡ Πυθια the Pythian [priestess] αποκρινεται answers τοις ερωτωσι to those who ask πως how δει one ought ποιειν to act η either περι θυσιας concerning a sacrifice η or περι θεραπειας concerning the observance προγονων of one's ancestors η or περι αλλου τινος concerning any other των τοιουτων of such things: ἡ τε γαρ Πυθια for both the Pythoness αναιρει gives answer ποιουντας that those who act νομῳ according to the law πολεως of the state ποιειν αν would act ευσεβως righteously, Σωκρατης τε and Socrates και αυτος both himself εποιει acted οὑτω so και and παρῃνει advised τοις αλλοις others, ενομιζε δε but he thought ποιουντας that [men] acting αλλως πως in any other way ειναι are περιεργους over-busy και ματαιους and vain. 2. Και ηυχετο δε but he also prayed προς τους θεους to the gods ἁπλως simply διδοναι to give us τα αγαθα things good for us, ὡς τους θεους ειδοτας since the gods know καλλιστα best ὁποια what things εστιν αγαθα are good for us: ενομιζε δε but he thought τους ευχομενους that those who pray for χρυσιον gold η αργυριον or silver η τυραννιδα or kingly power η or αλλο τι any other των τοιουτων of such things ευχεσθαι pray for ουδεν nothing διαφορον different η than ει if ευχοιντο they prayed for κυβειαν playing at dice η or μαχην fighting η or αλλο τι any other των of the things φανερως αδηλων which are manifestly uncertain ὁπως how αποβησοιτο they would turn out.

3. *Θυων δε* but when sacrificing *μικρας θυσιας* small sacrifices *απο μικρων* from his small means *ἡγειτο* he thought *ουδεν μειουσθαι* that he did not fall short *των θυοντων* of those who sacrificed *πολλα* many *και μεγαλα* and great [offerings] *απο πολλων* from many *και μεγαλων* and great [resources]. *Εφη γαρ* for he said *ουτε καλως εχειν* that neither would it be right *τοις θεοις* for the gods, *ει* if *εχαιρον* they took pleasure *ταις μεγαλαις θυσιαις* in great sacrifices *μαλλον* more *η* than *ταις μικραις* in small ones, (*πολλακις γαρ* for that often *τα* the offerings *παρα των πονηρων* from bad men *ειναι αν* would be *μαλλον κεχαοισμενα* more grateful *αυτοις* to them *η* than *τα* those *παρα των χρηστων* from the good,) *ουτε* nor *ειναι αν* would it be *αξιον* worth while *τοις ανθρωποις* for men *ζην* to live, *ει* if *τα* the offerings *παρα των πονηρων* from the wicked *ην* were *μαλλον κεχαρισμενα* more grateful *τοις θεοις* to the gods *η* than *τα* those *παρα των χρηστων* from the good : *αλλα* but *ενομιζεν* he thought *τους θεους* that the gods *χαιρειν* rejoiced *μαλιστα* most *ταις τιμαις* in the honours [they received] *παρα των ευσεβεστατων* from the most pious. *Ην δε* and he was *επαινετης* an approver *και* also *του επους τουτου* of this verse,

"*Ερδειν δε* and to perform *ἱερα* sacrifices *αθανατοισι θεοισι* to the immortal gods *κατα δυναμιν* according to one's ability."

εφη δε and he said *και προς φιλους* that

towards friends also *και ξενους* and strangers *και* and *προς την αλλην διαιταν* as regards the rest of life *ειναι* it is *καλην παραινεσιν* a good admonition *την* which tells us *ερδειν* to act *καδδυναμιν* according to our ability.

4. *Ει δε* but if *τι* any thing *δοξειεν* appeared *σημαινεσθαι* to be intimated *αυτῳ* to him *παρα των θεων* from the gods *ἡττον αν επεισθη* he would less be persuaded *ποιησαι* to act *παρα τα σημαινομενα* contrary to such intimations *η* than *ει* if *τις* any one *επειθεν αυτον* persuaded him *λαβειν* to take *ἡγεμονα* as guide *ὁδου* of his road *τυφλον* one who was blind *και μη ειδοτα* and who did not know *την ὁδον* the way *αντι βλεποντος* instead of one who saw *και ειδοτος* and knew : *κατηγορει δε* and he blamed *μωριαν* the folly *και των αλλων* of others also, *οἱ τινες* who *ποιουσι τι* do any thing *παρα τα σημαινομενα* contrary to what has been intimated *ὑπο των θεων* by the gods, *φυλαττομενοι* whilst guarding against *την αδοξιαν* bad repute *παρα τοις ανθρωποις* among men. *Αυτος δε* but himself *ὑπερεωρα* neglected *παντα τα ανθρωπινα* all human considerations *προς την συμβουλιαν* compared with counsel *παρα των θεων* from the gods.

5. *Επαιδευσε δε* but he regulated *την τε ψυχην* both his soul *και το σωμα* and body *διαιτῃ* by a mode of life *ᾗ* which *τις* any man *χρωμενος* using *διαγοι αν* might go on *θαρραλεως* confidently *και ασφαλως* and safely *ει μη* unless *τι δαιμονιον* any thing from the gods

ειη were to happen, *και* and *ουκ αν απορησειε* would not be in want *τοσαυτης δαπανης* of so much expense [as would be needful]. *Ην γαρ* for he was *ουτω ευτελης* so inexpensive *ωστε* that *ουκ οιδα* I know not *ει* whether *τις* any one *εργαζοιτο αν* would earn *ουτως ολιγα* so little *ωστε* as *μη λαμβανειν* not to receive *τα αρκουντα* what was sufficient *Σωκρατει* for Socrates. *Εχρητο μεν γαρ* for he used *τουσουτῳ σιτῳ* so much food *ὁσον* as *ησθιεν* he ate *ἡδεως* with pleasure; *και* and *ῃει* went *οὑτω παρεσκευασμενος* so prepared *επι τουτον* to this *ὡστε* that *την επιθυμιαν* his desire *του σιτου* of food *ειναι* was *οψον* sauce *αυτῳ* to him: *παν δε ποτον* and every drink *ην* was *ἡδυ* sweet *αυτῳ* to him *δια το μη πινειν* through his not drinking *ει μη* unless *διψῳη* he was thirsty. 6. *Ει δε* but if *ποτε* at any time *κληθεις* invited *εθελησειεν* he wished *ελθειν* to go *επι δειπνον* to supper, *εφυλαττετο* he avoided *πανυ ῥᾳδιως* with the greatest ease *τουτο* that *ὁ* which *εστιν* is *εργωδεστατον* a most difficult thing *τοις πλειστοις* to most men *ὡστε φυλαζασθαι* to guard against, *το εμπιμπλασθαι* to cram themselves *ὑπερ τον κορον* beyond satiety. *Συνεβουλευε δε* but he advised *τοις μη δυναμενοις* those who were unable *ποιειν* to do *τουτο* this *φυλαττεσθαι* to guard against *τα πειθοντα* things that persuaded them *εσθιειν* to eat *μη πεινωντας* when they were not hungry *μηδε διψωντας* and when not thirsty *πινειν* to drink. *Και*

γαρ εφη for he said also ταυτα that these ειναι are τα λυμαινομενα the things that do harm to γαστερας men's bellies και κεφαλας and heads και ψυχας and minds. 7. Εφη δε but he said επισκωπτων using irony οιεσθαι that he thought και την Κιρκην that Circe also ποιειν ὑς made men swine δειπνιζουσαν feasting them πολλοις τοιουτοις on many such things, τον δε Οδυσσεα but that Ulysses, ὑποθημοσυνῃ τε both by suggestion Ἑρμου of Hermes και and αυτον himself οντα being εγκρατη abstemious και and αποσχομενον avoiding το ἅπτεσθαι to taste των τοιουτων such things ὑπερ τον κορον beyond satiety, ου γενεσθαι did not become ὗν a swine δια ταυτα for these reasons. 8. Τοιαυτα μεν such things επαιζεν he said in jest περι τουτων on these subjects ἁμα at the same time time σπουδαζων being in earnest.

Παρῃνει δε but he advised απεχεσθαι to abstain ισχυρως strictly αφροδισιων from the loves των καλων of beautiful persons: εφη γαρ for he said ουκ ειναι that it was not ῥᾴδιον easy ἁπτομενον for one who touched των τοιουτων such persons σωφρονειν to be temperate. Αλλα but και also πυθομενος when he heard ποτε once Κριτοβουλον of Critobulus τον Κριτωνος son of Criton, ὅτι that εφιλησεν he kissed τον υἱον the son Αλκιβιαδου of Alcibiades καλον οντα who was good-looking, ηρετο he asked Ξενοφωντα Xenophon παροντος του Κριτοβουλου in the presence of

Critobulus: 9. "*Ειπε μοι* tell me, *ω Ξενοφων* oh Xenophon," *εφη* said he, "*ου συ ενομιζες* did you not think *Κριτοβουλον* Critobulus *ειναι* to be *των σωφρονικων ανθρωπων* of the prudent men *μαλλον* rather *η* than *των θρασεων* of the rash, *και* and *των προνοητικων* of the forethoughtful *μαλλον* rather *η* than *των* of those *ανοητων τε* who are both senseless *και ῥιψοκινδυνων* and rash?" "*Παντ μεν ουν* certainly," *εφη* said *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates. *Νυν τοινυν* now then *νομιζε* deem *αυτον* him *ειναι* to be *θερμουργοτατον* most headstrong *και λεωργοτατον* and most audacious; *οὑτος* he *και* both *κυβιστησειεν αν* would tumble *εις μαχαιρας* on swords *και* and *ἁλοιτο αν* would leap *εις πυρ* into fire." 10. "*Και τι δη* and what then *ιδων* seeing him *ποιουντα* doing," *εφη* said *ὁ Ξενοφων* Xenophon, "*κατεγνωκας τοιαυτα* have you formed this judgment against *αυτου* him?" "*Ου γαρ οὑτος ετολμησε* for has he not dared," *εφη* said he, "*φιλησαι* to kiss *τον υἱον* the son *Αλκιβιαδου* of Alcibiades, *οντα* who is *ευπροσωποτατον* of a most fair countenance *και* and *ὡραιοτατον* in the prime of youth?" "*Αλλα* but *ει μεντοι* if however," *εφη* said *ὁ Ξενοφων* Xenophon, "*τοιουτον* such *εστιν* is *το εργον* the act *ῥιψοκινδυνου* of an audacious man, *και εγω* I also *δοκω αν* seem likely *μοι* to myself *ὑπομειναι* to undergo *τουτον τον κινδυνον* this danger." 11. "*Ω τλημον* oh wretched man!" *εφη* said *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates, "*και τι* and

what οιει do you think παθειν αν that you would suffer φιλησας kissing καλον a handsome person? αρ' ουκ αν would it not [be] ειναι to become αυτικα μαλα all at once δουλος μεν a slave αντ' ελευθερου instead of a free man, δαπαναν δε and to expend πολλα much money εις βλαβερας ἡδονας on harmful pleasures, εχειν δε and to have πολλην ασχολιαν much want of leisure του επιμεληθηναι from studying τινος any thing καλου honourable και αγαθου and good, αναγκασθηναι δε and to be compelled σπουδαζειν to be earnest εφ' οἱς in things where ουδε not even μαινομενος a mad man σπουδασειεν αν would be earnest?" 12. "Ω Ἡρακλεις oh Hercules!" εφη said ὁ Ξενοφων Xenophon, "ὡς δεινην τινα how dreadful-like λεγεις you say ειναι is την δυναμιν the power του φιληματος of the kiss!" "Και θαυμαζεις and do you wonder at τουτο this?" εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ουκ οισθα do you not know ὁτι that τα φαλαγγια the talantulæ οντα which are ουδε not even ἡμιωβολιαια half an obolus το μεγεθος in size, μονον only προσαψαμενα touching τῳ στοματι with the mouth επιτριβει τε both wear out τους ανθρωπους men ταις οδυναις with pains και and εξιστησι drive them out του φρονειν of their wits?.. "Ναι yes μα Δια by Jove," εφη said ὁ Ξενοφων Xenophon, "τα γαρ φαλαγγια for the tarantulas ενιησι τι discharge something in κατα το δηγμα in their bite." 13. "Ω μωρε oh

foolish man!" εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ου δε οιει but do you not think τους καλους that handsome men φιλουντας who love ενειναι τι inject something, ὁτι because συ you ουχ ὁρᾳς do not see it? ουκ οισθα do you not know ὁτι that τουτο το θηριον this wild beast ὁ which καλουσι they call καλον beautiful και ὡραιον and prime, εστιν is τοσουτῳ by so much δεινοτερον more formidable των φαλαγγιων than tarantulas ὁσῳ in as much as εκεινα μεν they ἁψαμενα having touched τουτο δε but this ουδ' ἁπτομενον not even touching ενιησιν injects και even παυυ πορρωθεν from a great distance τι something τοιουτον of such a kind ὡστε as ποιειν to cause men μαινεσθαι to be mad? Ισως δε and perhaps και also οἱ Ερωτες Loves καλουνται are called τοξοται archers δια τουτο on this account, ὁτι because και also οἱ καλοι beautiful persons τιτρωσκουσι wound πορρωθεν from a distance. Αλλα but συμβουλευω σοι I advise you, ω Ξενοφων oh Xenophon, ὁταν when ιδῃς you see τινα any one καλον handsome φευγειν to flee προτροπαδην with haste, σοι δε but you, ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critubulus, συμβουλευω I advise απενιαυτισαι to go away for a year; μολις γαρ for with difficulty γενοιο αν could you become πως any how ὑγιης sound [το δηγμα of the sting] εν τοσουτῳ χρονῳ in so long a time." 14. Οὑτω δη in such wise then ᾠετο he thought τους that those μη ασφαλως εχοντας who were not safely disposed προς αφροδι-

σια towards venereal pleasures χρηναι ought και also αφροδισιαζειν to indulge in such pleasures προς τοιαυτα towards such objects οία which ἡ μεν ψυχη the mind ουκ αν προσδεξαιτο would not receive του σωματος if the body μη πανυ δεομενου did not at all need them, ου δε αν παρεχοι and would not cause πραγματα trouble δεομενου if it needed them. Αυτος δε but himself ην was φανερος manifestly ούτω παρεσκευασμενος so prepared προς ταυτα towards these things ώστε απεχεσθαι as to abstain ῥαον more easily των καλλιστων from [objects] the most beautiful και and ώραιοτατων most in their prime η than οἱ αλλοι other men των αισχιστων from the most ugly και and αωροτατων most out of their prime. 15. Περι μεν δη βρωσεως concerning eating them και ποσεως and drinking και and αφροδισιων venereal pleasures ην he was ούτω κατεσκευασμενος thus disposed, και and ῳετο he thought ἡδεσθαι αν that he should take pleasure ουδεν not at all ἡττον αρκουντως less satisfactorily των than those πραγματευομενων πολλα who gave themselves much trouble επι τουτοις in such matters λυπεισθαι δε but was pained πολυ ελαττον much less.

IV. Ει δε but if τινες any men νομιζουσι think Σωκρατη that Socrates, ώς as ενιοι some men γραφουσι τε both write και λεγουσιν and speak τεκμαιρομενοι from conjecture περι αυτου about him, γεγονεναι μεν was κρατιστον most powerful προτρεψασθαι to encourage

ανθρωπους men επ' αρετην to virtue ου δε ικανον but not able προαγαγειν to lead them on επ' αυτην to it, σκεψαμενοι considering μη μονον not only ἁ what [questions] εκεινος he ερωτων asking κολαστηριου ἑνεκα for the sake of chastisement ηλεγχεν used to refute τους οιομενους those who thought ειδεναι that they knew παντα all things, αλλα but και also ἁ what things λεγων saying συνημερευεν he passed the day in company with τοις συνδιατριβουσι those who stopped with him, δοκιμαζοντων let them prove ει whether ην he was ικανος able ποιειν to make τους συνοντας those who were with him βελτιους better. 2. Λεξω δε but I will name πρωτον first ἁ what ηκουσα I heard ποτε once αυτου from him διαλεγομενου discoursing προς Αριστοδημον to Aristodemus επικαλουμενον surnamed τον Μικρον the Little. Καταμαθων γαρ for having learnt αυτον that he ουτε θυοντα neither sacrificed τοις θεοις to the gods ουτε χρωμενον nor used μαντικῃ augury, αλλα but και also καταγελωντα laughed at των ποιουντων those who did ταυτα these things, εφη he said, "Ειπε μοι tell me, ω Αριστοδημε oh Aristodemus, εστιν is [are] there οὑστινας ανθρωπους men whom τεθαυμακας you have admired επι σοφιᾳ for wisdom?". "Εγωγε I have indeed," εφη said he; και ὁς and he εφη said, "Λεξον ἡμιν tell us τα ονοματα αυτων their names." "Επι μεν τοινυν ποιησει for the making επων of epic poetry εγωγε

I indeed τεθαυμακα admire Ὁμηρον Homer μαλιστα most, επι δε διθυραμβῳ but for dithyrambic poetry Μελανιππιδην Melanippides, επι δε τραγῳδιᾳ and for tragedy Σοφοκλεα Sophocles, επι δε ανδριαντοποιᾳ and for statuary Πολυκλειτον Polycleitus, επι δε ζωγραφιᾳ and for painting Ζευξιν Zeuxis." 4. "Ποτερα whether οἱ απεργαζομενοι do those who make ειδωλα images αφρονα τε both senseless και ακινητα and immovable δοκουσιν appear σοι to you ειναι to be αξιοθαυμαστοτεροι more worthy of admiration η or οἱ those [who make] ζῳα animals εμφρονα τε both having sense και ενεργα and having the power of action?" "Πολυ much [more] νη Δια by Jove οἱ ζῳα those [who make] animals, ειπερ γε if indeed ταυτα these γιγνεται are made μη not τυχῃ τινι by some chance αλλα but ὑπο γνωμης by design." "Των δε εχοντων but of those which are situated ατεκμαρτως without any criterion ὁτου ἑνεκα for what purpose εστι they exist και and των of those οντων which exist φανερως manifestly επ' ωφελειᾳ for use ποτερα which of the two κρινεις do you judge εργα [to be] works τυχης of chance και and ποτερα which γνωμης of design?" "Πρεπει μεν it stands clear τα γιγνομενα that those which are επ' ωφελειᾳ for use ειναι are εργα works γνωμης of design." 5. "Ουκ ουν δοκει does [it] not then seem σοι to you ὁ ποιων [that] he who made ανθρωπους men εξ αρχης from the

beginning προσθειναι attached αυτοις to them επ' ωφελεια for use [members] δι ὡν through which αισθανονται they perceive ἑκαστα the several objects, οφθαλμους μεν eyes ὡστε ὁραν so as to see τα ὁρατα the things that can be seen ωτα δε and the ears ὡστε so as ακουειν to hear τα ακουστα the things which can be heard? Τι γε μην what indeed ην αν would be οφελος the use ἡμιν to us οσμων of smells ει if ῥινες the nostrils μη προσετεθησαν had not been added? τις δε and what ην αν would have been αισθησις our perception γλυκεων of things sweet και δριμεων and sour και παντων and of all things των ἡδεων that are pleasant δια στοματος through the mouth, ει if γλωττα the tongue μη ενειργασθη had not been constructed therein γνωμων as the judge τουτων of these? 6. Προς δε τουτοις but in addition to this ου και τυδε does not this also δοκει seem σοι to you εοικεναι to be like εργοις works προνοιας of forethought, επει since ἡ μεν οψις the sight εστιν is ασθενης weak το θυρωσαι αυτην to shut it in βλεφαροις with eye-lids, ἁ which αναπετανυνται μεν open themselves ὁταν when δεῃ τι there is any need χρησθαι αυτῃ to use it, συγκλῃεται δε but are closed εν τῳ ὑπνῳ in sleep? εμφυσαι δε and to implant βλεφαριδας eye-lids ἡθμον as a strainer, ὡς so that μηδε ανεμοι not even the winds βλαπτωσιν αν may harm it? απογεισωσαι τε and to battlement οφρυσι with eye-brows τα the parts ὑπερ των

ομματων above the eyes ὡς so that μηδε neither ὁ ἱδρως the sweat εκ της κεφαλης from the head κακουργῃ may annoy it? το δε and the fact την ακοην that the hearing δεχεσθαι μεν receives πασας φωνας all sounds, μηποτε δε but never εμπιμπλασθαι is filled? και and τους μεν προσθεν οδοντας that the fore teeth πασι ζῳοις in all animals ειναι are οἱους such as δεξαμενους having received παρα τουτων from these λεαινειν to grind? και and καταθειναι μεν to place πλησιον near οφθαλμων the eyes και ῥινων and nostrils στομα the mouth δι' ου through which τα ζῳα animals εισπεμπεται take in ὡν the things which επιθυμει they desire? επει δε and since τα αποχωρουντα those things which come out of us δυσχερη are disagreeable, αποστρεψαι to turn off τους οχετους the passages τουτων of these ᾗ δυνατον προσωτατω as far as possible απο των αισθησεων from the senses—απορεις do you doubt ποτερα whether ταυτα these things πεπραγμενα done οὑτω thus προνοητικως with forethought εστιν are εργα the works τυχης of chance η or γνωμης of design?" 7. "Ου no, μα τον Δια by Jupiter, (εφη said he,) αλλα but σκοπουμενῳ to one looking at it οὑτω γε thus ταυτα these things παυυ εοικεν seem very like τεχνηματι to the contrivance τινος of some one σοφου δημιουργου who is a wise creator και φιλοζωου and fond of animals." "Το δε εμφυσαι μεν and to have implanted

ερωτα the love της τεκνοποιϊας of begetting children, εμφυσαι δε and to have implanted ταις γειναμεναις in the mothers ερωτα the love του εκτροφειν of nourishing [their young], τοις δε τραφεισιν and in the young μεγιστον μεν ποθον the greatest love του ζην of life, μεγιστον δε φοβον and the greatest fear του θανατου of death?" "Αμελει of a truth και ταυτα these things also εοικεν are like μηχανημασι the contrivances τινος of some one βουλευσαμενου who has designed ζωα that animals ειναι should exist."

8. "Συ δε δοκεις but do you think σαυτον that yourself εχειν have φρονιμον τι any kind of intelligence?" ["Ερωτα γουν well question me, και and αποκρινουμαι I will answer." "Οιει δε but do you think ειναι that there is ουδαμου αλλοθι nowhere else ουδεν φρονιμον any thing intelligent? Και ταυτα and this too ειδως knowing ὁτι that εχεις you have εν τῳ σωματι in your body μικρον τε μερος both a small portion γης of earth πολλης ουσης which is so vast και and βραχυ a small part ὑγρου of liquid πολλου οντος which is so abundant, και and that το σωμα the body συνηρμοσται is put together σοι in you λαβοντι receiving μικρον μερος only a small part των αλλων of other elements οντων δηπου which are in truth μεγαλων abundant: δοκεις δε but do you think σε that you μονον alone ευτυχως πως by some happy chance συναρπασαι have caught νουν intelligence

ονται existing *ουδαμου* nowhere, *και* and *οιει* do you think *ταδε* that these [objects of creation] *τα ὑπερμεγεθη* exceeding great *και απειρα* and endless *πληθος* in multitude *εχειν* exist *οὑτως ευτακτως* in such good order *δι' αφροσυνην τινα* by some senseless origin?" 9. "*Μα Δια* by Jove [perhaps I do]: *ου γαρ ὁρω* for I do not see *τους κυριους* the rulers *ὡσπερ* as [I see] *τους δημιουργους* the makers *των* of those things *γενομενων* which are done *ενθαδε* here?" "*Ουδε γαρ* for neither *σιγε ὁρας* do you see *την σαυτου ψυχην* your own soul *ἡ* which *εστιν* is *κυρια* the ruler *του σωματος* of your body, *ὡστε* so that *κατα γε τουτο* according to this at least *εξεστι σοι* it is in your power *λεγειν* to say *ὁτι* that *πραττεις* you do *ουδεν* nothing *γνωμῃ* by design *αλλα* but *παντα* all things *τυχῃ* by chance." 10. *Και* and *ὁ Αριστοδημος* Aristodemus *εφη* said, "*Εγω* I, *ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates, *ου τοι ὑπεροραω* do not despise *το δαιμονιον* the divine power, *αλλα* but *ἡγουμαι* I deem *εκεινο* it *μεγαλοπρεπεστερον* more magnificent *η* than *ὡς* as *προσδεισθαι* to have further need *της εμῆς θεραπειας* of my worship." *Ουκ ουν αυτο* ought it not then," *εφη* said he, "*τιμητεον* to be honoured *τοσουτῳ μαλλον* by so much the more *ὁσῳ* in proportion as *μεγαλοπρεπεστερον* being more magnificient *αξιοι σε* it requires you *θεραπευειν* to worship it?" 11. "*Ευ ισθι* know well," *εφη* said he, "*ὁτι*

that, *ει* if *νομιζοιμι* I thought *θεους* that the gods *φροντιζειν* took thought *τι* at all *ανθρωπων* of men, *ουκ αν αμελοιην* I would not show neglect *αυτων* of them." "*Επειτα* then *ουκ οιει* do you not think *φροντιζειν* that they take thought? *οἱ* [they] who *πρωτον μεν* in the first place *ανεστησαν* have set up *ανθρωπον* man *μονον* the only one *των ζωων* of the animals *ορθον* upright, *ἡ δε ορθοτης* and this uprightness *και* also *ποιει* causes him *δυνασθαι* to be able *προοραν* to see in front of him *πλεον* further *και* and *θεασθαι* to observe *τα ὑπερθεν* things above him *μαλλον* better, *και* and *οἱς* [that those parts] in which *ενεποιησαν* they have placed *οψιν* sight *και ακοην* and hearing *και στομα* and the mouth, *ἡσσον κακοπαθειν* should less suffer injury: *επειτα* and in the next place *εδωκαν μεν* have given *τοις αλλοις ἑρπετοις* to the other animals *ποδας* feet *οἱ* which *παρεχουσι* provide *μονον* only *το πορευεσθαι* the power of walking, *ανθρωπῳ δε* but to man *προσεθεσαν* have added *και χειρας* hands also, *αἱ* which *εξεργαζονται* effect *τα πλειστα* the greater part of those things *οἱς* by which *εσμεν* we are *ευδαιμονεστεροι* happier *εκεινων* than they. 12. *Και μην* and indeed *παντων των ζωων* though all animals *εχοντων* have *γλωτταν γε* a tongue, *εποιησαν* they have made *την* that *των ανθρωπων* of men *μονην* alone *οἱαν* such as *ψαυουσαν* touching *του στοματος* the mouth *αλλοτε* at different times *αλλαχῃ* in a different place

αρθρουν τε both to articulate την φωνην the voice και and σημαινειν to signify αλλήλοις to one another παντα all things ἁ which βουλομεθα we wish. [Το δε δουναι and their having given και also τας ἡδονας the pleasures των ἀφροδισιων of venereal enjoyments τοις μεν αλλοις ζωοις to other animals περιγραψαντας limiting χρονον the time του ετους of the year, παρεχειν δε but allowing ταυτα these ἡμιν to us συνεχως continuously μεχρι γηρως until old age? 13. Ου τοινυν ηρκεσεν it did not however satisfy τῳ θεῳ the god μονον only επιμεληθηναι to take care του σωματος of the body, αλλα but, ὁπερ what εστιν is μεγιστον most important, ενεφυσεν he implanted τῳ ανθρωπῳ in man και also την ψυχην κρατιστην the most powerful spiritual system. 30. Τινος γαρ αλλου ζῳου for of what other animal ψυχη does the spirit ἡσθηται perceive πρωτα μεν first of all θεων about the gods συνταξαντων who have put together τα μεγιστα the greatest και καλλιστα and most beautiful [productions] ὁτι that εισι they exist? Τι δε αλλο φυλον but what other race η than οἱ ανθρωποι men θεραπευουσι worship θεους gods? Ποια δε ψυχη but what system of life ἱκανωτερα is more able της ανθρωπινης than man's προφυλαττεσθαι to foreguard against η λιμον either hunger η διψος or thirst η ψυχη or colds η θαλπη or heats, η or επικουρησαι to give succour τοις νοσοις to diseases, η or ασκησαι to cherish ῥωμην strength,

[η or εκπονησαι to labour προς μαθησιν for learning,] η or εστιν is ἱκανωτερα more able διαμεμνησθαι to remember ὁσα whatever ακουσῃ αν it may have heard η ιδῃ or have seen η μαθῃ or have learned? 14. Ου γαρ πανυ καταδηλον for is it not wholly evident σοι to you ὁτι that ανθρωποι men βιοτευουσι live ὡσπερ θεοι like gods παρα τα αλλα ζῳα compared with the other animals, κρατιστευοντες having the mastery φυσει by nature και both τῳ σωματι in body και τῃ ψυχῃ and soul? Ουτε γαρ for neither εχων αν could [one] having σωμα the body βοος of an ox γνωμην δε and the mind ανθρωπου of a man, εδυνατο αν be able πραττειν to do ἁ what εβουλετο he wished, ουτε nor ὁσα [do those animals] which εχει have χειρας hands, εστι δε but are αφρονα without reason, εχει possess ουδεν πλεον any advantage. Συ δε but do you τετυχηκως who have obtained αμφοτερων both the things των αξιων which are worth πλειστου the most, οιει think θεους that the gods ουκ επιμελεσθαι σου do not care about you? Αλλα but ὁταν when ποιησωσι they shall have done τι what? νομιεις will you think αυτους that they φροντιζειν σου care about you?" 15. "Ὁταν when πεμπωσι they send, ὡσπερ as συ φῃς you say αυτους that they πεμπειν send, συμβουλους advisers ὁ τι what χρη I ought ποιειν to do και and μη ποιειν not to do." "Ὁταν δε but when, (εφη said he,) φραζωσι they signify

Αθηναιοις to the Athenians *πυνθανομενοις* asking *τι* any thing *δια μαντικης* by augury, *ου δοκεις* do you not think *αυτους* that they *φραζειν* signify it *και σοι* to you also? *ουδε* nor *ὁταν* when *προσημαινωσι* they forewarn *τοις Ἑλλησι* the Greeks *πεμποντες* sending *τερατα* prodigies, *ουδε* nor *ὁταν* when *πασιν ανθρωποις* to all mankind; *αλλα* but *εξαιρουντες* choosing out *σε μονον* you alone *κατατιθενται* do they place you *εν αμελειᾳ* in neglect? 16. *Οιει δε* but do you think *τους θεους* that the gods *εμφυσαι αν* would implant *τοις ανθρωποις* in men *δοξαν* an opinion *ὡς* that *εισι* they are *ἱκανοι* able *ευ ποιειν* to do good *η κακως* or evil *ει* if *μη ησαν* they were not *δυνατοι* able, *και* and *ανθρωπους* that men *εξαπατωμενους* being deceived *τον παντα χρονον* for ever *ουδεποτε αν αισθεσθαι* would never have perceived it? *Ουχ ὁρᾳς* do you not see *ὁτι* that *τα πολυχρονιωτατα* the oldest *και σοφωτατα* and wisest *των ανθρωπινων* of human things, *πολεις* cities *και εθνη* and nations, *εστιν* are *θεοσεβεστατα* the most addicted to worship the gods, *και* and *αι φρονιμωτταται ἡλικιαι* the wisest ages [of men] *επιμελεσταται* have the most care *θεων* of the gods? 17. *Ω αγαθε* oh my good friend, (*εφη* said he,) *καταμαθε* learn *ὁτι* that *και ὁ σος νους* your mind also *ενων* being inside *μεταχειριζεται* manages *το σον σωμα* your body *ὁπως* as *βουλεται* it pleases: *χρη ουν* it therefore behoves you *οιεσθαι* to think *και*

την φρονησιν that the intelligence also *εν τῳ παντι* in all things *τιθεσθαι* disposes *παντα* all things *οὑτω* in such a way *ὁπως* as *ᾗ αν* may be *ἡδυ* agreeable *αυτῃ* to it, *και μη* and not *το σον μεν ομμα* that your eye *δυνασθαι* is able *εξικνεισθαι* to reach *επι πολλα σταδια* over many furlongs, *τον δε οφθαλμον* but that the eye *του θεου* of the god *ειναι* is *αδυνατον* unable *ὁραν* to see *παντα* all things *ἁμα* at the same time, *μηδε* nor *την σην μεν ψυχην* that your own soul *δυνασθαι* is able *φροντιζειν* to take thought *και* both *περιτων ενθαδε* of things here *και* and *εν Αιγυπτῳ* in Egypt *και* and *εν Σικελιᾳ* in Sicily, *την δε φρονησιν* but that the prudence *του θεου* of the god *μη ειναι* is not *ἱκανην* able *επιμελεσθαι* to take care *παντων* of all things *ἁμα* at the same time. 18. *Ην μεντοι* if however *ὡσπερ* in the same way as *θεραπευων* by courting *ανθρωπους* men *γιγνωσκεις* you find out *τους εθελοντας* those who are willing *αντιθεραπευειν* to court you in return, *και* and *χαριζομενος* by gratifying them *τους αντιχαριζομενους* those who gratify in return, *και* and *καταμανθανεις* you find out *τους φρονιμους* the prudent *συμβουλευομενος* by consulting with them, *οὑτω* so *και* also *λαμβανῃς* you obtain *πειραν* a trial *των θεων* of the gods *θεραπευων* by worshipping them, *ει* whether *θελησουσι* they will be willing *συμβουλευειν σοι* to advise you *τι* at all *περι των* concerning those things *αδηλων* which are not clear *ανθρωποις* to men, *γνωσει*

you will find out ὁτι that το θειον the deity εστιν is τοσουτον so great και and τοιουτον of such nature ὡστε as ἁμα at the same time ὁραν to see παντα all things και and ακουειν to hear παντα all things και and παρειναι to be present πανταχου everywhere και and επιμελεσθαι to take thought παντων of all things ἁμα at the same time."

19. Εμοι μεν ουν to me then λεγων by saying ταυτα these things εδοκει he seemed ου μονον not only ποιειν to make τους συνοντας his associates απεχεσθαι abstain, ὁποτε whenever ὁρῳντο they were seen ὑπο των ανθρωπων by men, των ανοσιων τε from things that are both unholy και αδικων and unjust και αισχρων and disgraceful, αλλα but και also ὁποτε when ειεν they were εν ερημιᾳ in solitude, επειπερ since ἡγησαιντο they would think μηδεν that none ὡν of the things which πραττοιεν they did διαλαθειν would escape the notice of τους θεους the gods.

V. Ει δε δη but if indeed και also εγκρατεια temperance εστιν is καλον τε both an honourable και αγαθον κτημα and good possession ανδρι to a man, επισκεψωμεθα let us consider ει if προυβιβαζε τι he at all led [men] on εις ταυτην to it λεγων τοιαδε by using such words, "Ω ανδρες oh my friends, ει if πολεμου γενομενου ἡμιν when a war came on us βουλοιμεθα we wished ἑλεσθαι to choose ανδρα a man ὑφ' ου by whom αυτοι μεν we ourselves μαλιστα αν σωζοιμεθα might be best

saved, χειροιμεθα δε and we might conquer τους πολεμιους our enemies, αρα αἱροιμεθα αν should we choose τουτον that man ὁντινα whom αισθανοιμεθα we should perceive ἡττω to be the slave γαστρος of his appetite η or οινου of wine η or αφροδισιων of venereal pleasures [η or πονου of fatigue] η or ὑπνου of sleep? και πως and how οιηθειμεν αν could we think τον τοιουτον that such a man η either σωσειν would save ἡμας us η or κρατησειν conquer τους πολεμιους our enemies? 2. Ει δε but if γενομενοι being επι τελευτῃ at the end του βιου of life βουλοιμεθα we wished επιτρεψαι to commit τῳ to any one η either παιδευσαι to bring up παιδας αρρενας male children η or διαφυλαξαι to be guardian of θυγατερας παρθενους maiden daughters, η or διασωσαι to preserve χρηματα money, αρα ἡγησαιμεθ' αν should we deem τον ακρατη the intemperate man αξιοπιστον trustworthy εις ταυτα for these duties: επιτρεψαιμεν δ' αν and should we trust η either βοσκηματα our flocks η or ταμιεια our store-houses η or επιστασιαν the foremanship εργων of works δουλῳ ακρατει to an intemperate slave; εθελησαιμεν δ' αν and should we be willing προικα even for nothing λαβειν to take τοιουτον such an one διακονον as an agent και and ωνοραστην a man to buy such things for us? 3. Αλλα μην but indeed ει γε if at least μηδε δεξαιμεθα αν we would not accept even δουλον a slave ακρατη who was intemperate, πως

how *ουκ αξιον* is it not worth while *φυλαξασθαι* that [a man] should guard against *γενεσθαι* becoming *τοιουτον* such *αυτον γε* himself? *Και γαρ* for moreover *ουκ* [things are] not [on this footing that] *ὡσπερ* as *οἱ πλεονεκται* over-reaching men *δοκουσι* seem *πλουτιζειν* to enrich *ἑαυτους* themselves *αφαιρουμενοι* whilst taking away *χρηματα* the property *των αλλων* of the rest, *οὑτως* so *ὁ ακρατης* the intemperate man *βλαβερος μεν* is harmful *τοις αλλοις* to others *ωφελιμος δε* and useful *ἑαυτῳ* to himself, *αλλα* but *κακουργος μεν* causes the injury *των αλλων* of others *πολυ δε κακουργοτερος* and still more causes the injury *ἑαυτου* of himself, *ει γε* if at least *εστιν* it is *κακουργοτατον* a most injurious thing *φθειρειν* to ruin *μη μονον* not only *τον οικον τον ἑαυτου* one's own house, *αλλα* but *και* also *το σωμα* one's body *και την ψυχην* and life. 4. *Τις δε* but who *ἡσθειη αν* would be pleased *εν συνουσιᾳ* in society *τῳ τοιουτῳ* with such a man *ὁν* whom *ειδειη* he knew *χαιροντα* to rejoice *μαλλον* more *τῳ οψῳ τε* in both rich fare *και* and *τῳ οινῳ* wine *η* than *τοις φιλοις* in his friends *και* and *αγαπωντα* loving *τας πορνας* harlots *μαλλον* more *η* than *τους ἑταιρους* his companions? *Αρα γε ου χρη* ought not *παντα ανδρα* every man, *ἡγησαμενον* thinking *την εγκρατειαν* temperance *ειναι* to be *κρηπιδα* the base *αρετης* of virtue, *κατασκευασασθαι* to establish *ταυτην* this *πρωτον* first *εν τῃ ψυχῃ* in his soul? 5. *Τις γαρ* for who *ανευ ταυτης*

without this η either μαθοι αν could learn η or μελετησειε study τι αγαθον any thing good αξιολογως worthily; η or τις who δουλευων being a slave ταις ἡδοναις to pleasures ουκ αν διατεθειη would not be affected αισχρως disgracefully και το σωμα both in his body και and την ψυχην his soul? Εμοι μεν to me δοκει it seems νη την Ἡρην by Juno ελευθερῳ μεν ανδρι that for a brave man ευκτον ειναι his prayer should be μη τυχειν not to get hold δουλου τοιουτου of such a slave, δουλευοντι δε but for one who is a slave ταις τοιαυταις ἡδοναις to such pleasures ἱκετευτεον τους θεους he should entreat the gods τυχειν that he may obtain δεσποτων αγαθων good masters: οὑτω γαρ for so μονως alone ὁ τοιουτος αν could such a man σωθειη be saved."

6. Λεγων δε but saying ταυτα this επεδεικνυ he showed ἑαυτον himself ετι still εγκρατεστερον more temperate τοις εργοις by his deeds η than τοις λογοις by his words; εκρατει γαρ for he conquered ου μονον not only των ἡδονων the pleasures δια του σωματος through the body αλλα but και also της δια των χρηματων that which is through money, νομιζων thinking τον λαμβανοντα that he who takes χρηματα money παρα του τυχοντος from any one he meets καθισταναι sets up δεσποτην a master ἑαυτου over himself και and δουλευειν serves δουλειαν a servitude ἡττον αισχραν less disgraceful ουδεμιας than none.

VI. *Αξιον δε αυτου* but it is his due *μη παραλιπειν* not to omit *ἁ* what *διελεχθη* he discoursed *προς Αντιφωντα* against Antipho *τον σοφιστον* the sophist. *Ὁ γαρ Αντιφων* for Antipho *ποτε* once upon a time, *βουλομενος* wishing *παρελεσθαι* to draw away *τους συνουσιαστας αυτου* his associates, *προσελθων* coming up *τῳ Σωκρατει* to Socrates *παροντων αυτων* when they were present, *ελεξε* said *ταδε* these words: 2. "*Ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates, *εγω μεν* I indeed *ᾠμην* used to think *τους φιλοσοφουντας* that those who philosophize *χρηναι* ought *γιγνεσθαι* to become *ευδαιμονεστερους* happier, *συ δε* but you *δοκεις* seem *μοι* to me *απολελαυκεναι* to have reaped *τα εναντια* the very opposite [fruits] *της φιλοσοφιας* of philosophy. *Ζῃς γουν* at least you live *οὑτως* in such a way *ὡς* as *ουδε εἱς* not a single man *δουλος* who was a slave *μεινειε διαιτωμενος* would continue to live *ὑπο δεσποτῃ* under a master. *Σιτει τε* you both feed on *σιτα* food *και πινεις* and drink *ποτα* drinks *τα φαυλοτατα* the very worst, *και* and *ημφιεσαι* you are clothed *ἱματιον* in a garment *ου μονον* not only *φαυλον* bad *αλλα* but *το αυτο* the same *θερους τε* both summer *και χειμωνος* and winter, *διατελεις τε* and you continue *ανυποδητος τε* both unshod *και* and *αχιτων* without tunic. 3. *Και μην* and indeed *ου λαμβανεις* you do not take *χρηματα* money, *ἁ* which *και ευφραινει* both cheers *κτωμενους* men gaining it *και* and *ποιει* makes *κεκτημενους* those who have

gained it ζην live ελευθεριωτερον τε both more liberally και ηδιον and more pleasantly. Ει ουν if then, ωσπερ as οι διδασκαλοι the teachers και των αλλων εργων of other occupations also αποδεικνυασι produce τους μαθητας their disciples μιμητας imitators εαυτων of themselves, ουτω so και συ you also διαθησεις shall dispose τους συνοντας those who associate with you, νομιζε consider ειναι that you are διδασκαλος a teacher κακοδαιμονιας of evil-fortune." 4. Και ὁ Σωκρατης and Socrates ειπε said προς ταυτα in reply to this, "Δοκεις you seem μοι to me, ω Αντιφων oh Antipho, ὑπειληφεναι to have formed the idea με that I ζην live ουτως ανιαρως so painfully ὡστε that πεπεισμαι I am persuaded σε that you ἑλεσθαι αν would choose μαλλον rather αποθανειν to die η than ζην to live ὡσπερ εγω as I do. Ιθι ουν come then επισκεψωμεθα let us consider τι what ησθησαι you have perceived χαλεπον painful του εμου βιου in my life. 5. Ποτερον is it ὁτι that αναγκαιον εστιν it is necessary τοις μεν λαμβανουσι for those who take αργυριον money απεργαζεσθαι to execute τουτο that [work] εφ' ὡπερ for which λαβωσιν αν they take μισθον hire, εμοι δε but for me μη λαμβανοντι who do not take it ουκ αναγκη there is no necessity διαλεγεσθαι to converse ᾧ with [any one with] whom μη βουλωμαι αν I do not choose? η or φαυλιζεις do you vilify την διαιταν μου my mode of life ὡς

εμου εσθιοντος on the ground that I eat ηττον μεν ὑγιεινα things less wholesome παρεχοντα δε and produced ισχυν strength ἥττον less η σου than you; η or ὡς that τα εμα διαιτηματα my articles of diet χαλεπωτερα are more difficult πορισασθαι to procure των σων than yours δια το ειναι through being σπανιωτερα τε both more scarce και and πολυτελεστερα more costly; η or ὡς that ἃ the things which συ παρασκευαζει you prepare οντα are ἡδιω more pleasant σοι to you η than ἃ those which εγω I procure εμοι to me? Ουκ οισθα do you not know ὅτι that ὁ μεν εσθιων he who eats ἥδιστα with the most pleasure ἥκιστα δειται has least need οψου of sauce, ὁ δε πινων and he who drinks ἥδιστα with the most pleasure ἥκιστα επιθυμει has least desire ποτου of drink του μη παροντος which is not at hand? 6. Οισθα μην you know indeed ὅτι that οἱ μεταβαλλομενοι those who change τα γε ἱματια their clothes μεταβαλλονται change them ψυχους ἕνεκα on account of cold και θαλπους and heat, και and ὑποδουνται shoe themselves ὑποδηματα with shoes ὅπως that μη κωλυωνται they may not be prevented πορευεσθαι from walking δια τα λυπουντα through things which pain τους ποδας the feet. Ἤδη ουν ποτε ἠσθου have you then ever yet perceived εμε me η either μενοντα stopping ενδον within δια ψυχος on account of cold μαλλον more το than any other person, η or δια θαλπος on

account of the heat μαχομενον fighting τῳ with any one περι σκιας for shade, η or ου βαδιζοντα not going ὁποι αν βουλωμαι wherever I please δια το αλγειν through its paining τους ποδας my feet? 7. Ουκ οισθα do you not know ὁτι that οἱ ασθενεστατοι those who are weakest φυσει by nature τῳ σωματι in body μελετησαντες by practising γιγνονται τε both become κρειττους stronger των ισχυροτατων than the strongest αμελησαντων who neglect to do so προς ἁ for those matters on which μελετησωσι αν they practise και φερουσιν and bear αυτα them ῥᾳον more easily? Ου δε αρα οιει but do you then not think εμε that I αει μελετωντα who am always enuring myself καρτερειν to bear τῳ σωματι with my body τα συντυγχανοντα those things which happen to it φερειν bear παντα all things ῥᾳον more easily σου than you μη μελετωντος who do not practise it? 8. Οιει δε and do you think αλλο τι than any other thing ειναι is αιτιωτερον rather the cause του μη δουλευειν of not being a slave γαστρι to appetite μηδε ὑπνῳ nor sleep και λαγνεια and venery η than το εχειν having ἑτερα other things ἡδιω more pleasant τουτων than these, ἁ which ευφραινει give pleasure ου μονον not only οντα εν χρειᾳ when in use αλλα but και also παρεχοντα furnishing ελπιδας hopes αει ωφελησειν that they will always be beneficial; και μην and indeed οισθα you know τουτο γε this, ὁτι that οἱ μεν οιομενοι those who think ευ πραττ-

τειν that they are well off μηδεν in nothing ουκ ευφραινονται are not cheerful, οἱ δε ἡγουμενοι but those who think η γεωργιαν that either agriculture η ναυκληριαν or seamanship η or αλλο any other thing ὁ τι which τυγχανωσιν αν εργαζομενοι they may chance to be working at καλως προχωρειν is prospering ἑαυτοις for them, ευφραινονται are in good spirits ὡς as ευ πραττοντες doing well. 9. Οιει ουν do you think then ειναι that there is τοσαυτην ἡδονην as great pleasure απο παντων τουτων from all these things ὁσην as απο του ἡγεισθαι τε from both thinking ἑαυτον that one's self γιγνεσθαι becomes βελτιω better και and κτασθαι from getting φιλους αμεινους better friends? [Εγω τοινυν I for my part διατελω shall continue ταυτα νομιζων holding these sentiments.] Εαν δε δη but if indeed δεῃ it be necessary ωφελειν to do good to φιλους one's friends η or πολιν the state, ποτερῳ to which of the two πλειων σχολη is there greater leisure επιμελεσθαι to make study τουτων of these things, τῳ διαιτωμενῳ to him who lives ὡς εγω νυν as I do now η or τῳ to him [who lives] ὡς as συ you μακαριζεις think happy? Ποτερος δε and which of the two στρατευοιτο αν would go on a campaign ῥαον more easily, ὁ μη δυναμενος he who is not able ζην to live ανευ πολυτελους διαιτης without a costly menage, η or ᾧ he to whom παρον that which belongs to him αρκοιη is

sufficient? *Ποτερος δε* and which of the two *εκπολιορκηθειη αν* would be besieged out *θαττον* the more quickly, *ὁ δεομενος* he who has need *των χαλεπωτατων* of the things most difficult *εὑρειν* to find, *η* or *ὁ χρωμενος* he who uses *αρκουντως* sufficiently *τοις ῥᾳστοις* those which are most easy *εντυγχανειν* to meet with? 10. *Εοικας* you are like, *ω Αντιφων* oh Antiphon, *οιομενῳ* to one who thinks *την ευδαιμονιαν* that happiness *ειναι* is *τρυφην* luxury *και πολυτελειαν* and expense: *εγω δε νομιζω* but I think *το μεν δεισθαῖ* that to be in want *μηδενος* of nothing *ειναι* is *θειον* a divine thing, *το δε* but to [be in want] *ὡς ελαχιστων* of as few things as possible *εγγυτατω* is nearest *του θειου* to what is divine, *και* and *το μεν θειον* that what is divine *κρατιστον* is the best, *το δε εγγυτατω* but that what is nearest *του θειου* to the divine *εγγυτατω* is nearest *του κρατιστου* to the best."

11. *Παλιν δε* but again *ποτε* once *ὁ Αντιφων* Antiphon *διαλεγομενος* conversing *τῳ Σωκρατει* with Socrates *ειπε* said, "*Ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates; *εγω τοι* I indeed, *νομιζω σε* deem you *δικαιον μεν* just *σοφον δε* but wise *ουδ' ὁπωστιουν* not even in the least degree; *δοκεις δε* but you seem *μοι* to me *και αυτος* yourself also *γιγνωσκειν* to know *τουτο* this: *πραττει γουν* you exact for instance *ουδενα* from no one *αργυριων* money *της συνουσιας* for your company: *καιτοι* and yet *νομιζων*

considering το γε ἱματιον your garment η or την οικιαν your house η or αλλο τι any other ὡν of the things which κεκτησαι you possess ειναι to be αξιον αργυριου worth money, ουδενι to no one μη ὁτι not to say προικα for nothing δοιης αν would you give it, αλλα but ουδε not even λαβων receiving ελαττον less της αξιας than the value. 12. Δηλον δη it is clear then ὁτι that ει και if also ῳου you thought την συνουσιαν your company ειναι to be αξιαν τινος worth any thing, επραττου αν you would have exacted αργυριον money ουκ ελαττον not less της αξιας than the value και ταυτης of this also. Δικαιος μεν ουν just then ειης αν you may be, ὁτι because ουκ εξαπατας you do not deceive επι πλεονεξιᾳ for covetousness, σοφος δε but wise ουκ αν you cannot be, επισταμενος since you know αξια μηδενος γε things that are worth nothing." 13. Ὁ δε Σωκρατης but Socrates προς ταυτα in reply to this ειπε said, "Ω Αντιφων oh Antiphon νομιζεται it is thought παρ' ἡμιν among us ειναι that it is ὁμοιως μεν καλον equally honourable ὁμοιως δε αισχρον and equally dishonourable διατιθεσθαι to dispose of την ὡραν beauty και and την σοφιαν wisdom. Εαν τε γαρ for both if τις any one πωλῃ sell αργυριου for money την μεν ὡραν beauty τῳ βουλομενῳ to him who wishes [to buy it], αποκαλουσι they call αυτον him πορνον a prostitute, εαν δε but if τις any one ποιηται make φιλον a friend ἑαυτῳ to himself τουτον that man, ὁν whom

γνῳ αν he may know οντα to be ερασταν a lover [of himself] καλον τε both honourable και αγαθον and good, νομιζομεν we deem him σωφρονα prudent: και and ὡσαυτως in like manner αποκαλουσι they call σοφιστας sophists, ὡσπερ πορνους as it were prostitutes, τους μεν πωλουντας those who sell την σοφιαν wisdom αργυριου for money τῳ βουλομενῳ to him who wishes [to buy], ὁστις δε but whosoever ποιειται makes φιλον a friend ὁν whomsoever γνῳ αν he knows οντα to be ευφυα of a good disposition διδασκων teaching him ὁ τι αγαθον whatever good thing εχῃ αν he may possess, νομιζομεν we deem τουτον that he ποιειν does ἁ those things which προσηκει are fitting τῳ καλῳ for the good και and αγαθῳ πολιτει honourable citizen. 14. Εγω δε ουν but I therefore και αυτος myself also, ω Αντιφων oh Antiphon, ὡσπερ as αλλος τις any other man ἡδεται takes pleasure η either ἱππῳ αγαθῳ in a fine horse η κυνι or dog η ορνιθει or bird, οὑτω in the same way, και ετι μαλλον and still more, ἡδομαι take pleasure φιλοις αγαθοις in good friends, και and διδασκω teach them εαν if εχω I have αγαθον τι any good thing, και and συνιστημι bring them into contact αλλοις with others παρ' ων from whom ἡγωμαι αν I may think αυτους that they ωφελησεσθαι will be benefitted τι in any way εις αρετην towards virtue. Και and τους θησαυρους the treasures σοφων ανδρων of wise men των παλαι of old time, οὑς which εκεινοι they γραψαντες having

written εν βιβλιοις in books κατελιπον have left, ανελιττων unrolling διερχομαι I peruse κοινῃ in common συν τοις φιλοις with my friends, και and αν if ὁρωμεν we see τι αγαθον any thing good, εκλεγομεθα we pick it out, και and νομιζομεν we deem it μεγα κερδος a great gain, εαν if γιγνωμεθα we become ωφελιμοι useful αλληλοις to one another." Εμοι μεν δη to me then ακουοντι hearing ταυτα these sentiments, εδοκει he seemed αυτος τε both himself ειναι to be μακαριος happy και and αγειν to lead τους ακουοντας those who heard him επι καλοκαγαθιαν to honour and goodness.

15. Και παλιν ποτε and again once του Αντιφωντος Antiphon ερομενου αυτον asking him πως how ἡγοιτο he thought ποιειν to make αλλους μεν others πολιτικους politicians αυτος δε but himself ου πραττοι did not practice τα πολιτικα political business, ειπερ even if επισταιτο he knew about it; "Ποτερως δε but in which of the two ways," εφη said he, "ω Αντιφων oh Antiphon, πραττοιμι should I practice τα πολιτικα political matters μαλλον the more, ει if πραττοιμι I practiced αυτα them μονος alone η or ει if επιμελοιμην, I took charge του ειναι of there being ὡς πλειστους as many as possible ἱκανους able πραττειν αυτα to practice them?"

VII. Επισκεψωμεθα δε but let us consider ει whether και also αποτρεπων dissuading τους συνοντας those who associated with him

αλαζονειας from arrogance προυτρεπεν he exhorted them επιμελεσθαι αρετης to aim at virtue. Αει γαρ ελεγε for he always said ὡς that ουκ ειη there was not καλλιων ὁδος a better road επ' ευδοξιαν to a good reputation η than δι' ἡς that by which τις any one γενοιτο αν might become αγαθος excellent τουτο in that ὁ in which και also βουλοιτο he wished δοκειν to be thought so. 2. Εδιδασκε δε but he taught ὡδε in this way ὁτι that ελεγεν he said αληθη what was true: "Ενθυμωμεθα γαρ for let us consider," εφη said he, "ει if τις any one μη ων not being αγαθος αυλητης a good flute-player βουλοιτο wished δοκειν to be thought so, τι what ειη αν would be ποιητεον αυτῳ necessary for him to do? Αρα ου μιμητεον would he not have to imitate τους αγαθους αυλητας good flute-players τα εξω in the matters that are beyond της τεχνης the art? Και πρωτον μεν and first, ὁτι because εκεινοι they κεκτηνται τε both possess σκευην καλην a fine dress και and περιαγονται lead about with them πολλους ακολουθους many followers, ταυτα ποιητεον this must be done και τουτῳ by him also; επειτα then ὁτι because πολλοι many επαινουσι praise εκεινους them, και τουτῳ παρασκευαστεον he also must procure πολλους επαινετας many applauders. Αλλα μην but however ουδαμου ληπτεον he must nowhere undertake εργον γε the practice [of his art] ἡ or ευθυς ελεγχθησεται he will at once be convicted γελοιος ων of being con-

temptible *και* and *ου μονον* not only *κακος αυλητης* a bad flute-player, *αλλα* but *και* also *ανθρωπος αλαζων* an arrogant man. *Καιτοι* and so *δαπανων μεν* expending *πολλα* much money, *ωφελουμενος δε* and benefitted *ουδεν* in nothing, *προς δε τουτοις* and in addition to this *κακοδοξων* having an evil reputation, *πως* how *ου βιωσεται* will he not live *επιπονως τε* both painfully *και* and *αλυσιτελως* unprofitably *και* and *καταγελαστως* contemptibly? 3. *Ὡς δε αυτως* and in the same way *ει* if *τις* any one *βουλοιτο* wished *φαινεσθαι* to appear *μη ων* though he was not in reality *αγαθος στρατηγος* a good general *η κυβερνητης* or pilot, *εννοωμεν* let us consider *τι* what *συμβαινοι αν* would happen *αυτῳ* to him. *Αρα ου τουτο αν* would not this *ειη* be *λυπηρον* painful, *ει μεν* if *επιθυμων* being desirous *του δοκειν* of seeming *ειναι* to be *ἱκανος* able *πραττειν ταυτα* to do this *μη δυναιτο* he should not be able *πειθειν* to persuade [people of it]? *ει δε* but if *πεισειεν* he should persuade them, *ετι* still *αθλιωτερον* more wretched? *Δηλον γαρ* for it is clear *ὁτι* that *ὁ μη επισταμενος* the man who does not know how *κυβερναν* to steer a ship *η* or *στρατηγειν* to lead an army *καταστασθεις* if appointed [to do so] *απολεσειεν αν* would ruin *οὑς* those whom *ἡκιστα αν βουλοιτο* he would least wish to *και* and *αυτος* himself *απαλλαξειεν αν* would get off *αισχρως* disgracefully *και κακως* and evilly." 4. *Ὡσαυτως δε* and in like manner *απεφαινεν*

he snowed *και* also *το δοκειν* that to appear *πλουσιον* rich *και* and *το* to [appear] *ανδρειον* valiant *και* and *το* to [appear] *ισχυρον* strong *μη ονται* when a man is not so *αλυσιτελες* is unprofitable. *Εφη γαρ* for he said *μειζω* that greater tasks *η* than *κατα δυναμιν* according to their power *προστατεσθαι* are assigned *αυτοις* to them *και* and *μη δυναμενους* that not being able *ποιειν* to do *ταυτα* these *δοκουντας* when they seemed *ειναι* to be *ἱκανους* able *ουκ αν τυγχανειν* they would not obtain *συγγνωμης* forgiveness. 5. *Εκαλει δε* and he called [a man] *ου μικρον απατεωνα* no little impostor, *ει* if *τις* any one *λαβων* having taken *αργυριον* money *η σκευος* or goods *παρα του* from any *πειθοι* by persuasion *αποστεροιη* should deprive him of it, *πολυ δε μεγιστον* but by far the greatest *ὁστις* [him] who *ων* being *αξιος μηδενος* of no worth *εξαπατηκοι* should have deceived *πειθων* persuading *ὡς* that *ειη* he was *ἱκανος* able *ἡγεισθαι* to undertake the rule *της πολεως* of the state. *Εμοι μεν ουν* to me therefore *εδοκει* he seemed *και* also *αποτρεπειν* to dissuade *τους συνοντας* his associates *του αλαζονευεσθαι* from being arrogant *διαλεγομενος* discoursing with them *τοιαδε* such things.

XENOPHON'S

MEMORABILIA.

BOOK II.

Εδοκει δε but he seemed *και* also *λεγων* saying *τοιαυτα* such things *προτρεπειν* to exhort *τους συνοντας* those who associated with him *ασκειν* to cultivate *εγκρατειαν* temperance *προς επιθυμιαν* towards the desire *βρωτου* of meat *και ποτου* and drink *και λαγνειας* and venery *και ὑπνου* and sleep *και ῥιγους* and cold *και θαλπους* and heat *και πονου* and toil. · *Γνους δε* but having noticed *τινα* some one *των συνοντων* of his associates *ακολαστοτερως εχοντα* too unrestrainedly inclined *προς τα τοιαυτα* to such things, "*Ειπὲ μοι* tell me," *εφη* said he, "*ω Αριστιππε* oh Aristippus, *ει* if *δεοι* it were needful *σε* that you *παραλαβοντα* taking *δυο* two *των νεων* of the young *παιδευειν* should educate them,

τον μεν the one, *ὁπως* that *εσται* he shall be *ἱκανος* fit *αρχειν* to govern *τον δε* but the other *ὁπως* that *μηδε αντιποιησεται* he shall not even lay claim to *αρχης* government, *πως* how *παιδευοις αν* would you educate *ἑκατερον* each of the two? *Βουλει* are you willing *σκοπωμεν* that we consider, *αρξαμενοι* beginning *απο της τροφης* from their food, *ὡσπερ* as if *απο των στοιχειων* from principles?" *Και ὁ Αριστιππος* and Aristippus *εφη* said, "*Ἡ γουν τροφη* the food certainly *δοκει μοι* seems to me *ειναι* to be *αρχη* a principle: *τις γαρ* for any one *ουδε ζῳη γ' αν* could not even live *ει μη* unless *τρεφοιτο* he were fed." 2. "*Ουκ ουν εικος* is it not then likely *το μεν βουλεσθαι* that the wish *ἁπτεσθαι σιτου* to get hold of food *παραγιγνεσθαι* should be present *αμφοτεροις* to both, *ὁταν* when *ὡρα* the hour *ἡκῃ* has come?" "[Yes:] *εικος γαρ* for it is likely," *εφη* said he. "*Ποτερον ουν* which of the two then *αυτων* of them *εθεζοιμεν αν* should we accustom *το προαιρεισθαι* to choose *μαλλον* rather *πραττειν* to do *το κατεπειγον* that which was urgent *η* than *χαριζεσθαι* to gratify *τῃ γαστρι* the appetite?" "*Τον παιδευομενον* the one who was being educated *νη Δια* by Jove," *εφη* said he, "*εις το αρχειν* for government." "*Ουκουν προσθετεον* must we not then enjoin *τῳ αυτῳ* on the same [youth], *και* also *ὁταν* when *βουλωνται* they wish *πιειν* to drink, *το δυνασθαι* to be able *ανεχεσθαι* to endure *διψωντα* being

thirsty?" "*Πανυ μεν ουν* certainly therefore," *εφη* said he. 3. "*Ποτερῳ δε* but on which of the two *προσθειμεν αν* should we impose *το ειναι* to be *εγκρατη* temperate *ὑπνου* in sleep, *ὡστε* so as *δυνασθαι* to be able *και* both *κοιμηθηναι* to sleep *οψε* late *και* and *αναστηναι* to rise *πρῳ* early *και* and *αγρυπνησαι* to be watchful, *ει* if *δεοι τι* it were at all needful?" "*Και τουτο* this too," *εφη* said he, "*τῳ αυτῳ* [must be imposed] on the same youth." "*Τι δε* but what," *εφη* said he, "*το ειναι* [about] being *εγκρατη* temperate *αφροδισιων* in love matters, *ὡστε* so as *μη κωλυεσθαι* not to be prevented *δια ταυτα* through them *πραττειν* from doing *ει τι* whatever *δεοι* were needful?" "*Και τουτο* this also, (*εφη* said he,) *τῳ αυτῳ* [must be imposed] on the same youth." "*Τι δε* but what? *ποτερῳ* to which of the two *προσθειμεν αν* should we impose *το μη φευγειν* not to sherk *τους πονους* toils, *αλλα* but *ὑπομενειν* to bear them *εθελοντην* willingly?" "*Και τουτο* this too," *εφη* said he, "*τῳ παιδευομενῳ* on him who is being taught *αρχειν* to govern." "*Τι δε* but what? *ποτερῳ* on which of the two *μαλλον αν πρεποι* would it be more suitable *προσθειναι* to enjoin in addition *το μαθειν* to learn *ει τι μαθημα* whatever knowledge *εστιν* is *επιτηδειον* useful *προς το κρατειν* towards mastering *των αντιπαλων* his antagonists?" "*Πολυ* far [more] *νη Δια* by Jove, (*εφη* said he,) *τῳ παιδευομενῳ* on him who is being educated

αρχειν for government: ουδεν γαρ οφελος for there is no use και των αλλων in the others also ανευ των τοιουτων μαθηματων without such qualifications." 4. "Ουκουν αν would not then ὁ πεπαιδευμενος he who has been educated οὑτω so δοκει seem σοι to you ἧττον less [likely] η than τα λοιπα ζῳα the other animals ἁλισκεσθαι to be caught ὑπο των αντιπαλων by their enemies? Τουτων μεν γαρ δηπου for of these, you know, τα μεν some δελεαζομενα ensnared γαστρι by their appetite, και ενια although some of them μαλα δυσωπουμενα being exceedingly shy, ὁμως yet αγομενα led προς το δελεαρ to the bait τῃ επιθυμιᾳ by the desire του φαγειν of eating ἁλισκεται are caught, τα δε and others ενεδρευεται are ensnared ποτῳ by drink." "Πανυ μεν ουν certainly therefore," εφη said he. "Ουκ ουν και αλλα do not others too εμπιπτουσι fall into τοις θηρατροις hunting-snares φερομενοι impelled ὑπο λαγνειας by lasciviousness, οἷον as for instance οἵ τε ορτυγες both quails και περδικες and partridges προς την φωνην at the cry της θηλειας of the female τῃ επιθυμιᾳ by the desire και ελπιδι and hope αφροδισιων of venery, και and εξισταμενοι abstaining του αναλογιζεσθαι from calculating τα δεινα the dangers?" 5. Συνεφη he agreed to και ταυτα this also. "Ουκ ουν δοκει does it not then seem σοι to you ειναι to be αισχρον shameful ανθρωπῳ to a man πασχειν τα αυτα to have the same passions

τοις αφρονεστατοις with the most senseless των θηριων of the beasts? ὡσπερ as οἱ μοιχοι adulterers εισερχονται enter εις τας εἱρκτας into enclosures, ειδοτες knowing ὁτι that κινδυνος there is danger τῳ μοιχευοντι to the adulterer παθειν τε both to suffer ἁ what ὁ νομος the law απειλει threatens και and ενεδρευθηναι to be plotted against και and ληφθεντα when caught ὑβρισθηναι to be insulted: και and τηλικουτων μεν such great things κακων τε both evil και αισχρων and base επικειμενων hanging over τῳ μοιχευοντι the adulterer, οντων δε πολλων and those things being numerous των απολυσοντων which will release him της επιθυμιας from the desire των αφροδισιων of venereal pleasures εν αδειᾳ without fear, ἀρ' ου τουτο εστιν is not this ηδη at once παντα-πασιν altogether κακοδαιμονωντος [the part] of an unlucky man, ὁμως notwithstanding [what has been said] φερεσθαι to rush εις τα επικινδυνα into those dangerous acts?" "Εμοιγε to me δοκει it seems so," εφη said he. "Ου δε δοκει but does it not seem σοι to you ειναι to be πολλη αμελεια much negligence το the [fact] πλειστας μεν πραξεις that most operations τας αναγκαιοτατας the most necessary ανθρωποις to men ειναι are carried on εν ὑπαιθρῳ in the open air οἱον as τας τε πολεμικας both those of war και and τας γεωργικας those of husbandry, και and ου τας ελαχιστας not the least των αλλων of the others, τους δε πολλους but that most men αγυμναστως

εχειν are without practice προς τε ψυχη both against cold και θαλπη and heat?" Συνεφη he assented to και τουτο this also. "Ουκ ουν δοκει σοι does it not then seem to you τον μελλοντα that he who intends αρχειν to govern δειν ought ασκειν to bear ταυτα these things ευπετως with ease?" "Πανυ μεν ουν certainly then," εφη said he. 7. "Ει ουν if then ταττομεν we classify τους εγκρατεις those who have the mastery τουτων απαντων of all these things εις τους αρχικους among men suited for government, ου ταξομεν shall we not class τους αδυνατους those who are unable ποιειν to do ταυτα these things εις τους among those μηδε αντιποιησομενους who will not even make a claim του αρχειν of governing?" Συνεφη he agreed to και τουτο this also. "Τι ουν what then? επειδη since και also οισθα you know την ταξιν the estimate εκατερου του φυλου of each class τουτων of these, ηδη ποτε επεσκεψω have you ever already considered εις ποτεραν into which των ταξεων τουτων of these classes δικαιως with justice ταττοις αν you might class σαυτον yourself?" 8. "Εγωγε I for my part, [have]" εφη said ὁ Αριστιππος Aristippus, "και and ουδαμως γε by no means ταττω do I rank εμαυτον myself εις την ταξιν in the class των βουλομενων of those who wish αρχειν to govern. Και γαρ for also, του παρασκευαζειν the procuring τα δεοντα what is wanting εαυτῳ to one's self οντος being μεγαλου εργου

a great task, το the fact τουτο that this μη αρκειν does not suffice, αλλα but προσαναθεσθαι to impose on one's self το πορίζειν to procure και τοις αλλοις πολιταις for the other citizens also ὡν the things which δεονται they need δοκει seems μοι to me πανυ altogether ειναι to be [the part] αφρονος ανθρωπου of a man wanting sense; και and πολλα μεν that many things ελλειπειν should be wanting ἑαυτῳ to one's self ὡν of the things which βουλεται he wishes to have, προεστωτα δε but that being at the head της πολεως of the city, εαν if μη καταπραττη he does not accomplish παντα all things ὁσα as many as ἡ πολις the city βουλεται wishes, ὑπεχειν δικην he must incur the responsibility τουτου of this, πως how ουκ εστιν is not τουτο this πολλη αφροσυνη much folly? 9. Και γαρ for also αἱ πολεις states αξιοῦσι think it right χρησθαι to use τοις αρχουσι their rulers ὥσπερ as εγω I τοις οικεταις my domestics. Εγω τε γαρ for both I αξιω claim τους θεραποντας that my servants παρασκευαζειν μεν should provide τα επιτηδεια necessaries αφθονα in abundance εμοι for me, αυτους δε but that themselves ἅπτεσθαι should touch μηδενος none τουτων of these things, αἵ τε πολεις and states οιονται think τους αρχοντας that their rulers χρηναι ought πορίζειν μεν to provide ἑαυταις for them ὡς πλειστα αγαθα as many good things as possible, αυτους δε but themselves απεχεσθαι abstain παντων τουτων from all these. Εγω ουν I then παιδευσας educating οὕτως

in this way τους μεν βουλομενους those who wish εχειν τε both to have και and παρεχειν to cause αλλοις to others πολλα πραγματα many cares καταστησαιμι αν would introduce them εις τους αρχικους among those qualified to govern: εμαυτον γε μεντοι but myself ταττω I class εις τους βουλομενους among those who wish βιοτευειν to live ᾗ in whatever way ῥᾳστα τε is both easiest και ἡδιστα and most pleasant."

10. Και and ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates εφη said, "Βουλει ουν are you willing then σκεψωμεθα that we consider και τουτο this also, ποτεροι which [men] of the two [classes] ζωσι live ἡδιον the more pleasantly, οἱ αρχοντες the rulers η or οἱ αρχομενοι those ruled?" "Πανυ μεν ουν by all means then," εφη said he. "Πρωτον μεν τοινυν now first then, των εθνων of the nations ὧν which ἡμεις we ισμεν know εν μεν τῃ Ασιᾳ in Asia Περσαι μεν the Persians αρχουσι bear rule, Συροι δε but the Syrians και Φρυγες and the Phrygians και Λυδοι and the Lydians αρχονται are ruled: εν δε τῃ Ευρωπῃ but in Europe Σκυθαι μεν the Scythians αρχουσι rule Μαιωται δε and the Mæotæ αρχονται are ruled: εν δε τῃ Λιβυῃ and in Lybia Καρχηδονιοι μεν the Carthaginians αρχουσι rule, Λιβυες δε and the Lybians αρχονται are ruled. Ποτερους ουν which then τουτων of these οιει do you think ζην live ἡδιον most pleasantly? Η or των Ελληνων of the Greeks, εν οἷς among whom

και αυτος ει you yourself also are, ποτεροι which of the two δοκουσι seem σοι to you ζην to live ηδιον most pleasantly, [οι κρατουντες the rulers η or οι κρατουμενοι the ruled] ?"
11. "Αλλα εγω τοι but yet I," εφη said ὁ Αριστιππος Aristippus, "ουδε neither τατταω rank εμαυτον myself εις την δουλειαν in slavery [among slaves], αλλα but δοκει there seems μοι to me ειναι to be ὁδος τις a kind of way μεση τουτων between these, ἡν which πειρωμαι I endeavour βαδιζειν to go, ουτε neither δι' αρχης through rule ουτε nor δια δουλειας through slavery, ἡπερ which αγει leads μαλιστα most προς ευδαιμονιαν to happiness."
12. "Αλλα but, ει μεν if," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ὡσπερ as αὑτη ἡ ὁδος this road φερει leads ουτε neither δι' αρχης through rule ουτε nor δια δουλειας through slavery, οὑτω so [it led] μηδε neither δι' ανθρωπων through mankind, ισως perhaps λεγοις αν τι you might say something [worth hearing] : ει μεντοι if however ων being εν ανθρωποις among men αξιωσεις you shall ask μητε neither αρχειν to rule μητε nor αρχεσθαι be ruled, μηδε θεραπευσεις and will not court τους αρχοντας your rulers ἑκων willingly, οιμαι I think σε that you ὁραν see ὡς that κρειττονες those who are stronger επισται know how καθισαντες setting down ἡττονας those who are weaker και κοινῃ publicly και ιδια and privately κλαοντ- tears χρησθαι to make use of them δου

λοις as slaves. *Η* or *λανθανουσι* do those escape your notice *οἱ τεμνοντες τε* who both cut, *αλλων σπειραντων* when others have sown *και φυτευσαντων* and planted *τον σιτον* the corn, *και δενδροκοπουντες* and who fell the trees *και πολιορκουντες* and besiege *παντα τροπον* in every way *τους ἡττονας* those who are weaker *και* and *μη θελοντας* are not willing *θεραπευειν* to pay respect to them, *ἑως* until *πεισωσιν αν* they have persuaded them *ἑλεσθαι* to choose *δουλευειν* to be slaves *αντι του πολεμειν* instead of making war *τοις κρειττοσιν* against their superiors? *Και* and *ιδια* privately *αν* again *ουκ οισθα* do you not know *ὁτι* that *οἱ ανδρειοι* the manly *και* and *οἱ δυνατοι* the powerful *καταδουλωσαμενοι* enslaving *τους ανανδρους* the unmanly *και* and *αδυνατους* the powerless *καρπουνται* enjoy the fruits?" "*Αλλα* but *εγω τοι* I (*εφη* said he) *ἱνα* that *μη πασχω* I may not suffer *ταυτα* this, *ουδε κατακλησω* do not even confine *εμαυτον* myself *εις πολιτειαν* in a government, *αλλα* but *ειμι* I am *ξενος* as stranger *παντα χου* everywhere." 14. *Και* and *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates *εφη* said: "*Τουτο μεντοι* this indeed *ηδη λεγεις* [which] you now say *δεινον παλαισμα* [is] a marvellous exertion. *Ουδεις γαρ* for no one *ετι* any longer *αδικει* harms *τους ξενους* strangers *ἐξ οὑ* from the time when *ὁ τε Σινις* both Sinis *και* and *ὁ Σκειρων* Skeiron *και* and *ὁ Προκρουστης* Procrustes *απεθανον* died: *αλλα* but *νυν* now *οἱ μεν πολι-*

τευομενοι the members of a free state και also τιθενται appoint νομους laws εν ταις πατρισιν in their countries, ινα that μη αδικωνται they may not be injured, και and κτωνται attach to themselves βοηθους as allies αλλους φιλους other friends προς τοις καλουμενοις in addition to those who are called αναγκαιοις their necessary friends [kinsmen] και and περιβαλλονται ερυμαια throw up defences round ταις πολεσι their cities και and κτωνται acquire ὁπλα arms οἱς by which αμυνουνται they shall repel τους αδικουντας evil doers και and προς τουτοις in addition to these κατασκευαζονται they get for themselves αλλους συμμιχους other allies εξωθεν from without: και and οἱ μεν κεκτημενοι those who have got παντα ταυτα all these ὁμως nevertheless ἀδικουνται are injured. 15. Συ δε but do you εχων μεν having ουδεν none τουτων of these, διατριβων δε but spending πολυν χρονον much time εν ταις ὁδοις in the roads, ενθα where πλειστοι very many αδικουνται are injured, ων δε and being ἡττων weaker των πολιτων than the citizens εις ὁποιαν αν πολιν into whatever city αφικῃ αν you may come, και and τοιουτος such a man οἱοις as [those] whom οἱ βουλομενοι those who wish αδικειν to injure μαλιστα επιτιθενται most set upon, ὁμως yet οιει think δια το ειναι through being ξενος a stranger ουκ αν αδικηθηναι you would not be injured? Η or θαρρεις are you so confident, διοτι because αἱ πολεις the cities

κηρυττουσι proclaim ασφαλειαν safety σοι to you προσιοντι coming και απιοντι and going? Η or διοτι because και also οιει you think δουλος that as a slave ειναι αν you would be τοιουτος such οιος as λυσιτελειν to be of advantage μηδενι δεσποτῃ to no master? Τις γαρ for who εθελοι αν would be willing εχειν to have εν οικιᾳ in his house ανθρωπον a man μηδεν εθελοντα not at all willing πονειν μεν to work χαιροντα δε but who took pleasure τῃ πολυτελεστατῃ διαιτῃ in the most costly diet? 16. Σκεψωμεθα δε but let us consider και τουτο this too, πως how οἱ δεσποται the masters χρωνται use τοις τοιουτοις οικεταις such domestics. Αρα ου σωφρονιζουσι do they not sober down την λαγνειαν αυτων their lewdness τῳ λιμῳ by hunger? κωλυουσι δε and prevent them κλεπτειν from stealing αποκλῃοντες excluding them ὁθεν [from any place] whence ῃ αν it may be possible λαβειν τι to take any thing? απειργουσι δε and prevent them δεσμοις by bonds του δραπετευειν from running away? εξαναγκαζουσι δε and force out of them την αργιαν their laziness πληγαις by stripes? Η or πως how συ ποιεις do you act ὁταν when καταμανθανῃς you find out τινα that any one των οικετων of your domestics τοιουτον οντα is such a man?" 17. "Κολαζω I punish him," εφη said he, "πασι κακοις with all [kinds of] pains ἑως until αναγκασω αν I have compelled him δουλευειν to serve. Αλλα but, — ω Σωκρατες oh

Socrates, τι γαρ for how οἱ παιδευομενοι do those who are instructed εἰς την βασιλικην τεχνην in the art of royalty, ἣν which συ δοκεις you seem μοι to me νομιζειν to think ειναι to be εὐδαιμονιαν happiness, διαφερουσι differ των κακοπαθουντων from those who suffer hardships ἐξ αναγκης by necessity, ει γε if at least πεινησουσι they shall hunger και διψησουσιν and thirst και ῥιγωσουσιν and be cold και αγρυπνησουσιν and be watchful και μοχθησουσιν and toil at παντα τα αλλα all other things ἑκοντες willingly? [Εγω μεν γαρ for I ουκ οιδα know not ὁ τι in what διαφερει it differs μαστιγουσθαι to be scourged το αυτο δερμα on the same skin ἑκοντα willingly η or ακοντα unwillingly, η or ὁλως generally πολιορκεισθαι to be battered το αυτο σωμα on the same body πασι τοις τοιουτοις by all such evils ἑκοντα willingly η ακοντα or unwillingly: αλλο γε is any thing else η αφροσυνη than folly προσεστιν attached τῳ θελοντι to him who is willing ὑπομενειν to endure τα λυπηρα things that are painful?]" 18. "Τι δε but what? ω Αριστιππε oh Aristippus," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ου δοκει σοι does it not seem to you τα ἑκουσια that those which are voluntary των τοιουτων of such things διαφερειν are different των ακουσιων from those which are involuntary, ἡ in as much as ὁ μεν ἑκων the willing man πεινων who is hungry φαγοι αν might eat ὁποταν when βουλοιτο he wished και and ὁ ἑκων

διψων he who is willingly athirst πιοι might drink, και and τα αλλα in the other cases ὡσαυτως in like manner, τῳ δε πασχοντ. but to him who suffers ταυτα these things εξ αναγκης by force ουκ εξεστιν it is not allowed παυεσθαι to leave them off ὁποταν βουληται when he wishes? Επειτα in the next place ὁ μεν ταλαιπωρων he who is suffering evil ἑκουσιως willingly ευφραινεται is cheered πονων because he is toiling επ' αγαθῃ ελπιδι for a good hope, οἱον as for instance. οἱ θηρωντες those who hunt τα θηρια wild beasts μοχθουσι toil ἡδεως pleasantly ελπιδι in the hope του λῃψεσθαι of taking them. 19. Και and τα μεν τοιαυτα αθλα such rewards των πονων of their labours εστιν are αξια μικρου τινος of some little worth: τους δε πονουντας but [as to] those who toil ἱνα that κτησωνται they may acquire φιλους αγαθους good friends, η or ὁπως that χειρωσονται they may subdue εχθρους enemies, η or ἱνα that γενομενοι becoming δυνατοι powerful και τοις σωμασι both with their bodies και and ταις ψυχαις with their souls, και οικωσι they may both govern τον ἑαυτων οικον their own house καλως well και and ευ ποιωσι do good to τους φιλους their friends, και and ευεργετωσι benefit την πατριδα their country, πως how χρη is it possible ουκ οιεσθαι not to think τουτους that these και πονειν both toil ἡδεως pleasantly εις τα τοιαυτα for such purposes και and ζην live ευφραινομενους cheerful αγαμενους μεν

honouring ἑαυτους themselves, επαινομενους δε and being praised και ζηλουμενους and envied ὑπο των αλλων by others? 20. Ετι δε but further αἱ μεν ῥᾳδιουργιαι deeds of laziness και and ἡδοναι pleasures εκ του παραχρημα momentarily presenting themselves ουτε neither εισιν ἱκαναι are able ενεργαζεσθαι to work out, ὡς as οἱ γυμνασται the gymnasts φασι say, ευεξιαν a good constitution σωματι in the body, ουτε nor εμποιουσιν implant ουδεμιαν επιστημην any knowledge αξιολογον worthy of account ψυχῃ in the soul, αἱ δε επιμελειαι but the exercises των εργων of works καλων τε which are both noble και αγαθων and good δια καρτεριας with perseverance ποιουσι make them εξικνεισθαι spring forth, ὡς as οἱ αγαθοι ανδρες good men φασι say. Και Ἡσιοδος δε and Hesiod also λεγει που says too:

"Εστι μεν γαρ for it is possible ἑλεσθαι to meet with την κακοτητα vice ῥηϊδιως easily και ιλαδον even in troops: ὁδος μεν the road λειη is smooth, ναιει δε and it lives μαλα εγγυθι very near. Θεοι δε αθανατοι but the immortal gods εθηκαν have placed ἱδρωτα sweat προπαροιθε in front της αρετης of virtue: οιμος δε out the path μακρος is long και ορθιος and steep ες αυτην to it και τρηχυς and rough το πρωτον at first: επην δε but when ἱκηαι you come εις ακρον to the summit επειτα δη then indeed πελει it becomes ῥηϊδιη easy, εουσα περ though being χαλεπη difficult."

Και Επιχαρμος δε but Epicharmus also *μαρτυρει* testifies [the same] *εν τωδε* in this [verse]:

"*Οἱ θεοι* the gods *πωλουσι* sell *παντα τα αγαθα* all good things *ἡμιν* to us *των πονων* for toils."

Φησι δε and he says *και* also *εν αλλῳ τοπῳ* in another place,

"*Ω πονηρε* oh wretched man, *μη μωσο* be not eager for *τα μαλακα* things soft, *μη* lest *εχῃς* you have *τα σκληρα* things hard."

21. *Και Προδικος* δε but Prodicus also *ὁ σοφος* the wise man, *εν τῳ συγγραμματι* in his treatise *τῳ περι του Ἡρακλεους* concerning Hercules, *ὁπερ δη* which indeed *και επιδεικνυται* he also displays *πλειστοις* to most men, *αποφαινεται* expresses himself *ὡσαυτως* in like manner *περι της αρετης* about virtue, *λεγων* saying *ὡδε πως* something of this kind, *ὁσα* as far as *εγω μεμνημαι* I remember. *Φησι γαρ* for he says *Ἡρακλεα* that Hercules, *επει* when *ὡρματο* he came forth *εκ παιδων* from children *εις ἡβην* to puberty, *εν ᾗ* in which *οἱ νεοι* the young *ηδη* already *γιγνομενοι* becoming *αυτοκρατορες* their own masters *δηλουσι* show *ειτε* whether *τρεψονται* they will turn *επὶ τον βιον* to living *την ὁδον* by the way *δι' αρετης* through virtue *ειτε* or *την* the way *δια κακιας* through vice, *εξελθοντα* having gone out *εις ἡσυχιαν* into solitude *καθησθαι* sat down *απορουντα* doubting *ὁποτεραν* which *των ὁδων* of the roads *τραπηται* he should turn: 22.

και and φανηναι that it seemed αυτῳ to him δυο γυναικας μεγαλας that two tall women προσιεναι approached, την μεν ἑτεραν the one ευπρεπη τε both handsome ιδειν to look on και and ελευθεριον liberal φυσει by nature, κεκοσμημενην adorned το μεν χρωμα in her complexion καθαροτητι with cleanliness τα δε ομματα and in eyes αιδοι with modesty, το δε σχημα and in figure σωφροσυνῃ with sobriety, εσθητι δε λευκῃ and in a white dress, την δε ἑτεραν but the other τεθραμμενην μεν fed εις πολυσαρκιαν τε both to fatness και ἁπαλοτητα and softness κεκαλλωπισμενην δε but beautified το μεν χρωμα in complexion ὡστε so as δοκειν to seem φαινεσθαι to appear λευκοτεραν τε both whiter και and ερυθροτεραν more ruddy του ουτος than the reality, το δε σχημα and in figure ὡστε so as δοκειν to appear ειναι to be ορθοτεραν taller της φυσεως than her nature, εχειν δε and to have τα ομματα her eyes αναπεπταμενα opened wide, εσθητα δε and a dress εξ ἧς from which ἡ ὡρα her beauty μαλιστα αν διαλαμποι might most appear through; θαμα δε and frequently κατασκοπεισθαι to look at ἑαυτην herself επισκοπειν δε and to look ει if τις αλλος any other person θεαται αυτην is looking at her, πολλακις δε and frequently αποβλεπειν to look back εις την ἑαυτης σκιαν on her own shadow. 23. Ὡς δε but when εγενοντο they became πλησιαιτερον του Ἡρακλεους nearer to Hercules, την μεν ῥηθεισαν that the one

named προσθεν first ιεναι went τον αυτον τροπον in the same [way [as before], την δε ἑτεραν but that the other βουλομενην wishing φθασαι to be first προσδραμειν ran up τῳ Ἡρακλει to Hercules και ειπειν and said, Ὁρω σε I see you, ω Ἡρακλεις oh Hercules, απορουντα doubting ποιαν ὁδον by what road τραπῃ you should turn επι τον βιον to live. Εαν ουν if then ποιησῃ you will make εμε me φιλην your friend, αξω σε I will lead you την ὁδον by the way ἡκιστην τε which is both most pleasant και ῥᾳστην and most easy, και and των μεν τερπνων of delights εσει you shall be αγευστος without the taste ουδενος of none, των δε χαλεπων but of troubles διαβιωσει you shall pass your life απειρος without experience. 24. Πρωτον μεν γαρ for in the first place ου φροντιεις you shall have no thought πολεμων of wars ουδε nor πραγματων of business, αλλα but διοισει shall continue σκοπουμενος considering τι what εὑροις αν you can find κεχαρισμενον that is gratifying to you η either σιτιον to be eaten η or ποτον to be drunk, η or τι what τερφθεις αν you might take delight ιδων seeing η ακουσας or hearing, η or τινων what things ἡσθεις αν you might be pleased οσφραινομενος smelling η ἁπτομενος or touching, τισι δε παιδικοις and with what pædika ὁμιλων associating ευφρανθεις αν you would rejoice μαλιστα most, και and πως how καθευδοις αν you might sleep μαλακωτατα the most softly, και and πως how

τυγχανοις αν you might obtain παντων τουτων all these απονωτατα the least laboriously. 25. Εαν δε but if ποτε ever γενηται there should arise τις ὑποψια any suspicion σπανεως of want αφ' ὡν [of means] from which ταδε these things εσται shall be [procured], ου φοβος there is no fear μη lest αγαγω σε I lead you επι το πoριζεσθαι to procuring ταυτα these πονουντα by toiling και ταλαιπωρουντα and slaving τῳ σωματι with your body και τῃ ψυχῃ and soul, αλλα but οἱς whatever things οἱ αλλοι other men εργαζωνται αν work out, χρησει you shall enjoy τουτοις them, απεχομενος abstaining ουδενος from nothing ὁθεν whence ῃ αν it may be δυνατον possible κερδαναι τι to gain any thing: εγωγε γαρ for I παρεχω afford τοις συνουσι μοι to those who associate with me εξουσιαν permission ωφελεισθαι to derive benefit πανταχοθεν from every source."

26. Και and ὁ Ἡρακλης Hercules ακουσας having heard ταυτα these words εφη said, "Τι δε and what, ω γυναι oh lady, εστιν is ονομα σοι your name?" Ἡ δε but she εφη said, "Οἱ μεν εμοι φιλοι my friends," καλουσι με call me Ευδαιμονιαν Happiness, οἱ δε μισουντες but those who hate me ὑποκοριζομενοι vilifying me καλουσι με call me Κακιαν Vice."

27. Και and εν τουτῳ during this ἡ ἑτερα γυνη the other woman προσελθουσα having come up ειπε said, "Και εγω I too ἡκω am come προς σε to you, ω Ἡρακλεις oh Hercules,

ειδυια knowing *τους γεννησαντας σε* those who begat you *και* and *καταμαθουσα* having perceived *την φυσιν την σην* your natural disposition *εν τῃ παιδειᾳ* in your education, *εξ ὡν* from which *ελπιζω* I hope, *ει* if *τραποιω* you turn *την ὁδον* by the way *προς εμε* [which leads] towards me, *σε* that you *γενεσθαι αν* would become *σφοδρα αγαθον εργατην* a very good workman *των καλων* of honourable *και σεμνων* and righteous deeds *και* and *εμε* that I *φανηναι* should appear *ετι* still *πολυ εντιμοτεραν* much more honoured *και* and *διαπρεπεστεραν* more conspicuous *επ' αγαθοις* for good things. *Ου δε εξαπατησω* but I will not deceive *σε* you *προοιμιοις* with prefaces *ἡδονης* of pleasure, *αλλα* but *διηγησομαι* will describe *μετ' αληθειας* with truth *τα οντα* things which are *ἡπερ* as *θεοι* the gods *διεθεσαν* have appointed them. 28. *Θεοι γαρ* for the gods *διδοασι* give *ουδεν* none *των αγαθων* of the good *και καλων* and beautiful things *οντων* that exist *ανθρωποις* to men *ανευ πονου* without toil *και επιμελειας* and care, *αλλα* but *ει τε* both if *βουλει* you wish *τους θεους* the gods *ειναι* to be *ἱλεως* favourable *σοι* to you, *θεραπευτεον* you must worship *τους θεους* the gods, *ει τε* and if *εθελεις* you wish *αγαπασθαι* to be loved *ὑπο φιλων* by your friends, *ευεργετητεον* you must do good to *τους φιλους* your friends, *ει τε* and if *επιθυμεις* you desire *τιμασθαι* to be honoured *ὑπο τινος πολεως* by any city, *ωφελητεον* you must be of use to *την πολιν* that city, *ει τε* and if

αξιοις you claim θαυμαζεσθαι to be admired επ' αρετῃ for your merit ὑπο της Ἑλλαδος πασης by the whole of Greece, πειρατεον you must endeavour ευ ποιειν to do good to την Ἑλλαδα Greece, ει τε and if βουλει you wish γην the earth φερειν to bear καρπους fruits αφθονους in abundance σοι for you, θεραπευτεον you must cultivate την γην the earth, ει τε and if οιει you think δειν that you ought πλουτιζεσθαι to enrich yourself απο βοσκηματων from herds of cattle, επιμελητεον you must take care βοσκηματων of herds of cattle, ει τε and if ὁρμας you are eager αυξεσθαι to be exalted δια πολεμου by means of war και and βουλει wish δυνασθαι to be able ελευθερουν τε both to free τους φιλους your friends και and χειρουσθαι to subdue τους εχθρους your foes, μαθητεον τε you must both learn παρα των επισταμενων from those who know τας πολεμικας τεχνας the warlike arts αυτας themselves και and ασκητεον must practise ὁπως how δει it is necessaay χρησθαι αυταις to use them. Ει δε but if βουλει you wish και also ειναι δυνατος to be strong τῳ σωματι in body εθιστεον you must accustom το σωμα the body ὑπηρετειν to be subject τῃ γνωμῃ to the mind και and γυμναστεον must exercise it πονοις in toils και ιδρωτι and sweat."

29. Και ἡ Κακια and Vice ὑπολαβουσα taking her up ειπε said, ὡς as Προδικος Prodicus φησι tells us, "Εννοεις do you

consider, ω Ἡρακλεις oh Hercules, ὡς χαλεπην how hard και μακραν ὁδον and long a road ἡ γυνη αὑτη this woman διηγειται points out σοι to you επι τας ευφροσυνας to enjoyments? Ἐγω δε but I αξω σε will lead you ῥᾳδιαν an easy και βραχειαν ὁδον and short way επι την ευδαιμονιαν to happiness." 30. Και and ἡ Αρετη Virtue ειπε said, "Τι δε αγαθον but what good συ εχεις have you, ω τλημον oh wretched woman? η or τι what thing ἡδυ pleasant οισθα do you know εθελουσα [you] who are willing πραττειν to do μηδεν nothing τουτων ἑνεκα for the sake of these [enjoyments]? Ἥτις [you] who ουδε αναμενεις do not even wait for την επιθυμιαν the desire των ἡδεων of pleasures, αλλα but εμπιμπλασαι cloy yourself παντων with all πριν επιθυμησαι before you desire them, εσθιουσα μεν eating πριν πεινην before you are hungry, πινουσα δε and drinking πριν διψην before you are thirsty, και and μηχαιωμενη μεν procuring οψοποιους cooks, ἱνα that φαγῃς you may eat ἡδεως pleasantly, ἱνα δε and that πιῃς you may drink ἡδεως pleasantly παρασκευαζει τε you both procure οινους πολυτελεις costly wines και and περιθεουσα running about ζητεις seek χιονα snow του θερους in the summer, ἱνα δε and that καθυπνωσης you may sleep ἡδεως pleasantly, παρασκευαζει you prepare ου μονον not only τας στρωμνας μαλακας those soft beds αλλα but και also τας κλινας those bed-steads και and

τα ὑποβαθρα rockers ταις κλιναις for the bed-steads: επιθυμεις γαρ for you have the desire ὑπνου of sleep ου not δια το πονειν from toiling αλλα but δια το εχειν from having μηδεν ὁ τι ποιῃς nothing to do. Αναγκαζεις δε and you force τα αφροδισια venereal pleasures προ του δεισθαι before needing them μηχανωμενη contriving παντα every means και χρωμενη and using τοις ανδρασι men γυναιξιν as women: οὑτω γαρ for so παιδευεις you teach τους σαυτης φιλους your friends της μεν νυκτος by night ὑβριζουσα insulting them, κατακοιμιζουσα δε and passing in sleep το χρησιμωτατον the most useful part της ἡμερας of the day. 31. Ουσα δε and being αθανατος immortal εκ θεων μεν from the gods απερριψαι you have been cast out, ὑπο δε ανθρωπων αγαθων and by good men ατιμαζει you are despised: ει δε and you are ανηκοος without hearing του ακουσματος of that sound ἡδιστου which is sweetest παντων of all, επαινου the praise σεαυτης of yourself, και and αθεατος without the seeing του θεαματος of that sight ἡδιστου sweetest παντων of all: τεθεασαι γαρ for you have seen ουδεν καλον εργον no good work σαυτης of yourself πωποτε ever yet.

55 Τις δε and who πιστευσειεν αν would believe σοι you λεγουσῃ τι saying any thing? τις δε and who επαρκεσειεν αν would give aid to you δεομενῃ τινος wanting any thing? η or τις who ευ φρονων in his senses τολμησειεν

αν would dare ειναι to be [one] του σου θιασου of your band? οἱ who νεοι μεν οντες when young εισιν are αδυνατοι impotent τοις σωμασιν in their bodies, γενομενοι δε and when they have become πρεσβυτεροι older ανοητοι are without sense ταις ψυχαις in their souls, φερομενοι μεν floating απονως without toil λιπαροι sleek δια νεοτητος through their youth, περωντες δε and passing αυχμηροι squalid επιπονως laboriously δια γηρως through old age, αισχυνομενοι ashamed τοις μεν πεπραγμενοις at their past career, βαρυνομενοι δε but weighed down τοις πραττομενοις by their present state, διαδραμοντες μεν running through τα ἡδεα pleasures εν τῃ νεοτητι in their youth, αποθεμενοι δε and putting off τα χαλεπα troubles εις το γηρως till old age. 32. Εγω δε but I συνειμι μεν associate with θεοις gods, συνειμι δε and I associate with ανθρωποις τοις αγαθοις men that are good; εργον δε καλον and good work ουτε θειον neither divine ουτε ανθρωπινον nor human γιγνεται is done χωρις εμου without me. Τιμωμαι δε and I am honoured μαλιστα most παντων of all και both παρα θεοις among the gods και and παρ' ανθρωποις among men οἱς to whom προσηκει it is fitting, αγαπητη μεν συνεργος being a welcome assistant τεχνιταις to craftsmen, πιστη δε φυλαξ and a trusty guard δεσποταις to masters οικων of houses, ευμενης δε παραστατις and a kindly assistant οικεταις to domestics, αγαθη [illegible]

λητρια and a good sharer των πονων of works εν ειρηνη in peace, βεβαια δε συμμαχος and a firm ally των εργων in the deeds εν πολεμῳ [done] in war, αριστη δε κοινωνος and the best partner φιλιας in friendship.. 33. Εστι δε and there is τοις μεν εμοις φιλοις for my friends απολαυσις an enjoyment σιτων of meats και ποτων and drinks ἡδεια μεν pleasant και απραγμων and untroubled; ανεχονται γαρ for they abstain ἑως until επιθυμησωσιν αν αυτων they have felt an appetite for them. Ὑπνος δε and sleep παρεστιν attends αυτοις on them ἡδιων more pleasant η than τοις αμοχθοις on those who have not toiled, και and ουτε αχθονται they are neither grieved απολειποντες αυτον leaving it off ουτε nor μεθιασι do they neglect πραττειν τα δεοντα to do their duty δια τουτον for the sake of it. Και and οἱ μεν νεοι the young χαιρουσι rejoice τοις επαινοις in the praises των πρεσβυτερων of their elders, οἱ δε γεραιτεροι and those who are older αγαλλονται pride themselves ταις τιμαις in the honours [they receive] των νεων of the young, και and μεμνηνται μεν they remember ἡδεως with pleasure των παλαιων πραξεων their former doings, ἡδονται δε and are pleased πραττοντες carrying on ευ successfully τας παρουσας their present ones, οντες being δι' εμε on my account φιλοι μεν dear θεοις to the gods, αγαπητοι δε and cherished φιλοις by their friends, τιμιοι δε and honoured

πατρισι by their countries. Οταν δε and when το πεπρωμενον τελος their destined end ελθη has come, ου κεινται they do not lie ατιμοι unhonoured μετα ληθης in forgetfulness, αλλα but θαλλουσι bloom μετα μνημης in memory ὑμνουμενοι celebrated in song τον αει χρονον for ever. Εξεστιν it is allowed σοι you, ω Ηρακλεις oh Hercules, παι son τοκεων αγαθων of good parents, διαπονησαμενῳ working out τοιαυτα such things κεκτησθαι to get την μακαριστοτατην ευδαιμονιαν the most blessed happiness."

34. Οὑτω πως thus somehow Προδικος Prodicus διωκει pursues την παιδευσιν the instruction Ηρακλεους of Hercules ὑπ' Αρετης by Virtue: εκοσμησε μεντοι he adorned however τας γνωμας his sentiments ῥημασι with language ετι μεγαλειοτεροις still more elevated η εγω than I [have done] νυν now. Αξιον δ' ουν but it is worth while therefore σοι for you, ω Αριστιππε oh Aristippus, ενθυμουμενῳ considering τουτων of these things πειρασθαι τι to endeavour somewhat φροντιζειν to take thought και also των of the things εις τον μελλοντα χρονον which concerns the future time του βιου of your life."

II. Αισθομενος δε but having perceived ποτε once upon a time Λαμπροκλεα that Lamprocles τον πρεσβυτατον υἱον αυτου his eldest son χαλεπαινοντα was angry προς την μητερα against his mother, εφη he said, "Ειπε μοι tell me, ω παι my son, οισθα do

you know τινας ανθρωπους any men καλουμενους called αχαριστους ungrateful?" "Και μαλα yes, certainly," εφη said ὁ νεανισκος the young man. "Καταμεμαθηκας ουν have you then learnt τι what act αποκαλουσι they called τους ποιουντας the doers of τουνομα τουτο by this name?" "Εγωγε I [have]," εφη said he; "καλουσι γαρ for they call αχαριστους ungrateful τους ευ παθοντας those who have been well treated, ὁταν when δυναμενοι being able αποδουναι to return χαριν the favour μη αποδωσι they do not return it." "Ουκ ουν δοκουσι do they not seem then σοι to you καταλογιζεσθαι to classify τους αχαριστους the ungrateful εν τοις αδικοις among the unjust?" "Εμοιγε [it seems so] to me," εφη said he. 2. "Εσκεψω δε ποτε but have you ever reflected ηδη ere now, ει αρα whether indeed, ὡσπερ as δοκει it seems ειναι to be αδικον unjust το ανδραποδιζεσθαι to enslave τους μεν φιλους one's friends, δικαιον δε but just [to enslave] τους πολεμιους one's enemies, οὑτω so και also εστιν it is αδικον unjust το αχαριστειν to be ungrateful προς μεν τους φιλους towards one's friends δικαιον δε but just προς τους πολεμιους towards one's enemies?" "Και μαλα yes, certainly [I have]," εφη said he, "και and δοκει he seems μοι to me ειναι to be αδικος unjust, ὑφ' οὗ by whom, ειτε whether φιλου a friend ειτε or πολεμιου a foe, τις a man ευ παθων having been well treated μη πειρατai does not try

αποδιδοναι to give back χαριν gratitude." "Ουκουν αν would not then, ει γε if at least τουτο this ουτως ἐχει is so, ἡ αχαριστια ingratitude ειη be ειλικρινης τις αδικια a kind of pure injustice?" Συνωμολογει he assented. "Ουκουν αν would not then, ὁσω in proportion as τις a man παθων having received μειζω αγαθα greater favours μη αποδιδῳ does not repay χαριν gratitude, ειη he be τοσουτῳ in the same degree αδικωτερος more unjust? Συνεφη he assented to και τουτο this also. "Τινας ουν whom then," εφη said he, ὑπο τινων and by whom εὑροιμεν αν should we find ευηργετημενους μειζω more benefitted η than παιδας children ὑπο γονεων by their parents? οὑς whom οἱ γονεις their parents εποιησαν μεν have caused ειναι to come into existence εξ ουκ οντων out of non-existence, ιδειν δε and to see τοσαυτα καλα so many beautiful things και and μετασχειν to share τοσουτων αγαθων in so many good things ὁσα as οἱ θεοι the gods παρεχουσι furnish τοις ανθρωποις to men ἁ δη which indeed και also δοκει seem ἡμιν to us ειναι to be οὑτως αξια so worthy παντος of every consideration, ὡστε that παντες φευγομεν we all shun το καταλιπειν αυτα the leaving them μαλιστα most παντων of all things: και and αἱ πολεις cities πεποιηκασιν have made θανατον death ζημιαν the penalty επι μεγιστοις αδικημασι for the greatest wrongs, ὡς as if ουκ αν παυσαντες not being likely to check την αδικιαν

injustice φοβῳ by the fear μειζονος κακου of a greater evil. 4. Και μην and truly ουχ ὑπολαμβανεις you do not suppose τους ανθρωπους that men παιδοποιεισθαι get children ἑνεκα for the sake των γε αφροδισιων of venereal pleasures, επει since αἱ μεν ὁδοι the streets μεσται are full των απολυσοντων of those what will release them τουτου γε from this, τα δε οικηματα and the houses μεστα are full; εσμεν δε but we are φανεροι manifest και σκοπουμενοι taking into consideration also εξ ὁποιων γυναικων from what women αἱ with whom συνελθοντες uniting τεκνοποιουμεθα we get children, βελτιστα τεκνα the best children γενοιτο αν may be born ἡμιν to us. 5. Και and ὁ μεν γε ανηρ the man τρεφει τε both maintains την the woman συντεκνοποιησουσαν will who join in producing children ἑαυτῳ with himself, και and προπαρασκευαζει provides τοις παισι for the children μελλουσιν who are about εσεσθαι to be born παντα all things ὁσα as many as οιηται he thinks συνοισειν αν may be of use αυτοις to them προς τον βιον for their living, και ταυτα and these ὡς αν πλειστα as many as δυνηται he is able: ἡ δε γυνη and the woman ὑποδεξαμενη τε both having received φερει bears τουτο το φορτιον this burden, βαρυνομενη τε being both oppressed και κινδυνευουσα and being in danger περι του βιου for her life, και and μεταδιδουσα giving a share της τροφης of the nourishment ἡ b which και αυτη

she herself also τρεφεται is fed, και and διενεγκουσα having gone through it συν πολλῳ πονῳ with much trouble και τεκουσα and having given birth [to the child] τρεφει τε both feeds it και επιμελεται and takes care of it, ουτε neither προπεπονθυια having received before ουδεν αγαθον any thing good ουτε nor το βρεφος the babe γιγνωσκον knowing ὑφ' ὁτου by whom ευ πασχει he is well treated ουδε δυναμενου and not being able σημαινειν to signify ὁτου what δειται he wants, αλλα but αυτη herself στοχαζομενη conjecturing τα τε συμφεροντα both the things useful και and τα κεχαρισμενα the things which are pleasing πειραται endeavours εκπληρουν to supply them και and τρεφει nurtures it πολυν χρονον a long time ὑπομενουσα submitting πονειν to labour και ἡμερας both by day και νυκτος and night, ουκ ειδυια not knowing ει whether απολῃψεται she shall receive τινα χαριν any gratitude τουτων for these things.
6. Και and ουκ αρκει it is not enough θρεψαι to feed them, αλλα but και also επειδαν when οἱ παιδες the children δοξωσι shall seem ειναι to be ἱκανοι able μανθανειν τι to learn any thing, διδασκουσι they teach them ἁ μεν whatever things οἱ γονεις the parents εχωσιν have αυτοι themselves αγαθα useful προς τοι βιον for their life, ἁ δε and whatever things οιωνται they think αλλον that any other person ειναι is ἱκανωτερον more able διδαξαι to teach them, πεμπουσι they send them

προς τουτον to him δαπανωντες spending money, και and επιμελονται they take care ποιουντες doing παντα all things ὁπως that οἱ παῖδες αυτοις their children γενωνται may become βελτιστοι the best ὡς δυνατον as far as is possible."

7. Προς ταυτα to this ὁ νεανισκος the young man ειπε said: "Αλλα τοι but in truth ει και even if πεποιηκε she has done παντα ταυτα all these things και αλλα and others πολλαπλασια τουτων many times as numerous as these, ουδεις no one δυναιτο αν would be able ανασχεσθωι to put up with την χαλεποτητα αυτης her untowardness." Και ὁ Σωκρατης and Socrates εφη said, "Ποτερα δε but whether οιει do you think αγριοτητα that the fierceness θηριου of a wild beast ειναι is δυσφορωτεραν harder to bear η or μητρος of a mother?" "Εγω μεν οιμαι I indeed think," εφη said he, "μητρος of a mother της γε τοιαυτης at least such an one [as mine]." "Εδωκεν ουν has she then caused κακον τι any harm σοι to you πωποτε ever yet ηδη already η either δακουσα by biting you η or λακτισασα by kicking you, οἱα which sort of things πολλοι many ηδη already επαθον have suffered ὑπο θηριων from wild beasts?" 8. "[No]" εφη said he, "αλλα but νη Δια by Jupiter, λεγει she says ἁ things which τις a man ουκ αν βουλοιτο would not wish ακουσαι to hear επι τῳ βιῳ παντι in all his life." "Ποσα δε πραγματα but how

many troubles δυσανεκτα hard to bear," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "συ οιει do you suppose παρασχειν you have caused ταυτῃ to her και both τῃ φωνῃ by crying και and τοις εργοις by acts εκ παιδιου from childhood δυσκολαινων being ill-tempered και ἡμερας both day και νυκτος and night, ποσα δε and in how many things λυπησαι to have grieved her καμνων by being ill?" "Αλλα but, (εφη said he,) ουδεπωποτε never yet ουτε ειπα have I either said ουτε εποιησα or done ουδεν any thing εφ' ᾧ at which ησχυνθη she has been ashamed." 9. "Τι δε but what?" εφη said [Socrates], "οιει do you think ειναι that it is χαλεπωτερον more difficult σοι for you ακουειν to hear ὧν [the things] which αὐτη she λεγει says η than τοις ὑποκριταις for actors, ὁταν when λεγωσι they say τα εσχατα the worst things αλληλους of one another εν ταις τραγῳδιαις in the tragedies?" "Αλλα but οιμαι I believe, φερουσι they bear ft ῥᾳδιως easily, επειδη since ουκ οιονται they do not think των λεγοντων [that] of the speakers ουτε either τον ελεγχοντα he who reproaches ελεγχειν reproaches ἱνα that ζημιωσῃ he may punish, ουτε or τον απειλουντα the man who threatens απειλειν threatens ἱνα that ποιησῃ he may do κακον τι any harm." "Συ δε χαλεπαινεις but are you angry ευ ειδως though you well know ὁτι that ἡ μητηρ your mother λεγει says ἁ what λεγει she says σοι to you ου μονον not only νουυσε

meaning *ουδεν κακον* no harm *αλλα* but *και βουλομενη* even wishing *αγαθα* good things *ειναι σοι* to befal you *ὁσα* as many as [she wishes] *ουδενι αλλῳ* to no other person? *Η* or *νομιζεις* do you think *την μητερα* that your mother *ειναι* is *κακονουν* ill-disposed *σοι* to you?" "*Ου δητα* no indeed, (*εφη* said he) *ουκ οιμαι* I do not think *τουτο γε* this at least." 10. *Και* and *ὁ Σωκρατὴς* Socrates *εφη* said, "*Ουκουν συ φῂς* are you not then saying *ταυτην* that she *ειναι χαλεπην* is ill-tempered, *ουσαν τε* though she both is *ευνουν σοι* your well-wisher *και* and *επιμελομενην* takes care *ὡς μαλιστα δυναται* as much as she is able *καμνοντος* of you when you are ill *ὁπως* that *ὑγιανεις τε* you may both be well *δαι* and *ὁπως* that *εσει* you may be *ενδεης* in want *μηδενος* of none *των επιτηδειων* of things needful, *κἀι* and *προς τουτοις* in addition to this *ευχομενην* who vows *πολλα* many things *τοις θεοις* to the gods *ὑπερ σου* for you *και αποδιδουσαν* and who pays *ευχας* your vows? *Εγω μεν οιμαι* I think, *ει* if *μη δυνασαι* you are not able *φερειν* to put up with *τοιαυτην μητερα* such a mother, *ου σε δυνασθαι* that you are unable *φερειν* to put up with *τα αγαθα* what is good for you. 11. *Ειπε δε μοι* but tell me," *εφη* said he, "*ποτερα* whether *οιει* do you think *δειν* that you ought *θεραπευειν* to pay court to *αλλον τινα* any other person, *η* or *παρεσκευασαι* have you laid yourself out *πειρασθαι* to

endeavour *αρεσκειν* to please *μηδενι ανθρωπων* no man, *μηδε* nor *ἑπεσθαι* to follow *μηδε* nor *πειθεσθαι* to obey *μητε* either *στρατηγῳ* a general *μητε* or *αλλῳ αρχοντι* any other commander?" "*Ναι* yea, *μα Δια* by Jove *εγωγε* I [think I ought]" *εφη* said he. 12. "*Ουκουν συ βουλει* are you then not willing," (*εφη* said *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates,) "*και* also *αρεσκειν* to please *τῳ γειτονι* your neighbour, *ἱνα* that *και εναυῃ* he may both kindle *πυρ* a fire *σοι* for you, *ὁταν* when *δεῃ* you have need *τουτου* of this, *και* and *γιγνηται τε* may both become *συλληπτωρ* an aider *σοι* to you *αγαθου* in what is good, *και* and *αν* if *τυχῃς* you happen *σφαλλομενος τι* to fail in any thing, *βοηθῃ σοι εγγυθεν* he may be at hand to aid you *ευνοϊκως* with good will?" "*Εγωγε* I [am willing]," *εφη* said he. "*Τι δε* but what? *ουδεν αν σοι διαφεροι* would it matter not to you *συνοδοιπορον* that a fellow-traveller *η* or *συμπλουν* a fellow passenger *η* or *ει* if *εντυγχανοις* you met with *αλλῳ τῳ* any other man, *γενεσθαι* should become *φιλον* a friend *η* or *εχθρον* a foe *σοι* to you, *η* or *οιει* do you think *δειν* that you ought *επιμελεσθαι* to take care *και της ευνοιας* of good will also *παρα τουτων* from these men?" "*Εγω γε* I [think so]," *εφη* said he. 13. "*Ειτα* then *παρεσκευασαι* are you ready *επιμελεσθαι μεν* to be careful *τουτων* of these men, *ου δε οιει* but do you not think *δειν* that you ought *θεραπευειν* to respect *την μητερα* your mother

την φιλουσαν σε who loves you *μελιστα* most *παντων* of all things? *Ουκ οισθα* do you not know *ὁτι* that *και* also *ἡ πολις* the city *επιμελεται* takes notice *ουδεμιας μεν αλλης αχαριστιας* of no other ingratitude *ουδε* nor *δικαζει* goes to law about it, *αλλα* but *περιορᾳ* overlooks *τους ευ πεπονθοτας* those who have received a kindness *ουκ αποδιδοντας χαριν* not showing gratitude for it, *εαν δε* but if *τις* any one *μη θεραπευῃ* does not respect *γονεας* parents, *επιτιθησι τε* it both inflicts *δικην* punishment *αυτῳ* on him, *και* and *αποδοκιμαζουσα* disfranchising *ουκ εᾳ* does not permit *τουτον* him *αρχειν* to be archon, *ὡς τουτου* as if such a man *ουτε* neither *θυοντος αν* would sacrifice *ευσεβως* righteously *τα ἱερα* the victims *θυομενα* that are sacrificed *ὑπερ της πολεως* for the city *ουτε* nor *τουτου* such a man *πραξαντος αν* being likely to do *ουδεν αλλο* any other duty *καλως* well *και δικαιως* justly? *Και* and *νη Δια* by Jupiter *εαν* if *τις* any one *μη κοσμῃ* does not adorn *τους ταφους* the tombs *των γονεων* of his parents *τελευτησαντων* who are dead, *ἡ πολις* the city *εξεταζει* enquires into *και τουτο* this also *εν ταις δοκιμασιαις* in the test-enquiries *των αρχοντων* of the archons. 14. *Συ ουν* you then, *ω παι* my son, *εαν* if *σωφρονῃ* you are wise, *παραιτησει* will entreat *τους θεους* the gods *ειναι* to be *συγγνωμονας* forgiving *σοι* to you, *ει* if *παρημελησας τι* you have at all neglected *της μητρος* your mother, *μη* lest *και*

οὗτοι these also νομισαντες thinking ειναι that you are αχαριστον ungrateful ουκ εθελησωσι shall not be willing ευ ποιειν to do good to you, φυλαξει δε but you will be on your guard against ανθρωπους men μη lest παντες all αισθομενοι perceiving σε you αμελουντα neglectful των γονεων of your parents ατιμασωσι despise you, και ειτα and then αναφανῃς you appear εν ερημιᾳ in total want φιλων of friends. Ει γαρ for if ὑπολαβοιεν they supposed σε that you ειναι were αχαριστον ungrateful προς τους γονεας towards your parents, ουδεις no one νομισειεν αν would think, ευ σε ποιησας if he did you a service, απολῃψεσθαι that he would get in return χαριν gratitude."

III. Αισθομενος δε but perceiving ποτε once upon a time Χαιρεφωντα Chærephon και Χαιρεκρατη and Chærecrates, οντε who were αδελφω μεν brothers αλληλοιν of one another γνωριμω δε and known ἑαυτῳ to himself, διαφερομενω at variance with one another, ιδων seeing τον Χαιρεκρατη Chærecrates, εφη he said, "Ειπε μοι tell me, ω Χαιρεκρατες oh Chærecrates, ουκ ει και συ you also are not, are you, δηπου forsooth των τοιουτων ανδρων [one] of such men, οἱ who νομιζουσι think χρηματα possessions χρησιμωτερον more useful η than αδελφον your brother? Και ταυτα and this too των μεν when the ones αφρονων οντων μεν are things without sense, του δε but the other φρονιμου is a sensible being, και

and *των μεν* they *δεομενων* needing *βοηθειας* your aid *του δε* but he *δυναμενου* being able *βοηθειν* to aid you, *και* and *προς τουτοις* in addition to this *των μεν* they *ὑπαρχοντων* being *πλειονων* many in number, *του δε* but he [the brother] *ἑνος* being only one. 2. *Και τουτο δε* but this also *θαυμαστον* is wonderful, *ει* if *τις* any one *ἡγειται* thinks *τους μεν αδελφους* his brothers *ζημιαν* a bore, *ὁτι* because *ου κεκτηται* he does not possess *και* also *τα* the property *των αδελφων* of his brothers, *ου δε ἡγειται* but does not think *τους πολιτας* his countrymen *ζημιαν* a bore, *ὁτι* because *ουκ εχει* he has not *και* also *τα* the property *των πολιτων* of his countrymen, *αλλα* but *ενταυθα μεν* in that case *δινηται* he is able *λογιζεσθαι* to calculate *ὁτι* that *κρειττον* it is better *οικουντα* living *συν πολλοις* with many *ασφαλως* safely *εχειν* to have *τα αρκουντα* what is enough *η* than *διαιτωμενον* living *μονον* alone *κεκτησθαι* to possess *παντα τα* all the property *των πολιτων* of his countrymen *επικινδυνως* with danger, *αγνοουσι δε* but they ignore *το αυτο τουτο* this same [argument] *επι των αδελφων* in the case of brothers. 3. *Και* and *οἱ μεν δυναμενοι* those who are able *ωνουνται* buy *οικετας* domestics, *ἱνα* that *εχωσι* they may have *συνεργους* helpers in their work *και* and *κτωνται* acquire *φιλους* friends *ὡς δεομενοι* as being in need *βοηθων* of supporters, *αμελουσι δε* but they neglect *των αδελφων* their brothers, *ὡσπερ* as if

φιλους friends γιγνομενους being made εκ πολιτων μεν out of one's countrymen, ου δε γιγνομενους but not being made εξ αδελφων out of brothers. 4. Και μην and yet το μεν φυναι to have been born εκ των αυτων from the same parents ὑπαρχει is μεγα a great point προς φιλιαν to friendship, το δε τραφηναι and having been bred ὁμου together μεγα is great, επει since και τοις θηριοις even in beasts εγγιγνεται there springs up ποθος τις a kind of love των συντροφων of those that have been brought up together: προς δε τουτοις but in addition to this και also οἱ αλλοι ανθρωποι the rest of mankind τιμωσι τε both honour τους those οντας συναδελφους who have brothers μαλλον more των αναδελφων than those who are without brothers και and ἡττον less επιτιθενται assail τουτοις them." 5. Και and ὁ Χαιρεκρατης Chærecrates ειπε said, "Αλλα but ει μεν if, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, το διαφορον the quarrel μη ειη were not μεγα great, ισως perhaps δεοι αν it would be necessary φερειν to put up with τον αδελφον my brother και and μη not φευγειν to avoid him μικρων ἑνεκεν on account of small matters: αδελφος γαρ for a brother, ων being οἱον δει such as he ought to be αγαθον is a good thing, ὡσπερ as και συ you also λεγεις say: ὁποτε μεντοι when however ενδεοι there is a want παντος of every thing και and ειη there is παν every thing το εναντιωτατον the very opposite, τι why επιχειροιη τις αν should a

man attempt τοις αδυνατοις things impossible?" 6. Και and ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates εφη said, "Ποτερα δε but whether, ω Χαιρεκρατες oh Chærecrates, δυναται Χαιρεφων can Chærephon αρεσαι please ουδενι no one, ὡσπερ as ουδε σοι he does not even [please] you, η or εστιν οἱς are there [some] to whom και παυυ αρεσκει he also certainly is pleasing?" "[Yes:] δια τουτο γαρ τοι for on this account indeed," εφη said he, "ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, αξιον εστιν it is right εμοι to me μισειν to hate αυτον him, ὁτι because αλλοις μεν to others δυναται he can αρεσκειν be pleasing, εμοι δε but to me, ὁπου αν wherever παρῃ he is present, εστιν he is πανταχου everywhere και λογῳ both in word και εργῳ and in deed ζημια a harm μαλλον rather η than ωφελεια an assistance." 7. "Αρ' ουν is it then [so]," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ὡσπερ as ἱππος a horse εστιν is ζημια a harm τῳ ανεπιστημονι μεν to one who is unskilled εγχειρουντι δε but who attempts χρησθαι to use him, οὑτω so also εστιν is αδελφος a brother ζημια a harm, ὁταν when τις any one μη επισταμενος not having knowledge εγχειρῃ attempts χρησθαι αυτῳ to use him?" "Πως δε but how," εφη said Χαιρεκρατης Chærecrates, "εγω αν ειην could I be ανεπιστημων ignorant χρησθαι how to make use of αδελφῳ my brother επισταμενος γε since at least I know how και both ευ λεγειν to speak well of τον ευ λεγοντα the man who speaks

well [of me] *και* and *ευ ποιειν* to do good to *τον ευ ποιουντα* him who does good to me? *τον μεντοι πειρωμενον* the man however who tries *ανιαν εμε* to grieve me *και λογῳ* both by word *και εργῳ* and deed *ουκ αν δυναιμην* I could not *ουτε* [n]either *ευ λεγειν* speak well of *ουτε* [n]or *ευ ποιειν* do good to, *αλλα* but *ουδε πειρασομαι* neither will I try." 9. *Και* and *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates *εφη* said, "*Λεγεις* you say *θαυμαστα γε* what is wonderful, *ω Χαιρεκρατες* oh Chærecrates, *ει* if *κυνα μεν* [in the case of] a dog—*ει* if *ων* being *επιτηδειος* useful *ην* he was *επι προβατοις σοι* over your sheep, *και* and *ησπαζετο μεν* fawned on *τους ποιμενας* the shepherds, *εχαλεπαινε δε* but was angry *σοι* against you *προσιοντι* when you came near him, *αμελησας* neglecting *του οργιζεσθαι* to be angry *επειρω αν* you should try *πραϋνειν* to pacify *αυτον* him *ευ ποιησας* by doing him good, *τον δε αδελφον φης μεν* but you say that your brother *ειναι αν* would be *μεγα αγαθον* a great good *οντα* if he was *οἱον* such as *δει* he ought to be *προς σε* towards you, *ὁμολογων δε* but though you acknowledge *επισταθαι* that you know how *και* both *ευ ποιειν* to do good *και* and *ευ λεγειν* to speak well, *ουκ επιχειρεις* you do not attempt *μηχανασθαι* to take measures *ὁπως* that *η* he may be *ὡς βελτιστος* the best possible *σοι* towards you." 10. *Και* and *ὁ Χαιρεκρατης* Chærecrates *εφη* said, "*Δεδοικα* I fear, *ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates, *μη* lest *εγω ουκ εχω*

I have not τοσαυτην σοφιαν such great wisdom ὡστε so as ποιησαι to make Χαιρεφωντα Chærephon οἱον such as δει he ought to be προς εμε towards me." "Και μην and yet," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "δει it is right μηχανασθαι to contrive ουδεν γε nothing ποικιλον cunning ουδε καινον nor new επ' αυτον against him, ὡς as δοκει it appears εμοι to me: οιμαι δε but I think αυτον that he ἁλοντα having been taken οἱς by [those means] which και συ αυτος you yourself also επιστασαι know ποιεισθαι αν would esteem σε you περι πολλου above much." 11. "Ουκ αν φθανοις you cannot be too soon," εφη said he, "λεγων saying ει if ηισθησαι you have seen με επισταμενον that I know φιλτρον τι any charm ὁ which εγω I ειδως λελησθα εμαυτον do not know that I know." "Λεγε δη μοι tell me then," εφη said [Socrates], "ει if βουλοιο you wished κατεργασὰσθαι to effect τινα that any one των γνωριμων of those you know καλειν σε should invite you επι δειπνον to supper, ὁποτε when θυοι he sacrificed, τι what ποιοιης αν would you do?" "Δηλον it is manifest ὁτι that καταρχοιμι αν I should make the beginning του καλειν of inviting him αυτος myself, ὁτε when θυοιμι I sacrificed." 12. "Ει δε but if βουλοιο you wished προτρεψασθαι to urge τινα any one των φιλων of your friends επιμελεσθαι to take charge των σων of your affairs, ὁποτε when αποδημοιης you went abroad, τι what ποιοιης αν would you

do?" "*Δηλον* it is manifest *ὁτι* that *εγχειροιην αν* I should undertake *προτερος* first *επιμελεσθαι* to take charge *των εκεινου* of his affairs, *ὁποτε* when *αποδημοιη* he went abroad." 3. "*Ει δε* but if *βουλοιο* you wished *ποιησαι* to make *ξενον* a friend in another country *ὑποδεχεσθαι* receive *σεαυτον* yourself, *ὁποτε* when *ελθοις* you went *εις την εκεινου* into his country, *τι* what *ποιοιης αν* would you do?" *Δηλον* it is manifest *ὁτι* that *ὑποδεχοιμην αν* I should receive *και τουτον* him also *ὁποτε* when *ελθοι* he came *Αθηναζε* to Athens: *και* and *ει γε* if at least *βουλοιμην* I wished *αυτον* him *προθυμεισθαι* to be zealous *διαπραττειν* to accomplish *μοι* for me *εφ' ἁ* the objects for which *ἡκοιμι* I came, *δηλον* it is clear *ὁτι* that *δεοι αν* it would behove *αυτον* myself *ποιειν* to do *και τουτο* this also *εκεινῳ* to him *προτερον* first." 4. "*Συγε αρα* have you then *επισταμενος* though knowing *παλαι* long ago *παντα τα φιλτρα* all the charms *εν ανθρωποις* among men *απεκρυπτου* been concealing it from yourself? *η* or *οκνεις* are you loth, (*εφη* said he,) *αρξαι* to begin, *μη* lest *φανῃς* you appear *αισχρος* mean *εαν* if *ευ ποιῃς* you do good to *αδελφον* your brother *προτερος* first? *Και μην* and yet *δοκει* he seems *ειναι* to be *ανηρ* a man *αξιος* worthy *πλειστου γε επαινου* of the greatest praise, *ὁς* who *φθανῃ αν* is the first *κακως μεν ποιων* doing harm to *τους πολεμιους* his enemies, *ευεργετων δε* and doing good to *τους φιλους*

his friends. *Ει μεν ουν* if then *Χαιρεφων* Chærephon *εδοκει* seemed *μοι* to me *ειναι* to be *ἡγεμονικωτερος* more likely to take the lead *σου* than you *προς την φιλιαν ταυτην* to this friendship, *επειρωμην αν* I would have tried *πειθειν* to persuade *εκεινον* him *προτερον* first *εγχειρειν* to set about *τῳ ποιεισθαι* making *σε* you *φιλον* a friend: *νυν δε* but now *συ δοκεις* you seem *μοι* to me *ἡγουμενος* by taking the lead *εξεργαζεσθαι αν* likely to effect *τουτο* this *μαλλον* rather [than he]." 15. *Και* and *ὁ Χαιρεκρατης* Chærecrates *ειπε* said, "*Λεγεις* you say *ατοπα* what is unreasonable, *ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates, *και* and *ουδαμως* by no means *προς σου* consistent with your character, *ὁς γε* who at least *κελευεις με* bid me *οντα νεωτερον* who am the younger *καθηγεισθαι* take the lead: *καιτοι* and indeed *τα εναντια* the contrary *τουτου γε* of this at least *νομιζεται* is customary *παρα πασιν ανθρωποις* among all men, *τον πρεσβυτερον* that the older *ἡγεισθαι* should take the lead *παντος* in every thing *και λογου* both word *και εργου* and deed." 16. "*Πως* how?" *εφη* said *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates, "*ου γαρ νομιζεται* for is it not usual *πανταχου* everywhere *και* also *τον νεωτερον* for the younger *παραχωρησαι* to give way *ὁδου* out of the road *πρεσβυτερῳ* to one who is older *συγτυγχανοντι* meeting him? *και* and *καθημενον* when sitting *ὑπαναστηναι* to rise to meet him, *και* and *τιμησαι* to honour him *κοιτῃ μαλακῃ*

with a soft bed, *και* and *ὑπειξαι* to yield to him *λογων* in talking? *Ω αγαθα* oh my good fellow, *μη οκνει* do not hesitate," *εφη* said he, "*αλλα* but *εγχειρει* endeavour *καταπραΰνειν* to soothe *τον ανδρα* the man, *και* and *ὑπακουσεται* he will listen *σοι* to you *πανυ ταχυ* very quickly. *Ουχ ὁρας* do you not see *ὡς* that *εστιν* he is *φιλοτιμος* honourable *καί ελευθεριος* and liberal? *Ου γαρ αν ἑλοις* for you could not catch *τα πονηρα ανθρωπια* mean men *αλλως* in any other way *μαλλον* better *η* than *ει* if *δοιης* you gave them *τι* something, *κατεργασαιο δε αν* but you may overcome *τους καλους* honourable *και αγαθους ανθρωπους* and good men *μαλιστα* best *χρωμενος* if you use them *προσφιλως* kindly."

17. *Και* and *ὁ Χαιρεκατης* Chærecrates *ειπε* said, "*Εαν ουν* if however, *εμου ποιουντος* when I do *ταυτα* this, *εκεινος* he *γιγνηται* becomes *μηδεν βελτιων* not at all better?" "*Τι γαρ αλλο* for what else [will that be]" *εφη* said *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates, "*η* than *κινδυνευσεις* [that] you will risk *συ μεν* yourself *ειναι* to be *χρηστος τε* both good *και* and *φιλαδελφος* loving your brother, *εκεινος δε* but he *φαυλος τε* both bad *και* and *ουκ αξιος* not worthy *ευεργεσιας* of kindness? *Αλλα* but *οιμαι* I think *ουδεν* that none *τουτων* of these things *εσεσθαι* will happen: *νομιζω γαρ* for I think *αυτον* that he, *επειδαν* when *αισθηται* he perceives *σε* you *προκαλουμενον* challenging *ἑαυτον* himself *εις τον αγωνα*

τουτον to this contest, πανυ φιλονικησειν will be altogether emulous ὁπως that περιγενηται σου he may overcome you και λογῳ both by word και εργῳ and deed ευ ποιων doing good. 18. Νυν μεν γαρ for now," εφη said he, "διακεισθον you two are situated οὑτως in the same way ὡσπερ ει as if τω χειρε your two hands, ἁς which ὁ Θεος God εποιησε made επι τῳ συλλαμβανειν to cooperate αλληλοιν with one another, αφεμενω leaving off from this τραποιντο were to turn προς το διακωλυειν to hindering αλληλω one another, η or ει if τω ποδε the two feet πεποιημενω which were made θειᾳ μοιρᾳ by divine providence προς το συνεργειν to work together αλληλοιν with one another, αμελησαντε neglecting τουτου this εμποδιζοιεν were to hinder αλληλω one another. 19. Ουκ αν ειη would it not be πολλη αμαθια great folly και and κακοδαιμονια untowardness χρησθαι to use επι βλαβῃ for harm τοις πεποιημενοις the things which were made επ' ωφελειᾳ for one's benefit? Και μην and yet ὁ θεος god εποιησε made αδελφω γε two brothers, ὡς as δοκει it seems εμοι to me, επι μειζονι for greater benefit αλληλοιν to one another η than χειρε τε both the two hands και ποδε and feet και οφθαλμω and eyes, και and τα αλλα the other limbs ὁσα which εφυσεν he has implanted αδελφα in pairs ανθρωποις in men. Χειρες μεν γαρ for the hands, ει if δεοι it were needful ποιησαι to do ἁμα together τα διεχοντα things which

are separated from one another πλεον more οργυιας than a fathom, ουκ αν δυναιντο would not be able: ποδες δε and the feet ουδε αν ελθοιεν could not even go ἁμα together επι τα διεχοντα to things separated οργυιαν a fathom: οφθαλμοι δε and the eyes οἱ δοκουντες which seem εξικνεισθαι to reach επι πλειστον to a very great distance, ουδε αν δυναιντο would not even be able ιδειν to see ἁμα at the same time τα προσθεν those in front και and τα οπισθεν those behind των of the things οντων which were ετι εγγυτερω still nearer; αδελφω δε but brothers οντε being φιλω friendly και even πολυ διεστωτε when far apart πραττετον act ἁμα together επ' ωφελειᾳ for the benefit αλληλοιν of one another."

IV. Ηκουσα δε αυτου but I heard him ποτε once διαλεγομενου discoursing και also περι φιλων about friends, εξ ὡν [sentiments] from which τις a man εδοκει seemed εμοιγε to me ωφελεισθαι αν likely to be benefitted μαλιστα very much προς κτησιν τε towards both the gaining και χρειαν and use φιλων of friends. Εφη μεν γαρ for he said ακουειν that he heard τουτο δη this πολλων from many, ὡς that σαφης a true και αγαθος φιλος and good friend ειη was κρατιστον the best παντων κτηματων of all possessions: εφη δε but he said ὁραν that he saw τους πολλους most men επιμελομενους taking thought παντος of every thing μαλλον more η than

κτησεως of the gaining φιλων of friends. 2. Εφη γαρ for he said ὁραν that he saw them κτωμενους τε both getting επιμελως carefully και οικιας both houses και αγρους and lands και ανδραποδα and slaves και βοσκηματα and flocks και σκευη and furniture, και and πειρωμενους endeavouring σωζειν to keep τα οντα what they have: φιλον δε but [as to] a friend, ὁ which φασι they say ειναι is μεγιστον αγαθον the greatest good, εφη he said ὁραν that he saw τους πολλους most men φροντιζοντας taking thought ουτε neither ὁπως in what way κτησονται they shall acquire [one] ουτε nor ὁπως how οἱ οντες ἑαυτοις those whom they have σωζωνται may be kept. 3. Αλλα but εφη he said και also, φιλων τε [that] when both friends και οικετων and domestics καμνοντων were ill ὁραν he saw τινας some men και εισαγοντας both introducing ιατρους doctors τοις μεν οικεταις to their domestics και and επιμελως carefully παρασκευαζοντας procuring τα αλλα the other things τα προς ὑγιειαν which tend to health, ολιγωρουντας δε but neglecting των φιλων their friends, αμφοτερων τε αποθανοντων and when both died, αχθομενους τε both mourning και and ἡγουμενους deeming it ζημιαν a loss επι μεν τοις οικεταις in the case of their domestics, επι δε τοις φιλοις but in the case of their friends οἰομενους thinking ουδεν ελαττουσθαι that they were not the worse for it, και and εωντας leaving ουδεν nothing των μεν αλλων

κτηματων of their other possessions αθεραπευ-τον unattended to ουδε nor ανεπισκεπτον unconsidered, αμελουντας δε but neglecting των φιλων their friends δεομενων who need επιμελειας attention.

4. Ετι δε but moreover προς τουτοις in addition to these εφη he said ὁραν that he saw τους πολλους most men ειδοτας knowing το πληθος the number των μεν αλλων κτηματων of their other possessions και even πανυ πολλων οντων when very many belonged αυτοις to them, ου δε μονον but not only αγνοουντας ignorant of το πληθος the number των φιλων of their friends ολιγων οντων who were few, αλλα but και also εγχειρησαντας attempting καταλεγειν to enumerate them τοις πυνθανομενοις to those who asked them τουτο this, παλιν ανατιθεσθαι that they again set aside τουτους those οὑς whom εθεσαν they had plaeed εν τοις φιλοις among their friends: τοσουτον so much αυτους φροντιζειν did they care των φιλων for their friends. 5. Καιτοι and yet προς ποιον κτημα to what possession των αλλων of the others παραβαλλομενος compared ουκ αν φιλος αγαθος would not a good friend φανειη appear πολλῳ κρειττων by far better? Ποιος γαρ ἱππος for what sort of horse η or ποιον ζευγος what pair of oxen οὑτω χρησιμον is so useful ὡσπερ as ὁ χρηστος φιλος the good friend? ποιον δε ανδραποδον and what slave οὑτως ευνουν is so well-disposed και παραμονιμον and abiding? η or

ποιον αλλο κτημα what other possession οὑτω παγχρηστον is so thoroughly good? 6. Ὁ γαρ αγαθος φιλος for the good friend ταττει ἑαυτον puts himself forward προς παν το ελλειπον to every thing that is wanting τῳ φιλῳ to his friend και both της κατασκευης of the arranging των ιδιων of his private affairs και and της πραξεως of the performance των κοινων of his public [duties]: και αν τε and both if δεῃ it be needful [for his friend] ευ ποιησαι to do a service to τινα any one, συνεπισχυει he helps to strengthen him, εαν τε and if φοβος τις any fear ταραττῃ disturbs him συμβοηθει he comes to his aid, τα μεν sometimes συναναλισκων joining in the expense, τα δε and sometimes συμπραττων acting with him, και and τα μεν sometimes συμπειθων helping him to persuade, τα δε and sometimes βιαζομενος using force, και and πλειστα very much ευφραινων cheering ευ μεν πραττοντας those who are doing well, πλειστα δε and very much επανορθων supporting σφαλλομενους those who fail. Ἃ δε but whatever αἵ τε χειρες both the hands ὑπηρετουσι minister ἑκαστῳ to each, και and οἱ οφθαλμοι the eyes προορωσι foresee, και and τα ωτα the ears προακουουσι hear beforehand, και and οἱ ποδες the feet διανυτουσιν effect, φιλος the friend λειπεται is left behind ουδενος neither τουτων of these ενεργετων doing good: πολλακις δε and often ὁ φιλος the friend εξηρκεσεν has effected προ του φιλου

for his friend ταυτα those services ἁ which τις a man ουκ εξειργασατο has not done η or ουκ ειδεν has not seen η or ουκ ηκουσεν has not heard η or ου διηνυσεν has not effected προ ἑαυτου for himself. Αλλ' ὁμως but yet ενιοι some πειρωνται endeavour θεραπευειν to cultivate δενδρα μεν trees του καρπου ἑνεκεν for the sake of the fruit, του δε κτηματος but of that possession παμφορωτατου the most productive of all, ὁ which καλειτει is called φιλος friend, οἱ πλειστοι most men επιμελονται take thought αργως idly και ανειμενως and loosely.

V. Ηκουσα δε but I heard ποτε once και also αλλον αυτου λογον another discourse of his, ὁς which εδοκει seemed μοι to me προτρεπειν to encourage τον ακουοντα the hearer εξεταζειν to examine ἑαυτον himself ὁποσου how much ειη αξιος he was worth τοις φιλοις to his friends. Ιδων γαρ for seeing τινα some one των συνοντων of his associates αμελουντα neglectful φιλου of a friend πιεζομενου who was pressed πενια by want, ηρετο he asked Αντισθενη Antisthenes εναντιον in presence του αμελουντος of the man who was neglectful αυτου of him και and αλλων πολλων of many others; 2. "Αρ' εισιν are there," εφη said he, "τινες αξιαι any valuations, ω Αντισθενες Antisthenes, φιλων of friends, ὡσπερ as οικετων of domestics? των γαρ οικετων for of domestics ὁ μεν που one perhaps εστιν is αξιος worth δυοιν μναιν two minæ,, ὁ δε and

another *ουδ' ἡμιμναιου* not even half a mina, *ὁ δε* and a third *πεντε μνων* five minæ, *ὁ δε* and another *και δεκα* even ten; *Νικιας δε* and Nicias *ὁ Νικηρατου* son of Nikeratus *λεγεται* is said *πριασθαι* to have bought *επιστατην* an overseer *εις τα αργυρεια* over his silver mines *ταλαντου* for a talent. *Σκοπουμαι δη* I am considering then *τουτο* this," *εφη* said he, "*ει αρα* whether indeed *εισι* there are *αξιαι* values *και των φιλων* of our friends also *οὑτω* in the same way *ὡσπερ* as *των οικετων* of domestics." 3. "*Ναι* yes," *μα Δια* by Jove," *εφη* said *ὁ Αντισθενης* Antisthenes, "*εγω γουν* I for instance *βουλοιμην αν* would wish *τυν μεν τινα* such an one indeed *ειναι* to be *φιλον* a friend *μοι* to me *μαλλον η* rather than *δυο μνας* two minæ, *τον δε* but another *προτιμησαιμι αν* I would value more *ουδε* not even *ἡμιμναιου* than half a mina, *τον δε* and another *ἑλοιμην αν* I would choose *και* even *προ δεκα μνων* rather than ten minæ, *τον δε* and another *πριαιμην αν* I would buy *ειναι* to be *φιλον* a friend *μοι* to me *προ παντων χρηματων* before all money *και πορων* and means." 4. "*Ουκουν αν καλως εχοι* would it not then be well," *εφη* said *ὁ Σωκρατης* Socrates, "*ει γε* if at least *ταυτα* these things *εστιν* are *τοιαυτα* so, *τινα* that a man *εξεταζειν* should examine *ἑαυτον* himself *ποσου αρα* how much *τυγχανει* he happens *αξιος ων* to to be worth *τοις φιλοις* to his friends *και* and *πειρασθαι* to endeavour *ειναι* to be *αξιος*

worth ὡς πλειστου as much as possible, ἱνα that οἱ φιλοι his friends προδιδωσιν αυτον may desert him ἡττον less. Ἐγω γαρ τοι for I," εφη said he, "πολλακις often ακουων hearing του μεν of one man ὁτι that φιλος ανηρ a man who was his friend προυδωκεν αυτον had deserted him, του δε and of another ὁτι that ανηρ a man ὁν whom ᾠετο he thought ειναι to be φιλον a friend εἱλετο had chosen μναν a mina μαλλον rather ανθ' εκεινου instead of him, σκοπω consider of τα τοιαυτα παντα all such cases μη lest ὡσπερ as, ὁταν when τις a man πωλῃ sells οικετην πονηρον a bad domestic, αποδιδοται he disposes of him του εὑροντος for what he will fetch, οὑτω so και also ῃ it may be επαγωγον tempting αποδιδοσθαι to get rid of τον πονηρον φιλον the base friend, ὁταν when εξῃ it is possible λαβειν to take το πλεον more της αξιας than his value. Τους δε χρηστους but [as to] good ones ὁρω I see ουτε neither οικετας domestics πανυ τι πωλουμενους ever at all sold ουτε nor φιλους friends προδιδομενους deserted.

VI. Ἐδοκει δε but he seemed μοι to me και also φρενουν to give advice εις το δοκιμαζειν for testing φιλους ὁποιους what sort of friends αξιον it is worth while κτασθαι to acquire λεγων τοιαδε speaking thus: "Ειπε μοι tell me," εφη said he, "ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, ει if δεοιμεθα we wanted φιλου αγαθου a good friend, πως how επιχειροιμεν αν should we set about σκοπειν the enquiry

[for him]: *Αρα ζητητεον* are we [not] to seek *πρωτον μεν* first, *ὁστις* [one] who *αρχει* has controul *γαστρος τε* both of his appetite *και* and *φιλοποσιας* his love of drink *και* and *λαγνειας* lust *και ὑπνου* and sleep *και αργιας* and idleness? *Ὁ γαρ κρατουμενος* for he who is overcome *ὑπο τουτων* by these *δυναιτο αν* would be able *πραττειν* to do *τα δεοντα* his duty *ουτε* neither *αυτος* himself *ἑαυτῳ* to himself *ουτε* nor *φιλῳ* to his friend." "*Μα Δια* by Jove, *ου δητα* no indeed," *εφη* said he. "*Ουκ ουν δοκει* does it not seem then *σοι* to you *αφεκτεον ειναι* that you should keep aloof *του μεν αρχομενου* from the man who is controuled *ὑπο τουτων* by these?" "*Πανυ μεν ουν* surely so," *εφη* said he. 2. "*Τι γαρ* for what?" *εφη* said he, "*ὁστις* [the man] who *ων* being *δαπανηρος* expensive *μη εστιν αυταρκης* has not enough of his own, *αλλα* but *αει* always *δειται* asks *των πλησιον* of his neighbours *και* and *λαμβανων μεν* getting [money] *μη δυναται* is not able *αποδιδοναι* to pay it back, *μη λαμβανων δε* but not getting any *μισει* hates *τον μη διδοντα* him who does not lend it, *ου δοκει οὑτος* does not he appear *σοι* to you *ειναι* to be *φιλος χαλεπος* a troublesome friend?" "*Πανυ γε* certainly," *εφη* said he. "*Ουκουν αφεκτεον* should we not keep aloof *και τουτου* from him too?" "*Αφεκτεον μεντοι* we should indeed keep clear of him," *εφη* said he. 3. *Τι γαρ* for what? *ὁστις* [in the case of him] who *δυνα-*

ται μεν is able χρηματιζεσθαι to make bargains, επιθυμει δε and is covetous πολλων χρηματων of much wealth, και and δια τουτο on this account εστιν is δυσξυμβολος difficult to make contracts with, και and λαμβανων μεν when he receives any thing ηδεται is pleased, μη δε βουλεται but is not willing αποδιδοναι to pay back?" "Εμοι μεν to me indeed, (εφη said he,) ουτος this man δοκει seems ειναι to be ετι πονηροτερος still worse εκεινου than the other." "Τι δε but what ὁστις [of him] who δια τον ερωτα through his love του χρηματιζεσθαι of making a bargain μηδε ποιειται does not even make for himself σχολην leisure προς ἑν αλλο for one other thing η than ὁποθεν from what source κερδανει he shall make gain?" "Αφεκτεον we should keep aloof και τουτου from him also ὡς δοκει μοι as it seems to me: ειη γαρ αν for he would be ανωφελης useless τῳ χρὡμενῳ to the man who made use of him." "Τι δε but what ὁστις [of him] who εστιν is στασιωδης τε both quarrelsome και θελων and wishing παρεχειν to create τοις φιλοις for his friends πολλους εχθρους many enemies?" "Φευκτεον we should avoid, νη Δια by Jove! και τουτον him too." "Ει δε but if τις any one εχοι had μηδεν μεν none indeed τουτων των κακων of these evil qualities, ανεχεται δε but suffers himself ευ πασχων to be done good to, μηδεν φροντιζων having no thought του αντευεργετειν of doing

service in return?" "*Και ουτος* he also *ειη αν* would be *ανωφελης* of no use. *Αλλα* but *ποιον* what sort of man, *ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates, *επιχειρησομεν* shall we try *ποιεισθαι φιλον* to make a friend to us?" "*Οιμαι μεν* I think, *οστις* [the man] who, *τα εναντια* the opposite *τουτων* these [qualities] *ειη μεν* is *εγκρατης* continent *των οδονων* in the pleasures *δια του σωματος* [enjoyed] by means of the body, *τυγχανει δε ων* and happens to be *ευνους* kindly *και ευσυμβολος* and easy to deal with, *και φιλονικος* and liking to outdo others *προς το μη λειπεσθαι* so as not to be behindhand *ευ ποιων* in doing good to *τους ευεργετουντας αυτον* those who do him good, *ωστε* so as *λυσιτελειν* to be of benefit *τοις χρωμενοις* to those who make use of him." 6. "*Πως ουν* how then *δοκιμασαιμεν αν* could we test *ταυτα* these qualities, *ω Σωκρατες* oh Socrates, *προ του χρησθαι* before making use of [a man]?" "*Δοκιμαζομεν* we test, (*εφη* said he,) *τους μεν ανδριαντοποιους* statuaries, *ου τεκμαιρομενοι* not conjecturing *τοις λογοις αυτων* by their words, *αλλα* but *ον αν* whomsoever *ορωμεν* we see *ειργασμενον* who has made *τους προσθεν ανδριαντας* his former statues *καλως* well, *πιστευομεν* we give credit *τουτῳ* to him, *ποιησειν* that he will make *και τους λοιπους* the others also *ευ* well." 7. "*Λεγεις δη* do you say then, (*εφη* said he,) *και ανδρα* that the man also, *ος* who *φαινηται αν* shows himself *ευ ποιων* doing good to *τους*

φιλους τους προσθεν his former friends, δηλον ειναι shows himself και also ευεργετησοντα likely to do good to τους ὑστερον the later ones?" ["Yes:] (εφη said he,) και γαρ ἱπποις for in the case of horses also ὁν αν whomsoever ὁρω I see καλως χρωμενον using well τοις προσθεν his former ones, οιμαι I think τουτον that he καλως αν χρησθαι will use well και αλλοις others also." 8. "Ειεν well, well! (εφη said he,) πως δε but how χρη ποιεισθαι must we make φιλον a friend τουτον him ὁς who δοκῃ αν may seem ἡμιν to us ειναι to be αξιος worthy φιλιας of friendship?" "Πρωτον μεν first, (εφη said he,) επισκεπτεον we must consider τα παρα των θεων such questions as arise from the gods, ει whether συμβουλευουσι they advise us ποιεισθαι to make him φιλον a friend." "Τι ουν what then? (εφη said he,) εχεις are you able ειπειν to say ὁπως how οὑτος he θηρατεος is to be caught ὁν whom δοκῃ τε αν it may both seem good ἡμιν to us και and οἱ θεοι the gods μη εναντιωνται may not oppose?" 9. "Μα Δια by Jove, (εφη said he,) ου not κατα ποδας by [swiftness of] the feet ὡσπερ as ὁ λαγως the hare, ουδε nor ἀπατῃ by deceit ὡσπερ as αἱ ορνιθες birds, ουδε nor βιᾳ by force ὡσπερ as οἱ καπροι boars [οἱ ἐχθροι enemies]. Ἐργωδες γαρ for it is laborious ἑλειν to catch φιλον a friend ακοντα against his will; χαλεπον δε and difficult και also κατεχειν to hold him δησαντα having bound him

ὥσπερ δουλον as a slave. Γιγνονται γαρ for men become εχθροι enemies μαλλον rather η φιλοι than friends πασχοντες ταυτα when so treated." "Πως δε but how φιλοι do they become friends?" εφη said he. "Φασι they say ειναι μεν that there are τινας επῳδας certain charms ἁς which οἱ επισταμενοι those who know επᾴδοντες singing over οἱς those whom βουλωνται they wish ποιουνται make αυτους them φιλους their friends ειναι δε and that there are και also φιλτρα love-draughts οἱς which οἱ επισταμενοι those who know χρωμενοι using προς οὑς towards those whom βουλωνται αν they choose φιλουνται are loved ὑπ' αυτων by them." 11. "Ποθεν ουν whence then, (εφη said he,) μαθοιμεν αν could we learn ταυτα these?" "Ηκουσας you have heard Ὁμηρου from Homer ἁ μεν what αἱ Σειρηνες the Sirens επῃδον sang τῳ Οδυσσει to Ulysses, ὡν of which αρχη the beginning εστιν is τοιαδε τις some such as this:

"Δευρο αγε δη come hither then, πολυαινε Οδυσευ much-famed Ulysses, μεγα κυδος great pride Αχαιων of Achæans!"

"Αἱ ουν Σειρηνες did the Sirens then, ω Σωκρατες Socrates, επᾴδουσαι singing και τοις αλλοις ανθρωποις to other men also ταυτῃ την επῳδην this charm κατειχον keep them ὡστε so that τους επᾰσθεντας those who were charmed μη απιεναι did not depart απ' αυτων from them?" 12. "Ου no: αλλα but επῃδον φιλοτιμουμενοις to

those who were ambitious επ' αρετῃ for virtue." "Λεγεις you say σχεδον τι something of this kind χρηναι that one ought επᾳδειν to sing ἑκαστῳ to each τοιαυτα such charms οἱα as ακουων hearing μη νομιει he will not think τον επαινουντα that the man who praises him λεγειν says it καταγελωντα laughing at him. Οὑτω μεν γαρ for in that case ειη τε αν he would both be εχθιων more hateful και and απελαυνοι would drive away τους ανθρωπους men αφ' ἑαυτου from him, ει if επαινοιη he praised τον ειδοτα the man who knows ὁτι that εστιν he is μικρος τε both short και αισχρος and ugly, και ασθενης and weak, λεγων saying ὁτι that εστιν he is καλος τε both handsome και μεγας and tall και ισχυρος and strong. Οισθα δε but do you know τινας αλλας επῳδας any other charms? 13. "Ου no: αλλα but ηκουσα μεν I have heard ὁτι that Περικλης Pericles επιστατο knew πολλας many, ἁς which επᾳδων chanting τῃ πολει to the city εποιει he αυτην made it φιλειν αὑτον love him." "Πως δε but how Θεμιστοκλης did Themistocles εποιησε make την πολιν the city φιλειν αὑτον love him?" "Μα Δια by Jove ου not επᾳδων by using charms towards it, αλλα but περιαψας αυτῃ by throwing round it αγαθον τι something for its good. 14. "Δοκεις you seem μοι to me λεγειν to say, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, ὡς that, ει if αελλομεν we intend κτησεσθαι to get αγαθον τινα any good man φιλον as a

friend, δει ἡμας we must αυτους ourselves γενεσθαι be αγαθους good [λεγειν τε both to speak και πραττειν and to act]." "Συ δε ωου but did you think," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ειναι that it is οἱον τε possible και even οντα πονηρον being a bad man κτησασθαι to get αγαθους φιλους good friends?" 15. "[Yes:] ἑωρων γαρ for I saw," εφη said ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus, "ῥητορας τε φαυλους both bad rhetoricians οντας φιλους being friends αγαθοις δημηγοροις to good speakers in-public και and ουχ ἱκανους men not able στρατηγειν to command ἑταιρους companions ανδρασι to men πανυ στρατηγικοις thoroughly able to command an army." 16. "Αρα ουν οισθα do you then know," εφη said he, "και also, περι οὐ on the subject about which διαλεγομεθα we are conversing, τινας any men οἱ who οντες being ανωφελεις useless δυνανται are able ποιεισθαι to make ωφελιμους useful men φιλους their friends?" "Ου δητα no, certainly μα Δια by Jove," εφη said he, "αλλα but ει if εστιν it is αδυνατον impossible οντα being πονηρον bad κτήσασθαι to get καλους honourable και αγαθους φιλους and good friends, εκεινο this ηδη now μελει is of interest μοι to me, ει whether εστιν it is possible αυτον one's self γενομενον becoming καλον honourable και αγαθον and good εξ ἑτοιμου readily ειναι to be φιλον a friend τοις καλοις to the honourable και αγαθοις and good." 17. "Θραττει it troubles σε you,

ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, ὁτι that πολλακις ὁρᾳς you often see ανδρας men και both πραττοντας doing τα καλα good actions και and απεχομενους abstaining των αισχρων from base ones, αντι του ειναι instead of being φιλους friends στασιαζοντας quarrelling αλληλοις with one another, και and χρωμενους treating [one another] χαλεπωτερον more harshly των ανθρωπων than those men μηδενος αξιων who are of no worth at all." 18. Και and ου μονον γε not only οἱ ιδιωται private men," εφη said ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus, "ποιουσι do τουτο this, αλλα but και πολεις cities also αἱ τε μαλιστα επιμελομεναι which both have most regard των καλων for honourable actions και and ἡκιστα προσιεμεναι which least allow of τα αισχρα base ones, πολλακις often εχουσι πολεμικως are hostilely disposed προς αλληλας towards one another.

19. Ἀ which things λογιζομενος reflecting on πανυ αθυμως εχω I am very desponding προς την κτησιν as regards the acquisition των φιλων of friends: ουτε γαρ for neither ὁρω do I see τους πονηρους bad men δυναμενους able ειναι to be φιλους friends αλληλοις to one another—πως γαρ for how δυναιντο αν could η either αχαριστοι ungrateful η or αμελεις careless η or απιστοι untrustworthy η or ακρατεις ανθρωποι intemperate men γενεσθαι become φιλοι friends? οἱ μεν ουν πονηροι bad men therefore παντως by all means δοκουσιν appear εμοιγε to me at least

πεφυκεναι to be naturally μαλλον rather εχθροι foes η φιλοι than friends αλληλοις to one another. 20. Αλλα μην but yet, ὡσπερ as συ λεγεις you say, ουδε neither οἱ πονηροι αν could bad men ποτε ever συναρμοσειαν unite τοις χρηστοις with the good εις φιλιαν for friendship: πως γαρ for how οἱ ποιουντες αν could those who do τα πονηρα evil deeds γενοιντο αν become φιλοι friends τοις μισουσι to those who hate το τοιαυτα such deeds? Ει δε δη but if indeed και οἱ ασκουντες those also who cultivate αρετην virtue στασιαζουσι τε both quarrel περι του πρωτευειν about taking the lead εν ταις πολεσιν in their cities και and φθονουντες envying ἑαυτοις themselves μισουσιν hate αλληλους one another, τινες what men ετι εσονται will there remain to be φιλοι friends και and εν τισιν ανθρωποις among what men ευνοια will kindness και πιστις and good faith εσται exist?" 21. "Αλλα but," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ταυτα μεν these things, ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, εχει πως exist somehow ποικιλως in various ways. Οἱ γαρ ανθρωποι for men εχουσιν have φυσει by nature τα μεν partly φιλικα friendly [tendencies]—δεονται τε γαρ for they both have need αλληλων of one another και and ελεουσι feel pity και and συνεργουντες working together ωφελουσι benefit [one another], και and συνιεντες understanding τουτο this state of things εχουσιν have χαριν gratitude αλληλοις to one another—τα δε and

partly πολεμικα hostile [tendencies] : νομιζοντες τε γαρ for both deeming τα αυτα the same things καλα good και ἡδεα and pleasant μαχονται they fight ὑπερ τουτων for these και and διχογνωμονουντες entertaining divided sentiments εναντιουνται they oppose one another. Και ερις δε but both strife πολεμικον is a cause of war και οργη and so is anger : και and ὁ μεν εοως the love του πλεονεκτειν of overreaching δυσμενες is odious, ὁ δε φθονος and envy μισητον is hateful. 22. Αλλ' ὁμως but yet ἡ φιλια friendship διαδυομενη slipping in δια παντων τουτων through all these συναπτει joins together τους καλους τε those who are both honourable και αγαθους and good. Δια γαρ την αρετην for on account of virtue αἱρουνται μεν they choose κεκτησθαι to possess τα μετρια moderate possessions ανευ πονου without toil μαλλον rather η than κυριευειν to be masters παντων of every thing δια πολεμου by war, και and δυνανται they are able πεινωντες hungering και διψωντες and thirsting αλυπως without annoyance κοινωνειν to have their share σιτου of meat και ποτου and drink και and καρτερειν abstain ἡδομενοι taking pleasure τοις αφροδισιοις in the charms των ὡραιων of beautiful persons, ὡστε so as μη λυπειν not to vex οὑς those whom μη προσηκει they ought not. 23. Δυνανται δε and they are able και also ου μονον not only απεχομενοι abstaining του πλεονεκτειν from overreaching κοινωνειν to share νομι-

ωως lawfully χρηματων in things, αλλα but και also επαρκειν to give aid αλληλοις to one another: δυνανται δε and they are able και also διατιθεσθαι to settle την εριν strife ου μονον not only αλυπως without pain, αλλα but και even συμφεροντως advantageously αλληλοις to one another, και and κωλυειν to prevent την οργην anger προϊεναι from proceeding εις το μεταμελησομενον to what will cause repentance. Αφαιρουσι δε and they remove τον φθονον envy πανταπασιν altogether, παρεχοντες offering τα μεν εαυτων αγαθα their own good things τοις φιλοις to their friends οικεια to be theirs, νομιζοντες δε and deeming τα those των φιλων of their friends εαυτων their own. 24. Πως ουν how then ουκ εικος is it unlikely τους καλους that the honourable και αγαθους and good ειναι should be κοινωνους sharers των πολιτικων τιμων of political honours μη μονον not only αβλαβεις unharmed αλλα but και even ωφελιμους usefully αλληλοις to one another? Οἱ μεν γαρ επιθυμουντες for those who are desirous τιμασθαι τε both to be honoured και αρχειν and to rule εν ταις πολεσιν in states, ἱνα that εχωσι they may have εξουσιαν power κλεπτειν τε both to steal χρηματα things και and βιαζεσθαι to tyrannize over ανθρωπους men και and ἡδυπαθειν to enjoy themselves, ειεν αν would be αδικοι τε both unjust και and αδυνατοι unable συναρμοσαι to make a contract αλλῳ with any other. 25. Ει δε

but if τις any one βουλομενος wishing τιμασθαι to be honoured εν πολει in a city ὁπως that αυτος τε both himself μη αδικηται may not be wronged, και and δυνηται may be able βοηθειν to aid τοις φιλοις his friends τα δικαια in what is just, και and αρξας when in power πειραται endeavours ποιειν τι αγαθον to do some good την πατριδα to his country, δια τι why ουκ αν ὁ τοιουτος should not such a man δυναιτο be able συναρμοσαι to make an union αλλῳ τοιουτῳ with another such man? Ποτερον whether δυνησεται will he be able ἡττον less μετα των καλων together with the honourable και αγαθων and good ωφελειν to benefit τους φιλους his friends? η or εσται will he be αδυνατωτερος less able ευεργετειν to do good service to την πολιν the city εχων having καλους honourable και and αγαθους good men συνεργους working with him? 26. Αλλα but εστιν it is δηλον manifest και also εν τοις γυμνικοις αγωσιν in the gymnastic contests ὁτι that, ει if εξην it were lawful τοις κρατιστοις for the strongest συνθεμενους having made a junction ιεναι to go επι τους χειρους against the weaker, οὑτοι they ενικων αν would conquer παντας τους αγωνας in all the contests και and οὑτοι they ελαμβανον αν would receive παντα τα αθλα all the prizes. Επει ουν since then εκει μεν there ουκ εωσι they do not permit men ποιειν to do τουτο this, εν δε τοις πολιτικοις but in the political contests, εν οἱς in which οἱ καλοι

the honourable *και αγαθοι* and good *κρατιστευουσιν* are strongest, *ουδεις* no one *κωλυει* prevents [a man] *ευεργετειν* from doing good to *την πολιν* the state *μεθ' οὑ* in union with whomsoever *τις* any one *βουληται αν* pleases, *πως* how *ου λυσιτελει* is it not expedient *πολιτευεσθαι* that [a man] should act as a politician *κτησαμενον* having got *τους βελτιστους φιλους* the best friends, *χρωμενον* using *τουτοις* these *κοινωνοις* as partners *και συνεργοις* and cooperators *μαλλον* rather *η* than *ανταγωνισταις* antagonists? 27. *Αλλα μην* but indeed *και εκειvο* this also *δηλον* is manifest, *ὁτι* that *και αν* if also *τις* a man *πολεμῃ* makes war *τινι* upon any one, *δεησεται* he will be in need *συμμαχων* of allies *και τουτων* and these *πλειονων* more numerous, *εαν* if *αντιτατηται* he opposes himself *καλοις* to honourable *και αγαθοις* and good men. *Και μην* and indeed *οἱ εθελοντες* those who are willing *συμμαχειν* to be his allies *ευ ποιητεοι* must be treated well, *ἱνα* that *θελωσι* they may be willing *προθυμεισθαι* to be zealous in his cause. *Πολυ δε κρειττον* but it is much better *ευ ποιειν* to do good to *τους βελτιστους* the best men *ελαττονας* who are fewer *η* than *τους χειρους* the worst *ονταs* who are *πλειονας* more numerous: *οἱ γαρ πονηροι* for the bad *δεονται* are in need *πολυ πλειονων ευεργεσιων* of many more services *η* than *οἱ χρηστοι* the good. 28. *Αλλα* but *πειρω* try, (*εφη* said he,) *ω Κριτοβουλε* oh Critobulus, *θαρρων*

with confidence γιγνεσθαι to be αγαθος good και and γενομενος being τοιουτος such επιχειρει endeavour θηραν to seek out τους those καλους τε who are both honourable και αγαθους and good. Ισως δε but perhaps και εγω I also εχοιμι αν might be able συλλαβειν σοι to help you τι in something εις την θηραν in the pursuit των of those men καλων τε who are both honourable και αγαθων and good δια το ειναι because I am ερωτικος fond [of them]. Ὧν γαρ ανθρωπων for of whatever men επιθυμησω I shall form a liking, ὅλος ὥρμημαι I am altogether impelled δεινως most powerfully επι το αντιφιλεισθαι τε to be both loved in return ὑπ' αυτων by them φιλων whilst loving αυτους them, και and ποθων whilst regretting them αντιποθεισθαι to be regretted in return, και and επιθυμων whilst desiring συνειναι to be in company with them αντεπιθυμεισθαι της συνουσιας to have my company desired in return. 29. Ὁρω δε but I see δεησον that there will be a need τουτων of these things και σοι to you also, ὁταν when επιθυμησῃς you shall desire ποιεισθαι to make φιλιαν friendship προς τινας with any ones. Μη ουν αποκρυπτου do not then hide με from me οἷς to whom βουλοιο αν you may wish γενεσθαι to beceme φιλος a friend: δια γαρ το επιμελεσθαι for through taking care του αρεσαι to please τῳ αρεσκοντι μοι the man who pleases me οιμαι I think ουκ απειρως εχειν that I am not with-

out experience προς θηραν for the capture ανθρωπων of men." Και and ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus εφη said:

30. "Και μην and indeed, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, εγω I παλαι επιθυμω have long since been desirous τουτων των μαθηματων of having these kinds of learning, αλλως τε both otherwise και and ει if ἡ αυτη επιστημη the same knowledge εξαρκεσει μοι will avail me επι τους αγαθους towards those who are good τας ψυχας in their minds και and επι τους καλους towards those who are handsome τα σωματα in their persons." Και and ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates εφη said: 31. "Αλλα but, ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, ουκ ενεστιν it is not εν τῃ εμῃ επιστημῃ in my science το ποιειν to make τους καλους handsome men ὑπομενειν submit to προσφεροντα a man who lays on them τας χειρας his hands. Πεπεισμαι δε but I am persuaded και also τους ανθρωπους that men φευγειν flee απο της Σκυλλης from Scylla δια τουτο for this reason ὁτι because προσεφερε she laid τας χειρας her hands αυτοις on them: φασι δε but they say τας παντας that all ὑπομενειν wait for Σειρηνας the Sirenes, και and ακουοντας hearing αυτων them κηλεισθαι are enchanted, ὁτι because προσεφερον they laid τας χειρας their hands ουδενι on no one, αλλα but επῃδον sang πασι to all πορρωθεν from a distance." 32. Και and ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus εφη said, "Ως ου προσοισοντος since I shall not lay on [any one] τας χειρας my hands,

διδασκε tell me, ει if εχεις you have αγαθον τι any thing useful εις κτησιν for the acquisition φιλων of friends." "Ουδε ουν προσοισεις but will you not then lay το στομα your mouth προς το στομα to [any one's] mouth?" εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates. "Θαρρει be of good cheer," εφη said ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus, "ουδε γαρ for neither προσοισω will I approach το στομα my mouth ουδενι to any one, εαν μη unless η he be καλος handsome." "Συγε you, ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus," εφη said [Socrates,] "ευθυς ειρηκας have immediately said το εναντιον the opposite του συμφεροντος of what is expedient. Οἱ μεν γαρ καλοι for the handsome ουχ ὑπομενουσι do not abide τα τοιαυτα such doings: οἱ δε αισχροι but the ugly και ἡδεως even with pleasure προσιενται allow them, νομιζοντες thinking καλεισθαι that they are called καλοι beautiful δια την ψυχην on account of the mind." 33. Και and ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus εφη said, "Ως φιλησοντος μου since I shall kiss τους μεν καλους the beautiful, καταφιλησοντος δε and shall ardently kiss τους αγαθους the good, διδασκε tell me θαρρων boldly τα θηρατικα των φιλων the modes of capturing friends." Και and ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates εφη said, "Οταν ουν when then, ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, βουλη you wish γενεσθαι to become φιλος a friend τινι to any one, εασεις με will you permit me κατειπειν σου to state about you προς αυτον to

him ὁτι that αγασαι τε you both admire αυτου him και and επιθυμεις desire ειναι to be φιλος αυτου his friend?" "Κατηγορει make the statement," εφη said ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus, "οιδα γαρ for I know ουδενα no one μισουντα hating τους επαινουντας those who praise him." 34. Ἐαν δε but if," εφη said he, "προσκατηγορησω σου I shall further state about you, ὁτι that δια το αγασθαι αυτου through admiring him και ευνοϊκως εχεις you also are well disposed προς αυτον towards him, αρα μη δοξεις you will not seem, will you, διαβαλλεσθαι to be calumniated ὑπ' εμου by me?" "Αλλα nay," εφη said he, "εγγιγνεται there arises και αυτῳ μοι in myself also ευνοια good will προς οὑς towards those whom ὑπολαβω αν I may understand ευνοϊκως εχειν to be amiably disposed προς εμε towards me." 35. "Ταυτα μεν δη these things then," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "εξεσται it will be lawful μοι for me λεγειν to state περι σου about you προς οὑς to those whom βουλῃ αν you may wish ποιησασθαι to make φιλους your friends: εαν δε but if δῳς μοι you give me ετι further εξουσιαν permission λεγειν to say περι σου about you ὁτι that ει τε you both are επιμελης careful των φιλων of your friends και and χαιρεις rejoice ουδενι in nothing οὑτω so much ὡς as φιλοις αγαθοις in good friends, και and αγαλλει τε both take pride επι τοις καλοις εργοις in the honourable deeds των

των φιλων of your friends *ουχ ηττον* no lese *η* than *επι τοις σαυτου* in your own, *και* and *χαιρεις* rejoice *επι τοις αγαθοις* at the good fortune *των φιλων* of your friends *ουδεν ηττον* no less *η* than *επι τοις σαυτου* at your own *ου τε καμνεις* and [that] you never give out *μηχανωμενος* contriving *ὁπως* how *ταυτα* these [good things] *γιγνηται* may accrue *τοις φιλοις* to your friends, *και* and *ὁτι* that *εγνωκας* you have made up your mind *ειναι* that it is *αρετην* the merit *ανδρος* of a man *νικαν* to surpass *τους μεν φιλους* his friends *ευ ποιουντα* in doing them good, *τους δε εχθρους* and his enemies *κακως* [in doing them] harm, *οιμαι* I think *με* that I *ειναι αν* should be *πανυ επιτηδειον* very serviceable *σοι* to you *συνθηρον* to aid you in the search *των αγαθων φιλων* of good friends." 36. "*Τι ουν* why however," *εφη* said *ὁ Κριτοβουλος* Critobulus, "*λεγεις* do you say *τουτο* this *εμοι* to me, *ὡσπερ ουκ ον* as if it were not *επι σοι* in your own power *λεγειν* to say *ὁ τι* whatever *βουλῃ αν* you may please *περι εμου* about me?" "*Ου* no *μα Δια* by Jupiter, *ὡς* as *εγω* I *ηκουσα ποτε* once heard *Ασπασιας* from Aspasia: *εφη γαρ* for she said *τας αγαθας προμνηστριας* that good match-makers *διαγγελλουσας μεν* reporting *τα αγαθα* good things *μετ' αληθειας* with truth *ειναι* are *δεινας* clever *συναγειν* to bring together *ανθρωπους* men *εις κηδειαν* to an alliance, *ου δε ωφελειν* but do no good *επαινουσας* if they praise them *ψευδομενας* telling

untruths: τους γαρ εξαπατηθεντας for that those who are [thus] deceived μισειν hate ἁμα at the same time αλληλους τε both one another και and την προμνησαμενην the match maker. Ἁ δη which και εγω I also πεισθεις being persuaded ορθως εχειν to be true ἡγουμαι think ουκ εξειναι that it is not lawful μοι for me επαινουντι praising you λεγειν to say περι σου about you ουδεν any thing ὁ τι in which μη αν αληθευω I do not speak the truth." 37. "Συ μεν αρα you then," εφη said ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus, "ει are τοιουτος φιλος such a friend μοι to me, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, οἱος as συλλαμβανειν μοι to cooperate with me, αν μεν if αυτος I myself εχω have επιτηδειον τι any thing useful εις το κτησασθαι to get φιλους friends: ει δε μη but if not, ουκ αν εθελοις you would not be willing πλασας inventing ειπειν to say τι any thing επι τῃ εμῃ ωφελειᾳ for my benefit." "Ποτερα δε αν δοκω but should I seem likely," εφη said ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates, "ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, ωφελειν σε to benefit you μαλλον more επαινων by praising you τα ψευδη for what was false η than πειθων σε by persuading you πειρασθαι to endeavour γενεσθαι to become αγαθον ανδρα a good man? 38. Ει δε but if τουτο this μη φανερον is not clear σοι to you οὑτω so, σκεψαι consider it εκ τωνδε from this point of view. Ει γαρ for if βουλομενος wishing ποιησαι σε to make you φιλον a friend ναν-

κληρῳ to a ship-owner επαινοιην I were to praise you φασκων saying ειναι that you were αγαθον κυβερνητην a good steersman, ὁ δε and he πεισθεις μοι listening to me επιτρεψειε were to commit την ναυν his ship σοι to you μη επισταμενῳ not knowing how κυβερναν to steer, εχεις have you τινα ελπιδα any hope μη αν απολεσαι that you would not lose σαυτον τε both your own life και and την ναυν the ship? η or ει if ψευδομενος speaking falsely πεισαιμι αν I should persuade την πολιν the city κοινῃ publicly επιτρεψαι to trust ἑαυτην itself σοι to you ὡς as στρατηγικῳ τε both skilled in generalship και δικαστικῳ and a good lawyer και πολιτικῳ and able politician, τι what οιει do you think σαυτον that yourself και and την πολιν the city παθειν αν would suffer ὑπο σου under your [management]? η or ει if ψευδομενος saying what was false πεισαιμι I should persuade τινας any των πολιτων of the citizens ιδιᾳ privately επιτρεψαι to entrust τα ἑαυτων their affairs [to you] ὡς οντι as being οικονομικῳ τε both a good economist και επιμελει and a careful man, αρ' ουκ αν would you not διδους πειραν giving proof ειης τε both be βλαβερος harmful ἁμα at once και and φαινοιο appear καταγελαστος ridiculous? 39. Αλλα but συντομωτατη τε both the shortest και and ασφαλεστατη the safest και and καλλιστη ὁδος the best way [is], ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, ὁ τι in whatever βουλῃ ἀν you wish δοκειν to seem ειναι to be

αγαθος good, τουτο in that πειρασθαι to endeavour και also γενεσθαι to become αγαθου good. Ὅσαι δε αρεται but whatever virtues λεγονται are named εν ανθρωποις among men, εὑρησεις you will find σκοπουμενος by examining πασας that all αυξανομενας are increased μαθησει τε both by learning και and μελετῃ by care. Εγω μεν ουν I then οιμαι think, ω Κριτοβουλε oh Critobulus, ἡμας that we δειν ought οὑτως thus θηραν to seek φιλους friends; ει δε but if συ you γιγνωσκεις know how to αλλως πως in and other way, διδασκε inform me." Και and ὁ Κριτοβουλος Critobulus εφη said, "Αλλα but αισχυνοιμην αν I should be ashamed, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, αντιλεγων to say the contrary τουτοις to these sentiments; λεγοιμι γαρ αν for I should say ουτε καλα neither what is honourable ουτ' αληθη nor true."

VII. Και μην and moreover τας αποριας γε [as regards] the difficulties των φιλων of his friends επειρατο he endeavoured ακεισθαι to heal by γνωμῃ advice τας μεν δι' αγνοιαν those which arose from ignorance, διδασκων δε and teaching επαρκειν to assist αλληλοις one another κατα δυναμιν according to their power τας δι' ενδειαν in those which arose from want. Ερω δε but I will tell και εν τουτοις on these points also ἁ what συνοιδα I am conscious of αυτῳ to himself. Ὁρων γαρ for seeing Αριστα-
χον Aristarchus ποτε once εχοντα σκυθρωπως looking downcast εφη he said, "Εοικας you

seem, ω Αριστταρχε oh Aristarchus, φερειν to be bearing τι something βαρεως heavily. Χρη δε but you ought μεταδιδοναι to impart a share του βαρους of the load τοις φιλοις to your friends: ισως γαρ for perhaps και ἡμεις we also κουφισαιμεν αν σε might lighten you τι somewhat." 2. Και and ὁ Αριστταρχος Aristarchus εφη said "Αλλα μην but yet ειμι I am εν πολλῃ γε απορια in a great strait. Επει γαρ for since ἡ πολις the city εστασιασεν has been in a disturbance, πολλων φυγοντων many having fled εις τον Πειραια to the Piræus, συνεληλυθασι there have come together ὡς εμε to me αδελφαι τε both sisters και and αδελφιδαι nieces και ανεψιαι and cousins καταλελειμμεναι left behind τοσαυται so many ὡστε ειναι that there are εν τῃ οικια in the house τεττταρας και δεκα fourteen [in number] τους ελευθερους the free men [only]. Λαμβανομεν δε but we receive ουδεν nothing ουτε either εκ της γης from the land, οἱ γαρ εναντιοι for the enemies κρατουσιν have possession αυτης of it, ουτε nor απο των οικων from the houses: γεγονε γαρ for there has arisen ολιγανθρωπια a scarcity of men εν τῳ αστει in the city. Ουδεις δε but no one ωνειται buys τα επιπλα the moveables, ουδε nor εστιν is it possible δυνεισασθαι to borrow αργυριον money ουδαμοθεν from any source, αλλα but τις a man δοκει αν μοι would seem to me [likely] εὑρειν to find αργυριον money ζητων seeking it εν τῃ ὁδῳ in the road προτε-

ρον sooner η than λαβειν to get it δανειζομε-νος by borrowing. Εστι μεν ουν it is then χαλε-πον hard, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, περιοραν t(neglect τους οικειους my kinsmen απολλυμενους perishing, αδυνατον δε but impossible τρεφειι to feed τοσουτους so many εν τοιουτοις πραγ-μασιν in such circumstances." 3. Ὁ ουι Σωκρατης Socrates then ακουσας hearing ταυτα this εφη said, "Τι ποτε why εστιν is it ὁτι that Κεραμων Ceramon τρεφων feeding πολλους many ου μονον not only δυναται is able παρεχειν to afford τα επιτηδεια necessa-ries ἑαυτῳ τε both to himself και and τουτοις to these, αλλα but και also περιποιειται gains τοσαυτα so much ὡστε και πλουτειν that he is even rich, συ δε but you τρεφων maintaining πολλους many δεδοικας fear μη lest απολησθε you perish ἅπαντες all δι' ενδειαν through want των επιτηδειων of necessaries?" "Ὁτι because νη Δια by Jove, "εφη said he, "ὁ μεν he τρεφει maintaius δουλους slaves, εγω δε but I ελευθερους free men." 4. "Και ποτε-ρον and whether, (εφη said he,) οιει do you think τους ελευθερους that the free men παρα σοι with you ειναι are βελτιους the best η or τους δουλους the slaves παρα Κεραμωνι at Ceramon's?" "Εγω μεν I indeed οιμαι think, (εφη said he,) τους ελευθερους the free men παρ' εμοι with me." "Ουκουν αισχρον is it not then shameful, (εφη said he,) τον μεν that he ευπορειν should be well off απο των πονηροτερων from those who are

inferior, *σε δε* but that you *εχοντα* having *πολλῳ βελτιους* much better men *ειναι* should be *εν απορια* in difficulties?" "*Νη Δια* by Jove, (*εφη* said he,) *ὁ μεν γαρ* for he *τρεφει* maintains *τεχνιτας* artisans, *εγω δε* but I *πεπαιδευμενους* men who have been educated *ελευθεριως* liberally." 5. "*Αρ' ουν εισιν* are not then, (*εφη* said he,) *τεχνιται* artisans *οἱ επισταμενοι* those who know how *ποιειν* to make *χρησιμον τι* any thing useful?" "*Μαλιστα γε* certainly," *εφη* said he. "*Ουκουν* is not then *αλφιτα* meal *χρησιμα γε* useful?" "*Σφοδρα γε* very much so." "*Τι δε αρτοι* but what of loaves of bread?" "*Ουδεν ἡττον* no less [valuable]." "*Τι γαρ* for what (*εφη* said he,) *ἱματια τε* both clothes *ανδρεια* of men *και* and *γυνεικεια* of women *και* and *χιτωνισκοι* vests *και χλαμυδες* and cloaks *και εξωμιδες* and mantles?" "*Σφοδρα γε χρησιμα* very useful indeed, (*εφη* said he,) *και παντα ταυτα* are all these also." "*Επειτα* then, (*εφη* said he,) *οἱ* do those *παρα σοι* with you *επιστανται* know how *ποιειν* to make *ουδεν* none *τουτων* of these things?" "*Παννα μεν ουν* nay, all of them, *ὡς* as *εγω οιμαι* I think." 6. "*Ειτα* then *ουκ οισθα* do you not know *ὁτι* that *αφ' ἑνος μεν* from one *τουτων* of these, *αλφιτοποιϊας* the making of meal, *Ναυσικυδης* Nausicudes *τρεφει* supports *ου μονον* not only *ἑαυτον τε* both himself *και* and *τους οικετας* his household *αλλα* but *προς τουτοις* in addition to these *και ὑς πολλας* both many

swine και βους and oxen, και and περιποιειται gains τοσαυτα so much ὡστε that και also πολλακις λειτουργειν he often ministers τῃ πολει to the state, Κυρηβος δε and Curebus απο αρτοποιϊας from bread-making διατρεφει τε both maintains πασαν την οικιαν all his house και and ζῃ lives δαψιλεως in plenty, Δημεας δε and Demeas ὁ Κολλυτευς of Collytus απο χλαμυδουργιας from cloak-making, Μενων δε and Menon απο χλανιδοποιϊας from robe-making, οἱ δε πλειστοι and the greater part Μεγαρεων of the Megareans διατρεφονται maintain themselves απο εξωμιδοποιϊας from mantle-making?" "Νη Δια [yes] by Jove, (εφη said he,) οὑτοι μεν γαρ for these ωνουμενοι buying ανθρωπους men βαρβαρους who are barbarians εχουσι keep them, ὡστε so as αναγκαζειν to compel them εργαζεσθαι to work at ἁ things which καλως εχει are proper; εγω δε but I [have] ελευθερους τε both freemen και συγγενεις and kinsmen." 7. "Επειτα then, (εφη said he,) ὁτι because εισι they are ελευθεροι τε both free men και and συγγενεις σοι your kinsmen, οιει do you think αυτους χρηναι that they ought ποιειν to do μηδεν αλλο nothing else η than εσθιειν eat και καθευδειν and sleep? Ποτερον ὁρᾳς do you see και των αλλων ελευθερων that of other free men also τους ζωντας those who live οὑτω so διαγοντας pass their time αμεινον better και and μαλλον ευδαιμονιζεις do you think them more happy

η than τους those επιμελομενους who interest themselves τουτων in those things ἁ which επιστανται they know χρησιμα to be useful προς τον βιον for life? η or αισθανει do you perceive την μεν αργιαν that idleness και την αμελειαν and negligence ουτα ωφελιμα are useful τοις ανθρωποις to men προς τε το μαθειν both for learning ἁ what προσηκει it is fit επιστασθαι to know, και and προς το μνημονευειν for remembering ἁ what things μαθωσιν αν they may have learnt, και and προς το ὑγιαινειν τε for both being healthy και and ισχυειν being strong τοις σωμασιν in their bodies και and προς το κτησασθαι τε for both getting και σωζειν and preserving τα χρησιμα the things which are useful προς τον βιον for life, την δε εργασιαν but that industry και and την επιμελειαν diligence ουδεν χρησιμα are not useful? 8. Ποτερον δε but whether εμαθον did they learn ἁ what φης you say αυτας that they [the women] επιστασθαι know ὡς as ουτε neither ουτα being χρησιμα useful προς τον βιον for subsistence ουτε nor ποιησουσαι being themselves about to practise ουδεν any αυτων of them, η or το εναντιον the opposite ὡς as και επιμελησομεναι both about to take care τουτων of these things και and ωφελησομεναι about to derive benefit απ' αυτων from them? Ποτερως γαρ for in which case ανθρωποι would men μαλλον αν σωφρονοιεν be most prudent, αργουντες being idle η or επιμελομε-

νοι being careful των χρησιμων of things which are useful? Ποτερως δε and in which case ειεν αν would they be δικαιοτεροι more just, ει if εργαζοιντο they worked, η or ει if αργουντες being idle βουλευοιντο they deliberated περι των επιτηδειων about the necessaries of life? 9. Αλλα but και also νυν μεν as things now are, ουτε neither, ὡς as εγω οιμαι I think, συ φιλεις do you love εκεινας them ουτε nor εκειναι they σε you, συ μεν you on the one hand ἡγουμενος thinking αυτας them ειναι to be επιζημιους burdensome σεαυτῳ to yourself, εκειναι δε and they ὁρωσαι seeing σε you αχθομενον vexed εφ' ἑαυταις on account of them. Εκ δε τουτων but from these causes κινδυνος there is danger μειζω τε απεχθειαν both that greater hatred γιγνεσθαι should arise και and χαριν that the good will την προγεγονυιαν that existed before μειουσθαι should be lessened. Εαν δε but if προστατησῃς you rule over them ὁπως so that ωσιν ενεργοι they may be at work, συ μεν you φιλησεις will love εκεινας them, ὁρων seeing ουσας that they are ωφελιμους useful σεαυτῳ to yourself εκειναι δε and they αγαπησουσι σε will be fond of you, αισθομεναι perceiving χαιροντα that you take pleasure αυταις in them, μεμνημενοι δε and remembering των προγεγονυιων ενεργεσιων the previous good services ἡδιον with greater pleasure αυξησετε you will encrease την χαριν the love απ' εκεινων which results from them και and εκ τουτων in

consequence of this ἐξετε you will have φιλικωτερον τε both a more friendly και and οικειοτερον more intimate footing αλληλοις to one another. 10. Ει μεν τοι νυν if indeed εμελλον they were about εργασεσθαι to do αισχρον τι something disgraceful, προαιρετεον ειη they should prefer θανατον death αντ' αυτου instead of it; νυν δε but now επιστανται μεν they know, ὡς εοικεν as it seems, ἁ occupations which δοκει are thought ειναι to be καλλιστα most honourable και and πρεπωδεστατα most becoming γυναιξι for women. Παντες δε but all εργαζονται work at ἁ things which επιστανται they know ῥαστα τε most easily και ταχιστα and most quickly και and καλλιστα most honourably και ἡδιστα and most pleasantly. Μη ουν οκνει do not hesitate then, (εφη said he,) εισηγεισθαι to point out αυταις to them ταυτα these things ἁ which λυσιτελησει will be profitable σοι τε both to you και εκειναις and to them, και and, ὡς εικος as is likely, ὑπακουσονται they will listen to you ἡδεως with pleasure." 11. "Αλλα but νη τους θεους by the gods, (εφη said ὁ Αριστταρχος Aristarchus,) δοκεις you seem, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, μοι to me λεγειν to speak οὑτω καλως so well, ὡστε that προσθεν μεν hitherto ου προσιεμην I was not desirous δανεισασθαι to raise a loan ειδως knowing ὁτι that αναλωσας when I had spent ὁ what λαβω αν I might have received, ουχ ἑξω I should not have [any money] αποδον-

ναι to repay it, νυν δε but now δοκω I seem μοι to myself ὑπομενειν [able] to endure ποιησαι doing αυτο it εις αφορμην for the starting εργων of the works."

12. Εκ τουτων δε but from these [beginnings] αφορμη μεν the means of starting επορισθη were procured, ερια δε and wools εωνηθη were bought, και and [the women] ηριστων μεν took their morning meal εργαζομεναι working εργασαμεναι δε and when they had done their work εδειπνουν they took their afternoon meal: ησαν δε and they were ἱλαραι cheeriul αντι σκυθρωπων instead of sad, και and αντι ὑφορωμενων instead of looking askance at ἑαυτους themselves ἑωρων they saw αλληλους one another ἡδεως pleasantly, και and αἱ μεν the women εφιλουν loved him ὡς κηδεμονα as a guardian, ὁ δε and he ηγαπα cherished them ὡς ωφελιμους as useful to him. Τελος δε but in the end ελθων coming προς τον Σωκρατη to Socrates διηγειτο he related to him χαιρων with pleasure ταυτα τε both these things και and ὁτι that αιτιωνται they accuse αυτον him μονον alone των of those εν τη οικια in the house εσθιειν of eating αργον idle. 13. Και and ὁ Σωκρατης Socrates εφη said, "Ειτα ου λεγεις then do you not relate αυταις to them τον λογον the fable του κυνος of the dog? Φασι γαρ for they say, ὁτε [that] when τα ζῳα the animals ην φωναεντα were able to speak, την οϊν the sheep ειπειν said προς τον δεσποτην to her master, 'Ποιεις

you do θαυμαστον a wonderful thing, ὁς who διδῳς givest ἡμιν to us ταις παρεχουσαις who yield σοι to you και ερια both wool και αρνας and lambs και τυρον and cheese, ουδεν nothing ὁ τι which μη αν λαβωμεν we do not take εκ της γης out of the ground, τῳ δε κυνι but to the dog, ὁς who παρεχει σοι supplies you with ουδεν nothing τοιουτον of that sort, μεταδιδῳς you give a share σιτου of the food οὑπερ which αυτος εχεις yourself have.' Τον κυνα ουν that the dog then ακουσαντα hearing this ειπειν said, 'Ναι yes νη Δια by Jupiter: εγω γαρ for I ειμι am ὁ και σωζων he who also keeps ὑμας αυτας yourselves ὡστε so that μητε κλεπτεσθαι you are neither stolen ὑπ' ανθρωπων by men μητε ἁρπαζεσθαι nor carried away ὑπο λυκων by wolves, επει since, ει if εγω I μη προφυλαττοιμι ὑμας did not guard you beforehand, ὑμεις γε you ουδ' αν δυναισθε would not be able even νεμεσθαι to graze, φοβουμενοι fearing μη lest απολησθε you perish.' Οὑτω δη so then λεγεται it is said και τα προβατα that the sheep also συγχωρησαι agreed τον κυνα that the dog προτιμασθαι should be especially honoured. Και συ ουν you also then λεγε say εκειναις to those women ὁτι that ει you are αντι κυνος in place of the dog φυλαξ their guard και επιμελητης and protector, και and ζωσι [that] they live δια σε on account of you ουδε αδικουμεναι not wronged even ὑφ' ἑνος by an individual, εργα-

ξομεναι working ασφαλως τε both safely και ἡδεως and pleasantly."

[VIII. Ἰδων δε but seeing ποτε once αλλον αρχαιον ἑταιρον another old comrade δια χρονου after an interval εφη he said, "Ποθεν whence φαινει do you appear, Ευθηρε Eutherus?" "Ὑπο μεν την καταλυσιν just after the end του πολεμου of the war, (εφη said he,) εκ της αποδημιας [I came] from absence abroad, νυνι μεντοι now however αυτοθεν [I come] from near here. Επειδη γαρ for since αφῃρεθην μεν I was deprived of τα κτηματα my possessions εν τῃ ὑπερορια in the land beyond the borders, ὁ δε πατηρ and my father κατελιπε μοι has left me ουδεν nothing εν τῃ Αττικῃ in Attica, αναγκαζομαι I am compelled νυν now επιδημησας stopping at home πορι-ζεσθαι to procure τα επιτηδεια necessaries εργαζομενος working τῳ σωματι with my body; τουτο δε and this δοκει seems μοι to me ειναι to be κρειττον better η than δεισθαι to beg τινος ανθρωπων of any man, αλλως τε και especially εχοντα having ουδεν nothing εφ' ὁτῳ on which δανειζοιμην αν I can raise a loan."

2. "Και ποσον χρονον and for how long time, (εφη said he,) οιει do you think το σωμα that your body ειναι αν would be ἱκανον able εργαζεσθαι σοι to earn you μισθου for hire τα επιτηδεια the necessaries of life?" "Μα τον Δια by Jove, (εφη said he,) ου πολυν χρονον no long time." Και μην and then, (εφη said he,) ὁταν γε when γενῃ you become

πρεσβυτερος older, δηλον it is clear ὁτι that δεησει μεν there will be need δαπανης of money to spend, ουδεις δε and no one εθελησει will be willing διδοναι σοι to give you μισθον hire των εργων του σωματος for your bodily labours." "Λεγεις you say αληθη the truth," εφη said he. 3. "Ουκουν εστιν is it not then, (εφη said he,) κρειττον better επιτιθεσθαι to set yourself αυτοθεν at once τοις τοιουτοις των εργων to such tasks ἁ which και also επαρκεσει will suffice [for you] γενομενῳ when you become πρεσβυτερῳ old, και and προσελθοντα approaching τῳ to some one των κεκτημενων of those who possess πλειονα χρηματα a larger property δεομενῳ who is in want του of some one συνεπιμελησομενου who will help him in his cares, επιστατουντα τε and taking the superintendence εργων of his works και and συγκομιζοντα helping to gather καρπους his fruits και and συμφυλαττοντα helping to protect την ουσιαν his substance, ωφελουντα whilst thus benefitting him αντωφελεισθαι to be benefitted in return?" 4. "Εγω I, ω Σωκρατες Socrates, (εφη said he) χαλεπως with difficulty ὑπομειναιμι αν could endure δουλειαν servitude." "Και μην and yet οἱ γε προστατευοντες those who take the lead εν ταις πολεσιν in cities και and επιμελομενοι who have the charge των δημοσιων of the affairs of the people ου νομιζονται are not thought δουλοπρεπεστεροι more slavish ἑνεκα τουτου on this account, αλλα but ελευθεριωτε-

ροι more free." 5. "Ὅλως in short, (εφη said he,) ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, ου πανυ προσιεμαι I do not at all desire το ειναι ὑπαιτιον being responsible τινι to any man." "Και μην and yet, Ευθηρε Eutherus, (εφη said he,) ουκ εστιν it is not πανυ γε ῥᾳδιον at all easy εὑρειν to find εργον a work εφ' ᾧ in which τις a man ουκ αν εχοι might not have αιτιαν responsibility. Χαλεπον γαρ for it is difficult ποιησαι to do τι any thing οὑτω so ὡστε as μηδεν ἁμαρτειν not to make any mistake, χαλεπον δε and it is difficult και also ποιησαντα doing τι any thing αναμαρτητως without an error περιτυχειν to meet with κριτῃ a judge μη αγνωμονι who is not harsh: επει since θαυμαζω I wonder ει if εστι ῥᾳδιον it is easy for you διαγιγνεσθαι to get through it ανεγκλητον without blame και even οἷς [from those] for whom φης you say νυν εργαζεσθαι you are now working.

6. Χρη ουν you ought therefore πειρασθαι to try φευγειν to avoid τους φιλαιτιους those who love to find fault και and διωκειν to follow after τους ευγνωμονας the fair-judging, και and των πραγματων of occupations ὑπομενειν μεν to submit to ὁσα whatever ones δυνασαι you are able ποιειν to do, φυλαττεσθαι δε but to avoid ὁσα whatever ones μη δυνασαι you are not able, ὁ τι δε but whatever πραττῃς αν you take in hand, επιμελεσθαι τουτου to pay attention to this ὡς καλλιστα in the best manner και and προθυμοτατα with the

utmost zeal. *Ουτω γαρ* for so *οιμαι* I think *σε* that you *ειναι αν* would be *ηκιστα* least *εν αιτια* in blame, *μαλιστα δε ευρειν* and most readily find *βοηθειαν* help *τη απορια* for your needs, *ζην δε* and live *ραστα* most easily *και* and *ακινδυνοτατα* with least danger *και* and *διαρκεστατα* most independently *εις το γηρας* to old age.

IX. *Οιδα δε* but I know *αυτον* that he *ποτε* once *και* also *ακουσαντα Κριτωνος* heard Crito [say], *ως χαλεπον* how difficult *ειη* was *ο βιος* life *ανδρι* to a man *βουλομενῳ* who wished *πραττειν* to attend to *τα εαυτου* his own affairs. "*Νυν γαρ* for now," *εφη* said he, "*τινες* some men *αγουσιν εμε* are bringing me *εις δικας* into lawsuits, *ου* not *ὁτι* because *αδικουνται* they are wronged *ὑπ' εμου* by me, *αλλα* but *ὁτι* because *νομιζουσι* they think *με* that I *τελεσαι αν* would pay *αργυριον* money *ἡδιον* more willingly *ἡ* than *εχειν πραγματα* have trouble." 2. *Και ὁ Σωκρατης* and Socrates *εφη* said, "*Ειπε δε μοι* but tell me, *ω Κριτων* oh Crito, *τρεφεις* do you keep *κυνας* dogs, *ἱνα* that *απερυκωσι* they may drive away *τους λυκους* the wolves *σοι* for you *απο των προβατων* from the sheep?" "*Και μαλα* yes indeed," *εφη* said he, "*μαλλον γαρ λυσιτελει* for it is more profitable *μοι* to me *τρεφειν* to keep them *η μη* than not."—*Ουκ αν ουν θρεψαις* would you not then maintain *και ανδρα* a man also *ὁστις* who *εθελοι τε* would both be willing *και*

δυναιτο and be able απερυκειν σου to drive from you τους επιχειρουντας those who try αδικειν δε to wrong you? — 3. "Ἡδεως γ' αν with pleasure would [I]," εφη said he, "ει if μη φοβοιμην I did not fear ὁπως μη lest τραποιτο he should turn επ' αυτον με against myself." "Τι δε but why?" εφη said he, "ουχ ὁρᾳς do you not see ὁτι that εστιν it is πολλῳ ἡδιον much more pleasant ωφελεισθαι to be benefitted χαριζομενον gratifying οἱῳ ανδρι σοι such a man as you η than απεχθομενον becoming hateful to you? Ευ ισθι know well ὁτι that εισι there are ενθαδε here των τοιουτων ανδρων [some] of such men, οἱ who πανυ αν φιλοτιμηθειεν would be very ambitious χρησθαι σοι to have you φιλῳ for their friend."

4. Και and εκ τουτων in consequence of this ανευρισκουσι they find out Αρχεδημον Archedemus, πανυ μεν ἱκανον very able ειπειν τε both to speak και and πραξαι to act, πενητα δε but poor: ου γαρ ην for he was not οἱος such a man as κερδαινειν to make gain απο παντος from every thing, αλλα but φιλοχρηστος τε both a lover of goodness και εφη and he said ειναι that it was ῥᾳστον very easy λαμβανειν to receive [money] απο των συκοφαντων from the sycophants [informers]. Ὁποτε ουν whenever therefore ὁ Κριτων Crito συγκομιζοι gathered in η σιτον either his corn η or ελαιον olive oil η οινον or wine η ερια or wool η or τι αλλο any other των γιγνομενων

of the things produced εν αγρῳ on his farm χρησιμων useful προς τον βιον for subsistence, αφελων selecting [some of it] εδιδου he gave it τουτῳ to him: και and ὁποτε whenever θυοι he sacrificed, εκαλει he used to invite him και and επεμελετο he paid attention to him παντα τα τοιαυτα in all such matters. 5. Ὁ δε Αρχεδημος but Archedemus νομισας thinking τον οικον the house Κριτωνος of Crito αποστροφην a place of refuge οἱ for him μαλα περιειπε αυτον made very much of him. Και ευθυς and immediately ανευρισκει he finds out πολλα μεν αδικηματα many crimes των συκοφαντουντων of those who informed against τον Κριτωνα Criton πολλους δε and many εχθρους who were their enemies: και and προσεκαλειτο he moreover summoned τινα some one αυτων of them εις δικην δημοσιαν to a public trial, εν ᾗ in which εδει it would result αυτον that he κριθηναι should be judged ὁ τι what δει παθειν he must suffer η or αποτισαι pay. 6. Ὁ δε but he συνειδως αυτῳ being conscious to himself of πολλα many και πονηρα and evil deeds εποιει did παντα every thing [he could] ὡστε so as απαλλαγηναι to get rid του Αρχεδημου of Archedemus. Ὁ δε Αρχεδημος but Archedemus ουκ απηλλαττετο did not leave him, ἑως until αφηκε τε he both let alone τον Κριτωνα Criton και and εδωκεν αυτῳ gave him χρηματα money. Επει δε but when ὁ Αρχεδημος Archedemus διεπραξατο had ma-

ged τουτο τε both this και and αλλα τοιαυτα other such things, ηδη τοτε then next, ὡσπερ as ὁταν when νομευς a shepherd ἐχῃ has αγαθον κυνα a good dog, και οἱ αλλοι νομεις the other shepherds also βουλονται wish ἱσταναι to place τας αγελας their herds πλησιον αυτου near him, ἱνα that απολαυωσι they may have the use του κυνος of the dog, οὑτω δη so then και also πολλοι many των φιλων of the friends Κριτωνος of Criton εδεοντο asked him παρεχ to allow και σφισι to them also τον Αρχεδημον Archedemus φυλακα as a guard. 8. Ὁ δε Αρχεδημος but Archedemus ἡδεως with pleasure εχαριζετο gratified τῳ Κριτωνι Criton, και and ουκ ὁτι [it resulted] not that ὁ Κριτων Criton μονος alone ην was εν ἡσυχιᾳ at peace, αλλα but και also οἱ φιλοι αυτου his friends. Ει δε but if τις any one τουτων of those οἱς to whom απηχθετο he was hateful ονειδιζοι αυτῳ reproached him ὡς that ωφελουμενος being benefitted ὑπο Κριτωνος by Criton κολακευοι he flattered αυτον him, "Ποτερον ουν whether then," εφη said ὁ Αρχεδημος Archedemus, "εστιν is it αισχρον disgraceful ευεργετουμενον being benefitted ὑπο χρηστων ανθρωπων by good men και and αντευεργετουντα benefiting them in return ποιεισθαι μεν to make τους τοιουτους such men φιλους your friends, διαφερεσθαι δε and to be at variance τοις πονηροις with bad men, η or αδικειν μεν to do harm to τους καλους the

honourable *και αγαθους* and good *πειρωμενον* trying *ποιεισθαι* to make them *εχθρους* your enemies, *συνεργουντα δε* and cooperating *τοις πονηροις* with the wicked *πειρασθαι* to endeavour *ποιεισθαι* to make them *φιλους* your friends *και* and *χρησθαι* to use *τουτοις* them *αντ' εκεινων* instead of the former?" *Εκ τουτου* from this *Αρχεδημος* Archemedus *ην τε* both was *εἷς* one *των φιλων* of the friends *Κριτωνος* of Criton *και* and *ετιματο* was honoured *ὑπο των αλλων φιλων* by the other friends *Κριτωνος* of Criton.

X. *Οιδα δε* but I know *και* also *αυτον* that he *διαλεχθεντα* discoursed *τοιαδε* to this effect *Διοδωρῳ* with Diodorus *οντι* who was *ἑταιρῳ* his companion. "*Ειπε μοι* tell me, *ω Διοδωρε* oh Diodorus," *εφη* said he, "*αν* if *τις* any one *των οικετων* of your domestics *αποδρᾳ σε* runs away from you, *επιμελει* do you take thought *ὁπως* in order that *ανασωσει* you may get him back?" 2. "[Yes:] (*εφη* said he,) *και παρακαλω* and I call on *αλλους γε* others *νη Δια* by Jupiter, *ανακηρυττων* proclaiming *σωστρα* rewards for the recovery *αυτου* of him." "*Τι γαρ* for how? (*εφη* said he) *εαν* if *τις* any one *των οικετων σοι* of your domestics *καμνῃ* is ill, *επιμελει* do you take care *τουτου* of him *και* and *παρακαλεις* call in *ιατρους* physicians, *ὁπως* that *μη αποθανῃ* he may not die?" "*Σφοδρα γε* by all means," *εφη* said he. "*Ει δε* but if *τις* any one (*εφη* said he) *των γνωριμων* of

those known σοι to you, ων being πολυ much χρησιμωτερος more useful των οικετων than your domestics κινδυνευει runs the risk απολεσθαι of perishing δι' ενδειαν through want, ουκ οιει do you not think ειναι that it is αξιον worth while σοι for you επιμεληθηναι to take care ὁπως that διασωθῃ he may be saved? 3. Και μην and indeed οισθα γε you know ὁτι that Ἑρμογενης Hermogenes ουκ εστιν is not αγνωμων unconscientious, αισχυνοιτο δ' αν but he would be ashamed ει if ωφελουμενος being benefitted ὑπο σου by you μη αντωφελοιη σε he should not benefit you in return. Καιτοι and indeed οιμαι I think το εχειν that to have ὑπηρετην a minister ἑκοντα τε both able και and ευνουν well disposed και and παραμονιμον stedfast και and οντα who is μη μονον not only ἱκανον able ποιειν to do το κελευομενον what is bidden him, αλλα but δυναμενον able και also ειναι to be χρησιμον useful αφ' ἑαυτου of himself και and προνοειν to have forethought και and προβουλευεσθαι to deliberate beforehand, ειναι is ανταξιον an equivalent πολλων οικετων of many domestics. 4. Οἱ μεντοι αγαθοι οικονομοι now good economists φασι say ὁταν that when εξῃ it is in your power πριασθαι to buy μικρου for little το αξιον that which is worth πολλου much δειν you ought τοτε then ωνεισθαι to purchase. Νυν δε but now εστιν it is possible δια τα πραγματα on account of the state of affairs κτησασθαι to obtain φιλους αγαθους

good friends ευωνοτατους most cheap." 5. Και and ὁ Διοδωρος Diodorus εφη said, "Αλλα but λεγεις τε you both speak καλως well, ω Σωκρατες oh Socrates, και and κελευσον bid τον Ἑρμογενη Hermogenes ελθειν come ὡς εμε to me." "Μα Δια by Jove (εφη said he) ουκ εγωγε not I indeed: νομιζω γαρ for I think ουτε neither το καλεσαι that calling εκεινον him ειναι is καλλιον more honourable σοι for you του ελθειν than going αυτον yourself προς εκεινον to him ουτε nor μειζον αγαθον that it is a greater good εκεινῳ to him η than σοι to you το ταυτα that these things πραχθηναι should be done." 6. Οὑτω δη thus then ὁ Διοδωρος Diodorus ᾠχετο went προς τον Ἑρμογενη to Hermogenes, και and ου τελεσας without spending πολυ much εκτησατο he gained φιλον a friend, ὁς who ειχεν had εργον for his work σκοπειν to consider ὁ τι what η λεγων either saying η πραττων or doing ωφελοιη τε he might both benefit και ευφραινοι and please Διοδωρον Diodorus.